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ABSTRACT
PRIMARY CARE AT WHAT PRICE? THE ROLE OF CONSUMER
INFORMATION UNDER QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
Jessica Pickett
Mark V. Pauly
This dissertation exploits cross-sectional variation in social heterogeneity, regula-
tory environment and local amenities to identify the eﬀects of consumer information
on the market for primary care when price and quality are uncertain - including
the impact of additional providers. If patients depend on word-of-mouth to assess
a clinic’s perceived value or doctor’s reputed skill, how do they choose a provider
in the face of ever-expanding options? How do these search costs aﬀect the type of
providers who enter the market and the amount of money they charge? Using unique
data on patient and provider characteristics, local geodemographic indicators, and
corresponding confidence in medical quality, I show that increasing provider density
reduces firm-level demand elasticity and allows higher monopoly prices in rural India.
I also find that social fragmentation combined with lax regulation further exacerbate
rising primary care prices and increase the underlying incidence of illness, contributing
to significant regional variations in overall outpatient expenditures.
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
Arrow (1963) famously observed that nearly all unique features of the medical market
derive from uncertainty surrounding the incidence of disease and eﬃcacy of treatment;
he further noted that nonmarket social forces strongly influence the quantity and
quality of physicians themselves.1 Yet the ensuing health economics literature has
shed little light on the intersection of these defining characteristics and their impact
on consumers’ search for available providers. I posit that diﬀerences in information
networks, provider density and regulatory environments may contribute to regional
variations in the price and utilization of medical care accordingly, especially where
out-of-pocket spending constitutes a substantial proportion of overall expenditures.
This is particularly true for primary care as a quintessential “reputation good” for
which consumers judge subjective quality based on the experience of their peers,
where the market is characterized as much by the search for information to reduce
diagnostic uncertainty as for treatment itself.2
1In a footnote discussing subsidized medical education - and which might equally extend to
occupational licensing, public sector hiring practices and related regulations - Arrow (1963) states:
“Strictly speaking, there are four variables in the market for physicians: price, quality of entering
students, quality of education, and quantity. The basic market forces, demand for medical services
and supply of entering students, determine two relations among the four variables. Hence, if the
nonmarket forces determine the last two, market forces will determine price and quality of entrants.”
Beyond the self-evident relevance for primary care physicians, this has broader implications given
the influence of physician decision making on the health care system writ large (Pauly, 1980).
2Dentists and veterinarians are similar reputation goods; non-medical examples include plumbers,
electricians, mechanics, lawyers and other experts - as well as teachers, or arguably even elected
politicians - who jointly provide a problem’s diagnosis and solution, with limited consumer ability
to verify those services and hence reliance on word-of-mouth recommendations. Doctors are also
frequently classified as “credence goods,” which characterizes the incentives for fraud when qual-
ity is expensive to judge even after purchase, rather than emphasizing consumer’s choice among
diﬀerentiated products in such markets (Darby and Karni, 1973). These complementary concepts
are closely related, if not fully interchangeable. I employ “reputation goods” here for consistency
with earlier work (Satterthwaite, 1979; Pauly and Satterthwaite, 1981; Dranove and Satterthwaite,
1992), especially insofar as the term underscores the word-of-mouth mechanism behind my empirical
approach to social networks.
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A consumer confronts several informational hurdles when seeking medical care for
herself or her child. Her prior assumptions about the health benefits from medical
care may be influenced by exposure to news media, but she largely depends on her
own education to assess whether a given illness merits professional attention and,
if so, upon hearsay from friends and neighbors with similar preferences to identify
trusted providers based on their prior experience. The number of her connections
depends on geographic factors such as local population density and road access as
well as demographic heterogeneity, gender dynamics and migration. These and other
determinants of community coordination and cooperation help mitigate uncertainty
about price and quality.3 However, the more patients are split across many providers
in a given market, the less knowledge those acquaintances have about any one of
them.4 Conversely, existing relationships directly with providers may yield the most
information but also constrain consideration of alternative recommendations.5
To the extent that social fragmentation and provider density thus aﬀect the flow of in-
formation within each patient’s network, these search costs will influence their choice
of provider and the corresponding firm-level demand elasticity.6 Pauly and Satterth-
3Related social capital investments may also provide partial risk protection that aﬀects demand
in the form of low-interest loans or other informal insurance.
4I will show results suggesting that this is true even holding the number of patients per provider
constant.
5While this paper focuses on search eﬃciency as it aﬀects a provider’s acquisition of new patients,
their long-run elasticity of demand is also aﬀected by the probability that their existing patients
become dissatisfied and switch to another provider. Schwartz et al. (2011) find evidence that long-
term relationships between patients and their providers imposes social or psychological costs that
contribute to more expensive, but not necessarily better, dental treatment. In related behavioral
experiments, patients are motivated to preserve relationship harmony at the expense of their own
wellbeing, and are less likely to switch from their own provider even in scenarios where they ob-
jectively recognize that a second opinion would be beneficial. Thus trust itself may raise prices to
the extent provider can exploit it. My empirical analysis tests for this possibility with a specific
indicator for whether a household’s social network includes any doctors or nurses and finds support
for the relationship maintenance hypothesis.
6Social fragmentation actually aﬀects consumer information in two ways. In a single period model,
the primary mechanism of action is the search costs of ascertaining provider recommendations.
In a multi-period model, though, consumers are also likely to update their subjective probability
distribution of expected provider quality based on their previous experiences and repeated searches,
2
waite (1981) previously demonstrated that physicians are constrained by consumer
information under this “increasing monopoly” model, whereby an increased supply of
horizontally diﬀerentiated providers may raise rather than reduces equilibrium price
under monopolistic competition. For the class of reputation goods, more choice may
thus paradoxically lead to higher welfare losses as the consumer’s search for informa-
tion becomes less eﬃcient in a crowded market.
However, Pauly and Satterthwaite’s original analysis requires that average quality
(including but not limited to clinical eﬀectiveness) is constant across regions and
symmetric within each market.7 Relaxing these restrictive assumptions in a general-
ized model permits realistic interpretation of results in more diverse medical settings.
Whereas some people feel they get better health outcomes from a doctor with warm
bedside manners who exhibits personal concern, others prefer a doctor with more
technical training but less empathy or ability to communicate. Likewise, there are
honest, hardworking and thoroughly mediocre providers competing against knowl-
edgeable, skillful doctors who shirk their duties and quit the clinic after tea break;
the latter’s prevalence may be determined by the regulatory environment, but the
whereby social learning should reduce uncertainty regarding those recommendations and increase
overall confidence in their ability to obtain “good” medical treatment that satisfies their idiosyncratic
quality preferences. The theoretical model presented later in this paper focuses on the former and
permits cross-sectional analysis; however, the instrumental variable strategy subsequently employed
will implicitly incorporate the latter eﬀect of social learning on medical confidence as well.
7Satterthwaite (1979) states: “The assumption of symmetry among sellers can now be introduced:
assume that all sellers are of the same average quality. Consistent with quality’s being a subjective
person-specific characteristic, this assumption means that if any two sellers were matched against
each other and randomly selected consumers in the community were asked to select the seller they
preferred, then the consumers would be expected to split half and half between them. Moreover,
to extend the symmetry an additional step, assume that all sellers face identical demand functions.
Finally, assume that all sellers have identical cost functions.[...] Strong assumptions of symmetry are
made above for both sellers and consumers. These assumptions are made to facilitate progress toward
the goal of showing that an increase in the supply of sellers may perversely cause the equilibrium
industry price to rise. Relaxation of one or more of these assumptions, however, would permit
investigating other interesting questions. For example, if all sellers are not of the same average
quality, then under what conditions do those sellers who are, on average, judged by consumers to be
of higher quality charge a higher price than those sellers who are, on average, judged to be of lower
quality?”
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true value of their treatment will depend on whether a patient can figure out how to
see them and get their attention. In a larger sense, then, provider competence reflects
the ability to improve overall wellbeing, given the patient’s own condition and pref-
erences.8 This concept of idiosyncratic quality implicitly underpins the Satterthwaite
(1979) search model: each consumer perceives the quality of their current primary
care provider, but cannot easily ascertain whether others are just as good, cheaper,
easier to see, or less requiring of side payments and favors, etc.9
The following paper extends Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981) with unique data on
household confidence in medical providers to cleanly identify the impact of such un-
certainty as well as the direct eﬀects of local social networks and provider density
on primary care prices.10 The analysis further incorporates several measures of id-
8Providers are horizontally diﬀerentiated by a number of other more specific quality dimensions,
which match equally idiosyncratic consumer preferences. Examples include: logistical convenience
with respect to proximity, waiting time, hours of availability and reliable supplies; language of com-
munication; preexisting social relationships or, conversely, relative anonymity; familiar manners and
a similar background versus hierarchical but authoritative demeanor; years of experienced practice
versus education in recent innovations; gender (where men are often more respected but women
perceived as less threatening); extent of physical exams (especially where modesty is highly prized);
underlying biomedical epistemology (i.e. allopathic, homeopathic, Ayurvedic or faith-based heal-
ing); time devoted to asking questions, listening to patient narratives, explaining the diagnosis and
soothing anxieties versus more eﬃcient, impersonal interaction at the expense of empathy; reassur-
ing optimism versus anticipation and mitigation of worst case scenarios (i.e. subjective probability
distribution and implied risk tolerance); relative emphasis on preventative, curative or palliative
care (i.e. discount rate); conservative or aggressive treatment strategy (e.g. number of prescrip-
tions, or the rate of c-sections among obstetricians); route of administration (e.g. injections, pills,
syrups, suppositories or topical creams); branded pharmaceuticals, generic counterparts or person-
alized formulations compounded on site; facility appearance, size, staﬃng and equipment; referral
networks, admitting privileges or insurance coverage (i.e. contracts); and, ultimately, continuity of
their existing care versus a fresh perspective from someone new. Some of these traits are correlated
with better clinical outcomes and perceived as noisy signals thereof, while others reflect the direct
consumption value from medical care - or, alternately, disutility - above and beyond the health it
produces. There is no obvious reason these should be symmetrically distributed except for empirical
convenience.
9Aside from spatial diﬀerentiation, provider behaviors are assumed intrinsic and hence diﬀerent
in equilibrium. The only choice variables they face are whether to select into the medical sector,
where to locate their practice, and how much to charge their patients.
10The confidence measure reflects several aspects of uncertainty. Most importantly for the model,
confidence incorporates asymmetric household preferences (i.e. consumers with niche tastes are
less likely to be satisfied by a recommended provider); it also reflects variation between households
with respect to knowledge, trust, risk tolerance, and prior beliefs. The latter may be updated
4
iosyncratic quality and controls for selective entry on “vertical” quality under the
prevailing state regulatory environment (permitting distributional diﬀerences rather
than assuming constancy between geographic markets or symmetry across provider
types).11 Indeed, almost all other studies of consumer information in healthcare
consider price and quality in isolation, or focus exclusively on the quantity of care
demanded (Kenkel, 1990). But quality — and uncertainty thereof — drives the ways
patients select and switch between providers: the equilibrium price reflects the latter’s
strategic short-run response and may ultimately influence long-run entry. Compart-
mentalizing informational eﬀects on price, quality, and quantity is both empirically
practical and contextually reasonable given the specificities of the U.S. market struc-
ture, but is a gross simplification in more consumer-driven medical systems. Emerging
markets with limited regulatory oversight or insurance penetration are particularly
susceptible to greater variation in the absence of liability, verifiability and purchasing
power (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). Monopolistic pricing may be further exac-
erbated in such settings, where noise due to provider density compounds uncertainty
about their quality.12
through personal experience and social learning to more accurately reflect the local distribution of
provider quality, as discussed in later sections. (I do not attempt to separately identify a household
risk aversion parameter, which would explain heterogeneous eﬀects of quality uncertainty on the
probability of switching providers, and simply assume risk tolerance is symmetric after controlling
for observable characteristics.)
11Abbott (1953) originally defined vertical quality as “the kind of quality change or comparison
which may properly be described in terms of ’higher’ or ’lower.’ Two things distinguish this kind
[from horizontal quality]: (a) the ’superior’ of any two qualities is considered preferable by virtually
all buyers, and (b) it entails greater cost. Therefore an upward (or downward) vertical change
in quality unaccompanied by a change in price gives the buyer more (or less) for his money than
before. Vertical diﬀerences in quality frequently consist of diﬀerences in the quantity of some desired
ingredient or attribute: the metallic content of an ore, the tensile strength of steel wire, the mileage
in an automobile tire. The simplest kind of vertical variation is a change in the size of the unit.
With vertical diﬀerences it is appropriate to speak of one quality being ’better’ or of higher ’grade’
than another, of ’cheap’ versus ’good’ quality, and of ’improvement’ or ’deterioration’ of quality.” In
addition to hedonic quality adjustments to account for potential vertical diﬀerences in quality (e.g.
training and motivation), I similarly control for individual selection based on illness severity and
other patient characteristics that may also aﬀect demand or input costs.
12Provider density similarly compounds uncertainty concerning provider price. However, quality
5
India is a particularly promising research context given the predominance of informal
institutions and unoﬃcial relationships. Recent research shows that the clinical ef-
fectiveness of primary care in Madhya Pradesh, India, varies significantly by facility
type and corresponds closely with price (Das et al., 2015). This confirms that the
measures of quality observable to patients appear correlated with measures of clinical
eﬀectiveness that may not directly be observable to them, suggesting that they dis-
cern signals of the latter even where average levels are extremely low; it more broadly
implies that consumers rely on information to diﬀerentiate between providers, who set
prices accordingly. To examine these mechanisms, I first derive reduced form hedonic
regressions from a theoretical model of consumer behavior in the market for repu-
tation goods, and then use instrumental variable estimation to validate the model’s
predictions for price and utilization of primary care using nationally representative
household survey data from 2004-2005. (Bajari and Benkard, 2005).13 Finally, I test
for possible adverse selection in provider composition, and explore the implications
for regional variations in outpatient expenditures. Juxtaposing these results from the
Indian health care system with earlier studies from the U.S. oﬀers potential policy
insights into both settings.14
Direct consumer spending remains the leading source of health financing in a majority
of low- and middle-income countries. According to the 2007 World Health Survey, for
is the dominant form of uncertainty under asymmetric information, where prices are more readily
observed even for reputation goods; this is reflected in a model where providers select market entry
and set prices but idiosyncratic quality is fixed.
13As Rosen (1974) points out, the hedonic price function traces out the compensated demand
curve if and only if buyers are identical but sellers diﬀer.
14However, it is important to note that India’s health care system has undergone a number of
major changes in the intervening decade, including rapid expansion of private medical insurance
(particularly in the urban middle class), state-subsidized insurance for the poor, increasing input
subsidies for primary health care centers and maternal health programs, and greater access to the
internet and other sources of consumer information. The extent to which the following results remain
relevant in the same way depends largely on whether the rural context remains largely unchanged.
Alternatively, if these changes have disrupted the equilibrium in rural markets then the direct policy
implications of my estimates are far more limited in scope.
6
example, more than 66% of all health expenditures in India were paid out of pocket,
representing 2.4% of per capita income and driven primarily by pharmaceuticals and
outpatient fees. As India’s economy continues to grow, businesses and policymakers
are increasingly interested in how health care is organized, financed, managed and
delivered there and in other emerging markets. Compared to the U.S., providers face
much more price-sensitive patients and are subject to diﬀerent informational and reg-
ulatory constraints, which diverge substantially from state to state as well as across
market localities. This may contribute to the tremendous regional variation in out-
patient expenditures across India as a whole. Meanwhile, understanding how prices
respond to consumer information more broadly has cost implications for other health
systems (including the U.S., where high deductible insurance contracts increasingly
shift costs back to consumers).
If patients depend on word-of-mouth to assess a clinic’s perceived value or doctor’s
reputed skill, how do they choose a provider in the face of ever-expanding options?
How do these search costs aﬀect the type of providers who enter the market and
the amount of money they charge? These critical questions are rarely explored in the
health economics literature due to the unusual data demands that extend well beyond
insurance claims. In India, the data problem is compounded due to decentralized
purchasing, and the limited administrative data that exists is neither reliable nor
easily accessible. As a result, most health policy makers there operate with very
little understanding of even basic spending levels, let alone the relationships between
patient demand, provider pricing, the quality of licensed government physicians, and
the supply of unqualified rural medical practitioners.15
15The term “rural medical practitioner” (RMP) is used here to denote private unqualified health-
care providers. Throughout, “physicians” will exclusively refer to licensed physicians holding a
Bachelor of Medicine and Surgery (MBBS) degree, almost all of whom have a government appoint-
ment (typically in addition to a private practice). The relationship between the supply of these two
categories is roughly analogous to the diﬀerentiation between medical / nursing assistants versus
7
There are three overarching objectives for this dissertation. First, I will explore the
role of social fragmentation on the probability of switching providers and the cor-
responding market price of primary care in rural India, both through information
search costs and the indirect eﬀects on subjective quality expectations. Second, I
will examine whether search costs associated with increasing provider density further
aﬀect the elasticity of each provider’s demand curve. Finally, I will analyze the im-
plications for regional variations in household utilization and outpatient expenditures
under diﬀerent regulatory environments.
To demonstrate the impact of consumer information on the price of primary care
under quality uncertainty, I exploit plausibly exogenous diﬀerences in state regula-
tory environments, local amenities and social heterogeneity to empirically test the
increasing monopoly model of price formation in the context of rural primary care. I
draw on the 2004-2005 India Human Development Survey (IHDS) dataset to match
treatment prices with patient and provider characteristics, local demographics and
infrastructure, and confidence in medical treatment from a nationally representative
sample of households in 1,503 villages (Desai et al., 2008).16 However, both the den-
sity of providers and uncertainty about their quality are likely to be endogenous. For
identification, I construct an index of confidence in local institutions for each village in
the IHDS sample as a key instrumental variable, alongside perceptions of corruption
in government hospitals for each state drawn from a separate household survey dur-
ing the same period (Transparency International India and Centre for Media Studies,
general practitioners elsewhere. Specialists usually hold an additional post-graduate degree and
are overwhelmingly based in urban clinics or specialty hospitals (generally private, along with a
few prestigious government training hospitals). While the latter comprise an important role in the
overall healthcare labor market, they nevertheless command a negligible proportion of primary care
for rural households. All of these subcategories are included in references to “doctors” or, more fre-
quently, “providers,” the latter of which might be equally applied to non-medical reputation goods
as well and is synonymous with “sellers” described in Satterthwaite (1979).
16Data and related materials are publicly available at http://www.ihds.info.
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2005). The latter follows from the intuition that regulatory institutions, policies and
enforcement lead to corresponding variations in barriers to entry and input costs that
shift the equilibrium quality distribution of providers in each state.17 I also directly
control for an index of state-level health outcomes and public health infrastructure
from the previous decade.18
My preliminary results confirm that the equilibrium price of primary care varies based
on provider density, social fragmentation, and state policy environments.19 I find that
an increase in the number of primary care providers raises prices, plausibly by reduc-
ing search eﬃciency and hence firm-level demand elasticity: the information eﬀects of
additional entrants dominate competitive pressure and allow higher monopoly prices.
Social fragmentation not only imposes additional search costs, but also further exacer-
bates uncertainty about the underlying distribution of provider quality and incidence
of illness, contributing to significant regional variations in overall outpatient expendi-
tures. This may compound regulatory influence on the equilibrium level of provider
quality insofar as poor clinical outcomes increase utilization. If adverse selection
then attracts marginal entrants below average quality – and if households update
their subjective probability distributions accordingly – firm-level demand elasticity
will continue to decline, further raising market prices.20 In the extreme case, this can
17Access to schools and electricity are other measures of local attractiveness that serve as additional
excluded exogenous variables.
18This measure is a component of the Human Development Index constructed by the National
Council for Applied Economic Research from the 1994/1995 IHDS panel, which serves here as a dual
proxy for lagged dependent variables and a continuous alternative to state fixed eﬀects.
19Henceforth, “social fragmentation” empirically refers to a fractionalization index of local hetero-
geneity (e.g. language, religion and caste groups) and measures of cooperation (or coordination)
within those communities as proxies for information networks, i.e. noisy signals of unobserved social
interactions that influence individual choices and economic outcomes, including the use of medical
care.
20Lower information flows in markets with fractionalized networks and high provider density limit
the scope for competing on reputed quality, especially where it is less observable than price (Dra-
nove and Satterthwaite, 1992). Insofar as information also constrains the monitoring capacity of
regulatory institutions, low quality providers also face lower risks of liability in those markets. In
the long run, this could even potentially erode the quality of medical education in those regions.
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result in a quality death spiral where the market for health collapses into a lemons
market for expensive, ineﬀective counterfeits (Akerlof, 1970).21
This paper has potentially important implications for assessing current policy pro-
posals in India and elsewhere, even accounting for subsequent changes in supply and
information institutions since the time of this survey.22 Most notably, consumer infor-
mation and quality assurance interventions may improve welfare more than the input
subsidies or outpatient insurance programs widely touted by the government. Indeed,
these findings suggest that the eﬀectiveness of programs intended to expand access
to medical care by increasing supply may be mitigated by corresponding reductions
in consumer information, undermining the success of such policy interventions and
possibly raising prices further.23 The predictions are also consistent with high outpa-
tient spending but low variance across households that would constrain demand for
insurance (Pauly et al., 2009), particularly in regions with poor regulatory oversight.
To the extent that demand is inelastic, providers will capture surplus from subsidies
anyway, which could plausibly increase household medical expenditures without im-
proving health. Instead, initiatives providing information on health status and the
quality of available providers may lower prices by directly reducing uncertainty and
indirectly selecting for better clinical performance.24
The analysis also contributes to understanding how social networks impact health,
21The state of Bihar has a particularly notorious reputation in this regard. Bester (1998) predicts
such corner solutions where consumers are uncertain about vertical quality characteristics, leading to
an equilibrium of “minimum diﬀerentiation” characterized by spatial clustering. He argues that the
incentives for clustering depend on the repeat purchase eﬀect; however, the latter is itself endogenous
in a search model insofar as increasing provider density raises search costs and reduces the probability
of switching. Hence quality uncertainty and provider density are jointly determined.
22See footnote 14.
23Future research will employ a subsequent panel wave to assess the implication that such subsidies
could have plausibly backfired.
24The expected eﬀects of information campaigns are consistent with studies of physician report
cards (Epstein, 2010) as well as more recent community score card experiments in low-income settings
(Svensson et al., 2014).
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where one under-explored pathway may be the eﬀect of improved consumer informa-
tion on demand for health inputs (including potential impacts on medical expendi-
tures and outcomes via preventive behaviors, treatment quantity, or price markups).
Finally, this model may extend to other reputation goods, including complementary
human capital investments such as primary education.25
25Primary education plausibly meets the criteria for a reputation good in rural India and other
settings characterized by high rates of illiteracy and innumeracy, where low regulatory oversight
contributes to a proliferation of private schools competing with free public alternatives across all
market segments. However, mistaken attribution is less prevalent relative to the health sector:
schools may not lead to much learning, but at least that learning can be definitively traced to
education. In contrast, medical providers may be incorrectly credited for spontaneous recovery from
self-limited illness, resulting in noisier observations of clinical outcomes that contributes to overall
consumer uncertainty. Work in progress will assess the magnitude of these sectoral diﬀerences.
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CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE
This paper connects literature across several subfields for a unified model of social
learning when price and quality are uncertain. Theoretical and empirical studies of
technology diﬀusion, demand for medical care, quality uncertainty, network eﬀects
and social capital have shed light on explanations for apparent paradoxes in the
primary care market, both in general and in India specifically.
The largest debt is owed to Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981), as previously discussed,
who found that additional primary care providers raise prices by reducing consumer
search eﬃciency under an “increasing monopoly” model of competition. This disserta-
tion closely follows their empirical strategy, building upon the underlying theoretical
model of price responses to the formation and diﬀusion of a seller’s reputation within
social networks (Satterthwaite, 1979). They show that a higher number of physicians
lowers the ratio of contacts per provider, and therefore increases search costs as social
interactions yield reliable information about fewer providers. Proxy measures of net-
work strength empirically validate this mechanism as an explanation for the increase
in prices attributable to the number of primary care providers in each market, reject-
ing the target income hypothesis of provider behavior. Although this paper is the first
to directly replicate their approach, most health economists accept their conclusion
— that price is increasing in provider density due to associated search costs — in con-
texts where patients bear the cost of care (Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000), albeit
not for surgeons or hospitals and with some critiques of the search model’s assump-
tions (Phelps, 1986). The larger debate over the extent of supplier induced demand
remains unresolved, though, and would also explain the widely observed correlation
between physician-population ratio and price in a wide range of settings (Carlsen and
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Grytten, 1998).26
Other papers have approached related questions in low-income countries using a va-
riety of methods. Leonard (2007) studies the diﬀusion of information about new
providers through social networks in Tanzania, including direct evidence on the
degree to which households recall the experience of neighboring patients (Leonard
et al., 2009). A related experiment exploits the Hawthorne eﬀect to demonstrate that
these reputations correlate with objective measures of clinical eﬀectiveness (Leonard,
2008).27 These studies support the argument that patient satisfaction and perceived
provider quality reflect accurate beliefs about clinical eﬀectiveness formed through
social learning. Kohler et al. (2007) document similar eﬀects of social networks on
subjective expectations of health risks.
In India, research on information diﬀusion has more commonly focused on the agri-
cultural sector rather than health. Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) first studied social
learning as applied to human capital investments and technology adoption during
the Green Revolution, which Munshi (2004) subsequently found was constrained by
population heterogeneity. Luke and Munshi (2007) is an exception in its exploration
of the role of caste aﬃliation on household investments in child health.28
26Fuchs (1978) was among the first to estimate the positive correlation between the supply of
surgeons and their fees, and provides an early discussion of the endogeneity of provider location
decisions. His observation that supply is partly determined by factors unrelated to demand, and
specifically by the attractiveness of the area as a place to live, is the basis for my identification
strategy.
27The formation of provider reputation is related to the ongoing debate over whether patients’ care
experience (“satisfaction”) correlates with clinical eﬀectiveness more generally, and how providers and
policymakers should respond to such surveys as a quality indicators in the U.S. (Price et al., 2014;
Anhang Price et al., 2014). Regardless of whether patient experience is an accurate proxy for actual
health outcomes, though, it directly and indisputably informs consumer behavior and hence price.
However, recent behavioral lab experiments suggest that higher price itself may increase perceived
therapeutic benefits for even placebo interventions, raising concerns about reverse causality whereby
price does not just signal quality but actively creates it (Shiv et al., 2005; Waber et al., 2008).
28In addition to the eﬀects on information, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) demonstrates that
caste networks and rural-urban migration are also widely used as competing sources of informal
insurance.
13
Group aﬃliations and related interactions have similar eﬀects in the U.S.29 For ex-
ample, Blavin (2011) examines impact of contact availability and information quality
on Medicaid enrollment within geographically-defined aﬃnity groups, finding a sub-
stantial multiplier eﬀect of high take-up groups. His work extends Bertrand et al.
(2000), which develops a metric of contact availability to explain suboptimal uptake
of welfare programs more generally. In the private market, Sorensen (2006) exam-
ines peer recommendations as a determinant in health plan choice, following from
Manski (2000). Dafny and Dranove (2008) investigates whether health plan report
cards meaningfully increase information relative to such market-based learning, and
show that the latter eﬀect dominates; moreover, they find consumers are especially
sensitive to both information channels when there is greater variance in HMO qual-
ity. This relates to a growing literature on the intersection of consumer information,
physician behavior and demand for care, especially in the context of inpatient sur-
gical procedures (David M. Cutler, 2004; Epstein, 2010; Kolstad, 2013).30 There is
also a substantial literature on peer eﬀects and group size with respect to information
diﬀusion among physicians as well, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Ultimately, though, consumer behavior is presumably driven more by the content and
reliability of information received than by its channel of communication. A number of
articles thus attempt to understand how consumers respond to provider quality – and
vice versa. In this regard, Dardanoni and Wagstaﬀ (1990) were particularly influential
in their theoretical approach to incorporating uncertainty surrounding the incidence
of illness and eﬀectiveness of medical care into a Grossman (1972) model of health as
human capital to demonstrate the conditions under which it should increase demand.
29Here, I focus primarily on the health care sector. For a broader discussion of the “strength of
weak ties,” refer to Granovetter (1973).
30Preliminary experiments with community score cards have similarly improved health outcomes
under very diﬀerent conditions in Uganda (Svensson et al., 2014).
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Bester (1998) models how quality uncertainty leads sellers of experience goods to
minimize horizontal diﬀerentiation when repeat purchase eﬀects are weak, resulting
in spatial clustering. Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992) similarly revisit the general
welfare predictions of consumer information when quality and price are imperfectly
observable, predicting that increased price transparency could lead providers to trade
oﬀ clinical eﬀectiveness in the long run. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) take this
further, finding that the dominant strategy for experts facing low-quality competi-
tion for credence goods is to reduce their own diagnostic eﬀort.31 This contrasts with
Bennett and Yin (2014), who empirically observe that higher quality entrants reduce
price and improve drug quality among incumbent pharmacies.32 Meanwhile, Björk-
man Nyqvist et al. (2012) more explicitly link consumer information about health
status to subjective probability assessments of antimalarial quality, which they find
mediates the supply response to price-quality competition from new pharmaceutical
distributors.
Most recently, Godlonton and Okeke (2016) found that a ban on informal providers
in Malawi was eﬀective at increasing the rate of delivery by government physicians,
but without any corresponding improvements in health outcomes. This suggests that
the presence of rural medical practitioners may emerge from low-quality public al-
ternatives rather than vice versa, and is consistent with similar studies of maternal
incentives schemes in India (Powell-Jackson et al., 2015). Indeed, rural Indian house-
holds are widely perceived to frequent unqualified medical practitioners over licensed
31Applying the general conclusions of Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) specifically to health care
points to an equilibrium characterized by a substantial degree of overcharging (including price dis-
crimination), over-treatment for short-term infections (especially where medicine and tests are in-
cluded in cost), and under-diagnosis of chronic conditions (due to qualifications in the private sector
and eﬀort in the public sector).
32Insofar as Bennett and Yin (2014) focuses on expanding a major existing chain, the results may
be partially explained by reputational eﬀects (both for quality and consistency) rather than solely
relying on economies of scale in procurement and subsequent competition on quality.
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government physicians. As a whole, the health services literature in that setting is
dominated by discrete choice models based on the perceived dichotomy between pub-
lic and private providers, if the latter are considered at all.33 Powell-Jackson et al.
(2013) measure “structural quality” of infrastructure and inputs for primary health
centers in the public sector and identify substantial regional variations attributable
to management practices. Gupta and Dasgupta (2002) previously calculated arc elas-
ticities of demand for outpatient care ranging from 0.000015 (among the wealthiest
quintile for 1-20 rupee costs at private qualified providers) to 0.026 (for poorest pa-
tients paying 502-1000 rupees in the public sector).34 Das et al. (2015) is the first
study to comprehensively map the full range of providers within a particular mar-
ket, assess their level of knowledge with vignettes, audit their clinical practice using
standardized patients, and analyze the relationship to price. They find that price is
positively correlated with clinical eﬀectiveness, which was dismally low on average
across both public and private providers; the only exception was public physicians
in their own private practice, who performed at a much higher level than the same
individuals during their government shift.
Finally, this dissertation engages with the political economy literature on socioeco-
nomic status and network fractionalization in the context of public goods provision
and the incidence of illness. Alesina et al. (1999) studied the impact of ethnic frac-
tionalization as a determinant of public goods provision across U.S. cities; Alesina
et al. (2003) extended that analysis to estimate the degree of ethnic, linguistic and
religious fractionalization for each country and its impact on institutional quality and
economic growth. Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) builds on their work to explore
33I will later argue that the distinction between public versus private providers is non-trivial, but
nonetheless a red herring that obscures the larger story of consumer information and regional quality
variation.
34Gupta and Dasgupta (2002) imputed prices from 1994/1995 wave of the India Human Develop-
ment Survey, i.e. data taken a decade earlier from the same population as my own study sample.
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the specific role that social heterogeneity plays in the Indian context by constructing
a more precise fractionalization index based on local caste aﬃliations (adopted here)
and find extremely high levels of social fragmentation, which they contrast with an
alternate model of bureaucratic incentives (Wade, 1982). While many other stud-
ies have subsequently deployed social heterogeneity in relation to government service
delivery, this dissertation is the first to examine whether the same patterns of infor-
mation exchange and coordination that allow communities to exert political demands
might similarly facilitate collective purchasing power in the private market for medical
care. This hypothesized mechanism might partially explain the previously observed
relationship between social capital and health outcomes (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004;
Laporte, 2014; Ciccone et al., 2014).
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CHAPTER 3 : THEORY
Model
Satterthwaite (1979) first developed a theory of information search for reputation
goods in a monopolistically competitive industry. Primary medical care is a partic-
ularly appropriate market for empirical tests of this theory insofar as each physician
delivers a diﬀerentiated combination of place, competence and prescription patterns,
which consumers discern through recommendations from their social network (Pauly
and Satterthwaite, 1981).35 Moreover, every person subjectively assesses the qual-
ity of each provider relative to their specific preferences, resulting in market power
relative to more eﬃcient markets (i.e. downward-sloping demand). Prices are conse-
quently set somewhere between the competitive price and the monopoly price; I argue
here that the magnitude of that mark up depends largely on social determinants of
consumer information, and will increase as additional entrants reduce the ratio of
signal to noise.
Specifically, I assume that each medical provider j possess a fixed vector of intrinsic
attributes Kj, with a finite number of possible combinations that characterize dif-
ferent provider types.36 The quantity of provider type k in a given health system is
exogenously determined by nonmarket social and regulatory factors (e.g. education,
occupational licensing and other barriers to entry). The quality of provider type
k is specific to each consumer according to their idiosyncratic preferences over the
set of possible attributes, and is correlated with observable sociodemographic factors.
35Unlike Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981), I do not explicitly address the target income hypothesis
as a competing model and instead take as a given that providers are profit maximizers.
36Although the vector of idiosyncratic attributes may be quite large, they may correlate with
observable institutional status (e.g. public hospital versus private clinic).
18
Provider j will locate in geographic markets based on a combination of personal tastes
(e.g. local amenities) and profit motive (e.g. where input prices are low and consumer
preferences are favorable) and set prices accordingly. Relative market power may vary
between provider type in proportion to scarcity rents, which are captured in hedonic
quality adjustments.37
Consumers are risk averse and price sensitive but only imperfectly observe providers’
relative price and qualifications.38 The model predicts that as the number of providers
in a geographic market increases, consumers will face costlier and/or noisier informa-
tion searches within their social network; as a result, consumers become less price
sensitive (i.e. each physician’s demand curve becomes less elastic). This may cause
equilibrium prices to rise as well as the quantity.
Health outcomes from medical treatment
Under the increasing monopoly model, aggregate consumer characteristics constrain
providers’ market power to set prices; however, each individual consumer acts as an
independent price taker. In the absence of bargaining, demand can be modeled in
terms of health status, expected medical benefits, the shadow price of health, and
uncertainty around the above.
37Although I relax the assumption of strict symmetry from Satterthwaite (1979), my adapted
model includes several of their other simplifying assumptions for comparability to yield predictions
that are testable with cross-sectional data. My most restrictive assumption is that the relative
distribution of provider types within a given state corresponds to regional variations in consumer
preferences (or rather, observed characteristics) so that each provider type is characterized by a
constant coeﬃcient of relative market power reflected in the hedonic quality adjustment. I also
assume that the fixed costs of entry are identical within each state but may vary between them.
Thus even if a majority of all consumers prefer licensed physicians from Kerala, the supply thereof
may be higher in Kerala itself than in Uttar Pradesh in due to regional and regulatory incentives.
The theoretical model is concerned with a single regulatory environment, and the empirical analysis
will control for diﬀerences across them.
38Health insurance typically covers a lower proportion of primary care oﬃce visits relative to other
medical services. Moreover, overall insurance rates are negligible (3%) in this particular research
setting.
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According to the Grossman (1972; 2000) model of demand for medical care, indi-
viduals are initially endowed with health stock Ho that evolves according to Ht+1 =
f (Qkt)   tHt, where Qkt represents the quantity of medical inputs of type k in time
t, f (Qkt) is the corresponding health production function, and  t is the depreciation
rate from age and chronic disease. I adapt this conventional model to account for
the the important role of socioeconomic factors and infectious disease, both of which
are major determinants of primary medical spending in low-income settings. Here,
individuals exhibit symptoms of short-term illness with probability ↵t as a stochastic
function of socioeconomic and epidemiological risk factors. These morbidity shocks
depreciate health according to the revised equation:39
Ht+1 = ↵t [f (Qkt)   tHt] + (1  ↵t)Ht (3.1)
This distinguishes quantity of treatment (Qkt) from preventive investments such as
vaccines or promotive behaviors that reduce the incidence (0  ↵t  1) and severity
(0   t  1) of illness, where function f (Qk) dictates the amount of health produced
by provider j from quantity Q using inputs k. Put diﬀerently, incremental health
improvement M H¯ is thus produced by vector of medical inputs K given  it and other
characteristics of patient i.
When the parameter ↵t is exogenous, demand for curative primary care derives from
demand for health to maximize lifetime patient utility U = f (C, H, k) = f(C, Qk),
where C is non-medical consumption and health H is itself both a consumption good
as well as a human capital investment.40 A pure investment model of medical care
39The subsequent empirical analysis primarily focuses on the bracketed portion of the equation,
and allows severity  t to vary with patient characteristics rather than assuming a constant rate of
depreciation.
40I will subsequently revisit the assumption of illness probability ↵t and severity  t with respect
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would presume that household i’s idiosyncratic preferences derive solely from their
subjective beliefs about the underlying health production function. However, medical
inputs k may also directly aﬀect utility above and beyond their signaling value.
Restricting the model to short-term illness primarily focuses on the consumption value
of health, and is subject to the simplified budget constraint where lifetime income
Y = C   pQk accordingly.
Demand for provider services
Medical care Q is a reputation good where a population of N consumer households
choose amongM competing providers within a given geographic market area g. Each
household selects a primary care provider jkg with a constant ratio k¯ of health produc-
tion factors for all relative prices, including latent ability, knowledge and diagnostic
eﬀort as well as medical technology, infrastructure, etc. In equilibrium, price and
vertical quality (e.g. clinical eﬀectiveness) in market g are identical for all providers
of type k, which denotes the vector of quality attributes observable to a provider’s
patients that correspond to their incentives and cost structure.41 In addition to choos-
ing between provider types k based on beliefs about the underlying health production
function, households may also sort based on idiosyncratic preferences for convenience,
kinship, bedside manner or other “matching” variables of individual provider j, which
are assumed symmetric within each market.42 Thus N tj represents provider jk’s house-
to clinical eﬀectiveness and community characteristics.
41Examples of the nine diﬀerent provider types observable in my data include: public hospitals,
primary health clinics, community health centers, sub-centers, family planning centers, private hos-
pitals, private clinics, private doctors, or traditional healers. These types are often aggregated into
the binary categories of public or private.
42Depending on their discount rate and risk tolerance, households may also variously prefer
providers of palliative remedies that are not clinically indicated for the underlying condition but
may temporarily relieve symptoms (e.g. allergy medication for asthma), or even unnecessary or
harmful treatments with potential long-term side eﬀects (e.g. antibiotics or steroids) to hedge
against misdiagnosis.
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hold panel in period t, where
PM
j=1N
t
j = N .
Provider visits are a function of their household panel N tj multiplied by the proba-
bility v (pj, p¯j) that each household visits during period t as a decreasing function of
own price pj and increasing with respect to the price of competing providers p¯j. In
equilibrium, all providers jkg set identical prices and quantity of care such that
Q (pj) = v (pj)Ni (pj) (3.2)
Households periodically reevaluate their selected provider; if dissatisfied, they switch
to another provider with probability s (pj, p¯j) as an increasing function of pj and
decreasing function of p¯j.43 In equilibrium, each provider acquires new patients with
probability ! (pj, p¯j) at the same rate they lose patients switching to other providers.
Each provider’s long-run price elasticity of demand is thus comprised of the respective
elasticities of visit rate, acquisition and switching:
ejQ ⇡ ejv + ej!   ejs + e⇠js (3.3)
Search eﬃciency & price elasticity of demand
Within each market, quality is assumed identical for all providers jkg; however, the
nature of health as a reputation good means that households are uncertain of the
existence and attributes of alternative providers p¯j. Consumers must first search for
information before switching providers, relying on the “strength of weak ties” in their
community to reduce market uncertainty (Granovetter, 1973).
43A risk aversion parameter also enters the functions for visit frequency v and switching probability
s, which is presumed CRRA and symmetric across households after accounting for observable patient
characteristics.
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Search eﬃciency primarily aﬀects provider elasticities via the acquisition rate:
! (pj, D) = Pr
 
Aij|D
 
Pr
 
Bij|Aij, pj, D
  ⌘ g (D)h (pj, D) (3.4)
Where Aij is the event that provider j is recommended and Bij is the event that i
selects j.
D represents an index of i’s information search costs and is determined by the share
of population Ng in i’s social network spread across Mg providers with quality  ¯g
in equilibrium. Insofar as observations of provider price and reputation evolve via
repeated queries and peer recommendations, information is exchanged more eﬃciently
between contacts within existing kinship networks or aﬃnity groups.
The price elasticity of acquisition is given by:
ej! =
pj!0 (pj)
! (pj)
=
pjhp (pj, D)
h (pj, D)
(3.5)
Partial diﬀerentiation yields the eﬀects of search eﬃciency on elasticity:
@ej!
@D
= pj
(
h (pj)hpD (pj, D)  hp (pj, D)hD (pj, D)
[h (pj, D)]
2
)
(3.6)
Incorporating quality uncertainty
Quality expectations plays a central role in the probability of acquiring new con-
sumers. When undertaking the search for a provider, household i evaluates their
utility
uij =  
i
j    pj (3.7)
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where  ij is perceived quality based on observable characteristics of provider jkg and  
is a parameter weighting the importance of price relative to those quality attributes.44
Each household’s beliefs about provider quality in their market are denoted by their
subjective probability distribution z( o), which represents the level of uncertainty
regarding the search outcomes.45
Under a sequential search model, households set a reservation price-quality level u⇤
and will continue to seek peer recommendations until identifying a provider where
uij   u⇤. Hence the probability that the household selects provider j conditional upon
recommendation is given by:
Pr
 
Bij|Aij, pj, D
  ⌘ h (pj, D) = 1  F (u⇤ +  pj) (3.8)
Substituting this back into the price elasticity equation for ! (pj) yields
ej! =  
 pjF 0 (u⇤ +  pj)
1  F (u⇤ +  pj) (3.9)
where F 0 is the probability density function implied by F . In turn, diﬀerentiating
with respect to search costs:
@ej!
@D
=   pj {1  F (u
⇤ +  pj)}F 00 (u⇤ +  pj) + {F 0 (u⇤ +  pj)}2
{1  F (u⇤ +  pj)}2
@u⇤
@D
(3.10)
As search costs D increase according to the distribution F, a household’s minimum
44The weighting parameter   may implicitly incorporate household risk aversion.
45Confirmation bias could result in reverse causality, if paying higher prices could lead patients to
subjectively assess quality to be higher (especially in the case of credence goods); conversely, high-
cost providers may be held to a higher implied standard (e.g. “value”). For theoretical simplicity,
I assume that the assessments of price and quality are separable but empirically mitigate possible
endogeneity using instrumental variables.
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acceptable price-quality level u⇤ also decreases (@u⇤/@D < 0). Satterthwaite (1979)
solves this equation for a range of possible functions F and finds @ej!/@D > 0 under
all plausible distributions, i.e. demand becomes less elastic as search costs rise.
Geographic variation in regulatory environment
Quality assurance is one of the key roles played by regulatory institutions. Moreover,
many states have implemented health reforms that subsidize certain medical inputs.
The regulatory environment hence mediates the relationship between search costs
D and a household’s reservation price-quality level u⇤ by shifting the probability
distribution of expected provider quality F
 
 ij
 
= F ( ¯kg) = F (u¯kg +  p¯kg) through
a combination of occupational licensing as well as subsidized input prices Wkg, which
ultimately determine the equilibrium mix of k provider types in market g and their
corresponding price-quality combination (p¯kg,  ¯kg).46 Regulatory diﬀerences thus also
aﬀects consumer assessment u¯kg as well as variation   across Mg providers.47
The result is that recommended provider jkg is less likely to exceed household i’s
reservation price-quality level u⇤ as u¯kg decreases and/or   increases (i.e. second-
order stochastically dominating shift in F ). Thus markets characterized by low qual-
ity increase the expected number of inquiries and overall search costs to acquire a
satisfactory provider, reducing household i’s incentive to switch or even inquire in the
first place.48
46For simplicity, each individual provider j has a constant factor ratio of K medical inputs that
is fixed in the short-run and identical for all providers similarly indexed by facility type k. Hence
the variation in vertical quality (e.g. clinical eﬀectiveness) is predominately due to long-run market
entry and persistent productivity diﬀerences due to factor input prices.
47This relationship holds even if the correlation between household perception and actual provider
attributes is noisy or if risk averse households implicitly incorporate   into certainty-equivalent
assessments.
48In other words, Dg is endogenous with respect to average quality  ¯kg for any fixed distribution
F .
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At the same time, decreasing average quality may simultaneously increase overall
demand for medical care reflected in the visit function v (pj) if households exhibit
constant relative risk aversion CRRA and the shadow price elasticity of health is less
than unity.49
Eﬀect of additional providers
Local search costs Dg increase with information incompleteness due to depreciating
recall or discounting second-hand information.50 At time t, household i has knowledge
vector ✓t of ui assessments for Mg   1 providers other than their own, where ✓tj = 0
represents no awareness of provider j and increases with information gleaned from
their social network (e.g. greater precision around provider j’s constant input ratio
k¯).51 As Mg increases, the probability that a given contact currently patronizes
provider j decreases. Similarly, the probability that ✓tj exceeds a reliability threshold
⌘ to recommend provider j based on hearsay also decreases.52 This means that each
query yields reputational information on fewer providers as Mg increases, implying
that @D/@M > 0 and @u⇤/@M < 0.53
49For example, consumers in states with lower average quality may require more medical care
required to reach the same level of health (Dardanoni and Wagstaﬀ, 1990). This could be vari-
ously interpreted as an increase in overall demand for primary care visits, decreased elasticity for
marginally eﬀective treatments, or decreased willingness to switch providers.
50See Satterthwaite (1979) for a full Markov chain analysis.
51From an empirical perspective, the probability Aij that provider j is recommended to consumer
i is a binary indicator for the latent variable ✓tj .
52Denser social networks diﬀuse both signals and noise, with ambiguous implications for uncer-
tainty. For simplicity, I assume that the parameter ⌘ is invariant and suﬃciently high such that
z( j) maintains a constant degree of accuracy relative to quality  ¯kg. Related assumptions are
that prices pj are observed with greater precision than medical inputs Qk; outcomes are imperfectly
inferred for each price-quality combination based on information flows; and that consumers use this
data to discern the implicit shadow price of health based on their subjective beliefs about productive
eﬃciency.
53To the extent that socially-transmitted information is such an important force for finding ap-
propriate providers, we might expect otherwise-connected individuals to share information about a
limited set of providers – in which case “markets” are endogenously defined relative to the underlying
group institutions. This is less of a concern for primary care, though, where spatial diﬀerentiation
plays a dominant role in segmenting markets geographically. An equal and opposite concern would
be endogenous network formation dedicate to sharing information about all providers in a given
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Mg may be endogenous if more providers enter the market as u⇤ decreases, which poses
a potential adverse selection problem whereby the marginal providers are dispropor-
tionately drawn from the lower end of the quality distribution such that  j <  ¯.54
Over time, selection for the relative proportion of provider type k would further shift
the subjective probability distribution zt( ¯o) < zt 1( ¯o) as households learn from
the search process and update their priors accordingly.55
Industry equilibrium & price
When thus constrained by consumer information, each medical provider j with fixed
factors of production k chooses price pj to maximize net income:
⇡k (pj, p¯j, Dg, Wkg) = pjQkg (pj, p¯j, Dg)  Ckg [Qkg (pj, p¯j, Dg) , Wkg] (3.11)
market. Indeed, a number of civic associations have arisen for this purpose in rural areas, while the
internet has enabled widespread exchange of information about providers in a number of urban mar-
kets (e.g. Zocdoc, Amino or Practo). My research setting was carefully chosen to emphasize routine
interactions where the assumptions of word-of-mouth exchange and rigid social groups are reason-
able. Conversely, if socially-transmitted reputation is such an important determinant of demand
then providers of a similar type might try to coordinate on high reputation (or collude on price) by
joining group practices, at least in areas with higher provider and patient density. Indeed, we do
see reputation – including of individual physicians – playing a huge role in how private hospitals
are established in urban India, as well as increasing attention to accreditation. These behaviors are
much more limited in the primary care market, though, especially in rural areas, aside from a few
startup franchises and excluding illegal franchises (e.g. where unqualified RMPs work as assistants
to a licensed physician or pay royalties to advertise under the latter’s name and credentials).
54In the absence of market power (i.e. pure competition), adverse selection on vertical quality –
including overall state measures of diagnostic accuracy – should drive the price down, not up. Thus
OLS estimates of provider density should be considered lower bounds which understate the eﬀects
of consumer information on price. In other words, the model’s predictions are biased downwards
(toward zero); consequently, I will use instrumental variables to correct for selection as well as
simultaneity.
55Insofar as learning from others is an inherently dynamic process, there may be multiple equilibria
based on the initial distribution of subjective beliefs in addition to true consumer preferences.
Satterthwaite (1979) abstracted away this theoretical possibility by assuming that consumers do
not update priors due to memory depreciation and other cognitive constraints; the subsequent
empirical strategy in Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981) implicitly incorporates the lasting impact of
social learning on uncertainty in the overall eﬀect of search eﬃciency. The results are in equilibrium
if consumer beliefs are accurate or information becomes obsolete at approximately the same rate
as it is diﬀused, and thus persistent diﬀerences in equilibrium hence emerge from the underlying
variation between markets. Multiple equilibria could similarly emerge from divergent priors due to
the polarizing eﬀects of confirmation bias when quality signals are ambiguous (Baliga et al., 2013).
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where price vector p¯j = (p1, ..., pj 1, pj+1, ..., pM) is charged by otherMg 1 providers
under Cournot competition.56 QuantityQkg (pj, p¯j, D) is demanded from provider jkg
facing costs Ckg (Qkg, Wkg) where Wkg is the vector of input prices and all providers
of type k are assumed identical within market g.57
Diﬀerentiating yields the first order condition
@⇡kg (pj , p¯j , Dg, Wkg)
@pj
= Qkg (e+ 1)  CQQp
=
Qkg (pj , p¯j , Dg)
pj
{pj [1 + e (pj , p¯j , Dg)]  CQ (Q (pj , p¯j , Dg) , Wkg) e (pj , p¯j , Dg)}
= 0 (3.12)
where j’s price elasticity of demand e = (pjQp) /Qkg, marginal cost CQ = @Ckg/@Qkg
and Qp = @Qkg/@pj.
In equilibrium pj = p¯j =  j u¯g  for given inputs of health production factors. Applying
this across multiple provider types, we might interpret the subjective assessment of
government physicians as u¯kg =  ¯kg    p¯kg. Local quality  ¯g = f
 
k¯
 
for the average
capital-labor ratio of medical technology (e.g. drugs and tests) to diagnostic expertise
(e.g. capability, eﬀort and training) in the overall market based on the equilibrium
proportion of government physicians and type of their facilities. State regulatory bar-
riers to entry determine the price-quality level via changes in the relative fixed costs
of entry and corresponding input subsidies for licensed physicians and government
hospitals, i.e. u¯g = h
 
k¯, Wkg
 
.58 Under this scenario, households’ subjective assess-
56Under Cournot behavior, homogenous providers of type k compete on quantity of work hours
and output eﬀort.
57Prices are set relative to marginal cost. Fixed costs (e.g. medical education and other human
capital investments) and associated regulatory barriers to entry (occupational licensing, centrally
planned hiring, etc.) determine the quantity of each provider type k.
58State regulatory barriers include but are not limited to corruption, but h more generally reflects
rents extracted from regulatory capture. The IHDS data is unusual insofar as it contains more
direct observations of subjective quality assessments than actual medical inputs; however, the causal
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ment of rural medical practitioner jg is uj =  j  pj. If government facilities are the
outside option, these private providers must set price so uj   u¯kg = u⇤. Substituting
into previous equations:59
 j    pj    ¯kg    p¯kg = f
 
k¯
    p¯kg ⌘ h  k¯, Wkg  (3.13)
The perceived price-quality level of government medical care thus aﬀects the price of
private alternatives, as does the number of providers. Put more generally, households’
joint valuation of price and quality will be equivalent across all providers in market g;
equilibrium price and quality will each be identical for local providers within a given
type k; and prices will increases while quality decreases as the total number of Mg
providers increases.
According to the preceding demand model, e (pj, u¯kg, Dg) andQ (pj, u¯kg, Mg).60 Sim-
ilarly substituting terms into the first order condition:
f (p, u¯,M,W,D) ⌘ Q (p, u¯,M)
p
{p [1 + e (p, u¯, D)]  CQ [Q (p, u¯,M) ,W ] e (p, u¯, D)} = 0
(3.14)
This implicitly defines a price function p⇤ (u¯,M,W,D) describing the structural rela-
tion between provider price, number of competing providers, perceived quality, input
prices and consumer search costs for a given distribution F ( o):
g [p⇤, u¯,M,W,D] ⌘ p⇤ [1 + e (p⇤, u¯, D)] CQ [Q (p⇤, u¯,M) ,W ] e (p⇤, u¯, D) = 0 (3.15)
mechanism is still relevant for the model.
59If public providers are actually free, then pj   j f(k¯)  . I do not make that restrictive assumption
here.
60Inclusion and exclusion of terms follows from the detailed demand model in section 3 of Sat-
terthwaite (1979). Indices are omitted as well.
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Note that u¯ would be endogenous with W if diﬀerential cost data are available for
each provider type, but is considered exogenous here. Number of providersM should
also be endogenous in a reduced form model.
Comparative statics
Diﬀerentiating the price function p⇤ with respect to each of the parameters yields the
response of equilibrium price with respect to changes in u¯,M,W,D. For example,
under previously established conditions:
p⇤M =  
gM
gp
=
eCQQ   [p⇤   CQ] eD @D@M
[1 + e] + [p⇤   CQ] ep   eCQQQp > 0 (3.16)
The denominator is known to be negative under industry equilibrium, which follows
from the facts that: elasticity e is definitionally negative; p⇤ CQ is positive because
equilibrium price exceeds marginal cost under monopolistic competition; @D/@M > 0
as previously demonstrated; QM is negative as each provider’s share of local demand
decreases; we assume economies of scale @CQ/@Q  0 as providers become more
eﬃcient; and @e/@D > 0 under most plausible assumptions about the distribution F .
Similar exercises predict that the signs of p⇤W and p⇤D are also positive while p⇤u¯ is
negative.
Estimation strategy
I derive reduced form equations based on comparative statics from the preceding
structural model of consumer behavior in the market for reputation goods. I then
use instrumental variable estimation to validate the model’s predictions for primary
care prices and utilization of primary care and explore the implications for regional
variations in outpatient expenditures.
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My dissertation’s primary empirical contribution lies in incorporating subjective prob-
ability distributions of provider quality to relax the restrictive assumptions of market
symmetry in earlier studies (Pauly and Satterthwaite, 1981). This requires data on
patient prices, community demographics, provider input costs and subjective mea-
sures of quality uncertainty. The latter is ideally elicited from estimates of F ( o),
e.g. each household’s level of confidence that the benefits from medical care are greater
than zero. Measuring quality uncertainty captures consumer variation within each
geographic market, whereas search costs from local information networks emphasize
price variation between markets (controlling for state-wise selection by regulatory en-
vironments). If the market were perfectly symmetric all households would be equally
confident in the quality of a random provider, which should have no residual eﬀect on
prices after adjusting for the average level of quality. However, asymmetric consumer
preferences, search costs and relative distribution of provider types create local varia-
tion in household uncertainty that reduces the probability of switching by risk averse
consumers and allows providers to further increase prices.
The previous model can be simplified to a stage game where regulatory barriers af-
fect the number of providers of type k in each market, who then choose work hours
and charge prices according to elasticity of firm-level demand such that marginal cost
equals their marginal revenue: MC = P
 
1 + 1e
 
. Time and other input costs (W ) are
exogenously determined by the regulatory environment (REG), facility characteris-
tics and payment structure, as well as illness severity and other patient characteristics
(X).61 The quantity of work available to each provider in a given market depends on
determinants of per capita demand for services (Y ) and providers per capita (MP ).
The elasticity (e) of each provider’s demand curve depends on consumer information,
including provider density (MD), sociodemographic networks (SOCDEM), and lo-
61The input prices included in W also double as an index for cost of living.
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cal geography (GEO), as well as underlying quality uncertainty among consumers
(QUAL).
I implicitly solve simultaneous equations for price when MP , MD and QUAL are
endogenous as an empirical test of the increasing monopoly model under quality
uncertainty:
P = PIM(QUAL, MP, MD, SOCDEM, GEO, REG, W, X, Y ) (3.17)
The model predicts that the coeﬃcients of QUAL < 0 (increasing certainty-equivalent
value of substitutes);MD and SOCDEM > 0 (decreasing information completeness);
and MP < 0 (reducing each provider’s level of demand).
My IV identification strategy exploits plausibly exogenous variation in local gover-
nance and other amenities that might attract providers to a market independent of
price, alongside the equilibrium price-quality evaluation of government hospitals u¯k
from a separate survey in each state.62 I correct for potential endogeneity in the
incidence of short-term morbidity ↵t and corresponding probability of provider visits
v (pj). I also test for adverse selection in the quality of providers attracted to each
market. Finally, I estimate the impact on households’ overall outpatient expenditures.
62Among other things, the second sample corrects for measurement error in reported confidence
due to subjective reference points and potential cognitive biases.
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CHAPTER 4 : DATA & CONTEXT
Setting
The preceding model generalizes to all markets for reputation goods, including many
health care systems.63 An idealized empirical test would experimentally vary: 1)
the density of local social networks as a determinant of information diﬀusion; 2) the
distribution of providers within each state via assignation or location incentives; and
3) regulatory diﬀerences between states to assess equilibrium eﬀects on provider entry.
To best approximate these conditions using instrumental variables, an observational
study must exhibit several features to rule out potential confounders.
First, consumer information will be most binding in markets characterized by decen-
tralized purchasing power and a significant level of out-of-pocket spending.64 Second,
there should be relatively low penetration of formal information markets such as
advertising, public reporting or expert referrals,65 where instead consumers predom-
inantly obtain information via word-of-mouth. Third, there should be substantial
variation in social heterogeneity across markets and corresponding measures of net-
work fractionalization, as well as data on the quality of a given household’s network
(e.g. socioeconomic status and personal medical connections). Fourth, there should
be similar variation in the density of providers across market, measured by the rel-
ative proportion of each type. Fifth, there must be a proxy for input costs, if not
63This model would not apply to either perfect search goods or “pure” credence goods, where
quality may be easily observed before purchase or, conversely, remains unobserved even after con-
sumption.
64Although primary care visits are generally covered by insurance in the U.S. and Europe, empirical
applications might be considered for veterinary and dental markets that are still predominantly out
of pocket.
65This also includes the absence of dedicated apps and other emerging information exchange
platforms (e.g. ZocDoc or Amino in the US medical market, or Practo in urban India) that may
drive down search costs for reputation goods in some settings.
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the specific illness being treated. Sixth, and most challenging, there must be some
way of assessing the average quality of providers in each market. Finally, there must
be plausibly exogenous instruments for the overall supply of providers and consumer
confidence therein.
Although the analysis has widespread applications, then, identifying an optimal re-
search setting becomes considerably more diﬃcult. Narrowing the focus to primary
medical care, the first two conditions are particularly pervasive in low- and middle-
income countries where information and insurance markets are least developed; how-
ever, detailed data from those countries is typically much more limited. Moreover,
many low- and middle-income countries are currently undergoing major policy re-
forms, which would preclude the estimation of equilibrium eﬀects from cross-sectional
data.
Fortunately, the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) perfectly satisfies these
unusually demanding data requirements, combining medical expenditures and de-
tailed socioeconomic characteristics from a nationally representative household sur-
vey with individual patient data on health status, treatment and costs alongside
corresponding details for a subset of primary care providers and facilities within each
market.66 The research context itself is equally appropriate in light of extremely high
out-of-pocket expenditures as a proportion of household income and total medical
spending (see Figure 4.1)67 alongside a notoriously high degree of quality variation.
Rural India circa 2004-2005 in particular approaches an idealized demand scenario
given the universally low insurance enrollment at that time, especially for outpatient
66An important caveat is that there is limited data on the specific medical inputs used by providers,
so I do not attempt to isolate the deliberate creation of supplier-induced demand – defined as “al-
terations in the quantity or quality of services consumers demand as physicians change the accuracy
of the information they provide in response to economic incentives” (Pauly, 1994).
67Data from a sample of countries in the World Health Survey 2007.
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Figure 4.1: India’s direct consumer health spending in global context
care.68 The increasing monopoly model suggests that additional providers should
have a larger impact in urban areas with greater medical density, where all else being
equal the prices would be higher because no one is using the same doctors and people
are cut oﬀ from their social networks; observing a significant eﬀect in rural markets
oﬀers even stronger support for the theory.69 The average rural village in my ana-
lytic sample is comprised of 802 households (71.5% with electricity and 35.7% with
piped water), with 3.58 primary care providers (58.5% private), as well as 2.03 pri-
vate schools. 52.2% of households last sought care from one of those local providers,
another 24.4% walked to providers in neighboring villages, and the remaining 23.6%
traveled to a larger town or district center. 54.6% have at least one pharmacy located
in their village.
68Coverage rates have since climbed exponentially. For the recent history of medical insurance in
India, see Sen et al. (2014).
69Conversely, null results in a rural setting could not conclusively reject the increasing monopoly
model. The IHDS adopts the oﬃcial census categories, where rural settlements are defined as those
that a) lack any municipality, corporation, cantonment or notified town area, as well as any others
with b) a population below 5,000, more than 25% of male workers in agricultural labor, or population
density below 1,000 per square mile. Such rural areas comprise approximately 70% of the overall
Indian population. Unfortunately, variables related to the number and density of primary care
providers were only collected for the the rural subsample, precluding a comparative analysis with
urban areas.
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Indeed, outpatient care for short-term illness is generally well-suited to an analysis of
consumer information given the combination of low moral hazard and greater price
sensitivity relative to inpatient care. In the case of India, the corresponding fees and
medication also drive overall spending with each household spending an average of
244 rupees per month for outpatient care (versus 175 rupees for inpatient care), of
which approximately 80% were attributed to pharmaceuticals and diagnostic tests.
However, these figures vary widely across the country, as does the distribution across
households by socioeconomic status. To the latter point, another empirical advantage
of the IHDS and the Indian setting more generally is the clearly delineated measures
of social heterogeneity along caste lines.70
Divergent regulatory environments create variation in barriers to entry and input
costs, leading to geographic disparities in provider price and quality across India.71
Figure 4.2 maps districts by quartile of out-of-pocket health spending as a percent-
age of non-medical consumption, which shows significant variation both within and
between states. The latter is underscored by the respective proportion of rural house-
holds who last sought treatment from a government medical facility in 16 of the
largest states, ranging from just over 1% in Bihar to more than 88% in Assam (see
Figure 4.3). 72 I thus adopt government capacity as a reasonable instrument for the
70Endogenous network formation is thus quite limited in the current period, insofar as people
cannot change their caste and relatively rarely move to villages other than their ancestral home
(although it is possible that some groups disproportionately emigrate to cities).
71I particularly focus on diﬀerences in implementation and enforcement, rather than the regulatory
policies themselves. This justifies the continued use of 2004-2005 data rather than applying this
analysis to the more recent 2011-2012 wave, which took place during the uneven rollout of national
subsidies for rural health care and state sponsored insurance programs across India. While interesting
in their own right, these reforms were suﬃciently disruptive that the supply of providers had probably
not reached equilibrium by the time of the survey; consumer knowledge of those benefits was similarly
mixed. Future analysis will attempt to untangle the direction of those trends, if not their magnitude.
72Figure 3 compares the rural market share of government medical facilities (excluding dual practi-
tioners) relative to private providers based on the most recent source of treatment in each household.
The average across all 16 states in the main analytic sample is 31.2%. Restricting the comparison to
individual episodes of illness in the past 30 days reduces the public market share to 20.4%, suggest-
ing that households who experience more frequent health shocks preferentially sort into the private
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Figure 4.2: Out-of-pocket expenditures by district within India (% per capita con-
sumption)
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Figure 4.3: Market share of public providers by state
distribution of providers and their perceived quality, using an external measure of
illicit payments, performance and perceived corruption in public hospitals for each
state. Other excluded instruments include subjective confidence in local institutions
and other amenities such as electricity and schools.
Recent research confirms that there is selection of providers between states, which
validates a story of initial selective entry into medicine combined with subsequent
labor mobility (Muralidharan et al., 2014). Hence even if all licensed government
physicians employed by primary health clinics in Uttar Pradesh share a common vec-
tor of attributes, that does not extend to their counterparts in Tamil Nadu; indeed,
the former perform worse on diagnostic vignettes than unqualified RMPs in Tamil
Nadu. Several additional measures capture average clinical eﬀectiveness in each state
due to diﬀerent consumer preferences, initial distribution of provider quality, or both
(e.g. average level of primary education), as well as specific state programs.73 Tak-
sector.
73The quality distribution of MBBS physicians is most directly linked to state investment in
medical education. Kumar (2015) explains the so-called “Vyapam” cheating scandal in Madhya
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ing the sample as a whole, an average of 68.1% of the local private providers are
perceived as untrained. Among the most frequently visited clinics, 27.5% practice
alternative medicine (ayurvedic, homeopathic, etc.) in addition to or instead of allo-
pathic medicine, and have a mean number of 0.72 staﬀ claiming any formal training.
In this context, consumers might reasonably diﬀerentiate ayurvedic and allopathic
doctors solely in terms of their manner or approach; conversely, all consumers would
probably agree that a private clinic with a licensed allopathic doctor is superior to an
untrained allopathic practitioner’s clinic, but cannot reliably discern those credentials
in practice.74
Aside from its academic appeal, the Indian context has practical policy relevance.
Despite general consensus that the quality of public medical care is dismal and out-
of-pocket medical expenditures are high (Patel et al., 2015), the underlying relation-
ships between patient demand, provider pricing and supply of unqualified rural med-
ical practitioners remain poorly understood. Currently, the health policy discourse
is largely preoccupied with a false dichotomy between free public provision versus
private medical care. Provider payment structures indisputably shape physician in-
Pradesh extends beyond a corrupt admissions system to the overall regulatory architecture and
hiring process. Given linguistic frictions combined with familial and professional networks, labor
mobility between states is relatively low compared to other settings. Rural to urban migration
within states, however, is much more common. Even in the US most doctors remain in the state
where they received their education (Peterson et al., 2014). For simplicity, the model assumes that
diﬀerences in the initial distribution of latent quality (i.e. the supply of providers in each state is
entirely independent with no selection on exogenous regulatory policy), but the empirical analysis
is agnostic regarding the source of state-level variation and also captures any sorting based on
regulatory environment (including but not limited to the number, cost and quality of accredited
medical schools, as well as the enforcement of licensing requirements). My main results pertain to
within state variation and thus may understate the true eﬀects to the extent that proxy measures
of state regulatory policies reflect underlying diﬀerences in consumer information and preferences as
well (e.g. collinearity with household characteristics). The regulatory environment itself is assumed
fixed, although in the very long run consumer information may also aﬀect the political economy of
those institutions.
74The Satterthwaite model assumes “true” (vertical) quality is uniform and the variation is re-
stricted to dimensions of idiosyncratic (horizontal) quality. My adapted model captures any ob-
servable vertical quality diﬀerences in the vector of characteristics denoting diﬀerent provider types,
which corresponds to the hedonic quality adjustments in the empirical specifications.
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Figure 4.4: Patient treatment price for short-term illness (rupees)
centives and hence prices in important ways, but weakly enforced regulations have
led to unoﬃcial charges within public facilities while government doctors maintain
illicit private practices (Figure 4.4). Yet billions of government dollars are currently
allocated to rural health programs and insurance subsidies despite limited empirical
evidence on existing market structure. Policy decisions are frequently based on a
widespread misperception that households are simultaneously unable to access care
while burdened by medical costs, belying mutually contradictory assumptions about
provider density and demand elasticity.75
As such, this dissertation addresses a tremendous need for a comprehensive analy-
sis of the market as a whole – including the unqualified rural medical practitioners
who dominate the primary care market and the private practices of government physi-
cians. Although the latter comprise a relatively small proportion of overall utilization,
they arguably drive the entire incentive structure, undermining the common assump-
tion that public and private providers constitute two separate markets. Instead, the
75Simulating a residential amenities “experiment” mirrors the expected eﬀects of related hardship
bonuses that have been proposed by health system administrators, albeit targeted exclusively toward
government physicians. (In states where dual practices are endorsed or tolerated, the existing salary
may already serve that purpose.)
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results are consistent with revenue-maximizing providers who merely face diﬀerent
input costs and productivity functions.76 The agnostic inclusion of both public and
private providers thus represents an important corrective to the Indian health services
research literature in itself.
India Human Development Survey
The India Human Development Survey (IHDS) is a nationally representative, multi-
stage cluster survey of 41,554 households in 1,503 villages and 971 urban neighbor-
hoods across India, where detailed interviews were conducted from November 2004
through October 2005.77 The various facility, household and individual question-
naires covered a wide array of topics in health, education, employment, economic
status, marriage, fertility, gender relations, and social capital.
76Most studies of the Indian health care market persist in focusing on a discrete choice model of
provider care (e.g. nested multinomial logit models) according to governmental categories. These
models are predicated on beliefs roughly analogous to the unlikely assumption that American patients
choose hospitals primarily based on tax status. I do not mean to trivialize important distinctions or
divergent incentive structures, and it is easy to sympathize with severely constrained datasets where
facility characteristics are often restricted to binary designations (e.g. household consumption sur-
veys) if not entirely limited to just one sector (e.g. government administrative sources). Ultimately,
though, those factors only enter the patient’s choice model indirectly. By way of example, most
analyses group together high-end specialty hospitals, untrained rural medical practitioners and gov-
ernment physicians’ personal clinics under the “private” category, although the diﬀerences between
these three are probably at least as significant as between the latter in his public practice or his col-
leagues who charge unoﬃcial fees on-site at the government facilities. At the same time, it would be
misleading to reduce these diﬀerences to qualifications, as Das et al. (2015) demonstrate substantial
diﬀerences in eﬀort levels across dual practice providers. Indeed, the theoretical model proposed
here suggests this may be a deliberate strategy to increase their prices. When dual practice is al-
lowed or tolerated, government doctors may actually have a strong incentive to reduce eﬀectiveness
if that drives up prices in their own private practices (Wade, 1982); these perverse incentives may
extend beyond individual clinical practice to encompass policy reforms and enforcement through
self-regulating agencies.
77The dataset contains sampling weights, identifiers for the first stage stratification of urban versus
rural areas, and PSU identifiers for the villages or urban blocks, which can be used for a single-stage
approximation of population estimates. However, a second household panel from 2011-2012 has
recently become available (with facility data to follow shortly), which would yield more current
point estimates; this analysis is thus predominantly concerned with the underlying mechanisms and
scales of magnitude.
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The health questionnaire features several outcome variables of particular interest to
health economists, including episodes of short-term illness (fever, cough, diarrhea) in
the last month, illness duration, categorized treatment costs, and provider type for
each household member; similarly, data on major morbidity by cause is collected for a
recall period of one year.78 Individuals are also asked their beliefs about medical care
and health practices, as well as a range of educational and socioeconomic covariates.
A separate questionnaire on income and consumption collects data on overall house-
hold spending, including annual inpatient treatment as well as outpatient care in
the last 30 days. There is also a range of questions about insurance coverage and
borrowing behaviors, participation in a self-help group or credit group, remittances
sent and received, as well as household amenities including durable goods correlated
with access to capital. More generally, it includes questions about civic participation,
perceptions of state capacity, and divisions within the community (e.g. by caste or
religion). Most uniquely, the IHDS permits analysis of consumers’ quality expecta-
tions and uncertainty thereof by directly reporting household confidence in medical
providers, i.e. the subjective probability distribution z( o) that provider j  quality
level  o.
In addition to the above questionnaires, the rural sample was supplemented with
village-level data on the population size, income, infrastructure and accessibility. The
latter notably includes measures of proximity to banks, credit centers, and medical
facilities of various types. Separate questionnaires were administered to the most fre-
78Recall that provider type denotes the vector of attributes k (including health inputs but also
matching variables like convenience, kinship etc.) observable to existing patients. Given a suﬃ-
ciently rich dataset where these are also observable by the researcher – in some cases with greater
precision than consumers – it is plausible to assume that the distribution of unobservable attributes
is symmetric and hence price and clinical eﬀectiveness are identical for every provider with the same
vector of observable attributes in a given market. However, household levels of confidence allow me
to relax even that assumption.
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quently visited public and private medical facility, containing basic details on provider
type, availability, services provided and infrastructure quality (with observations for
3,777 rural facilities, including individual records for 19,689 health staﬀ), which can
be mapped to patient behaviors and expenditures.79
Supplementary data
Alongside the four IHDS survey components (individual, household, village and medi-
cal facility), I also merge variables from three complementary sources. First, I control
for an index of state-level public health infrastructure and outcomes from the pre-
vious decade, which was constructed by the National Council for Applied Economic
Research using data drawn from the same rural sample in 1994-1995 (Kundu et al.,
2002). It serves here as a dual proxy for lagged dependent variables and a continuous
alternative to state fixed eﬀects. I also incorporate state-level measures of provider
knowledge from a subsequent 2009 vignette survey (Muralidharan et al., 2014).
Finally, I adopt an instrument from the Transparency International India Corruption
Study 2005. The TII study was the largest corruption survey ever undertaken in the
country with a sample of 14,405 respondents spread over 151 cities and 306 villages
in 20 of the 28 Indian states. It was also novel in scope, estimating monetary value
of petty corruption as well as perceived performance for each sector of public service,
including government hospitals. The latter index is central to the subsequent analysis.
79In general, there has been relatively little research on the supply-side of developing country health
markets; the few studies that do exist have delved into the murky waters of quality measurements
to brilliant eﬀect, but the in-depth survey demands (provider vignettes, standardized patients, etc.)
has previously come at the expense of geographic or demographic breadth.
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Key variables
Descriptive statistics can be found in the appendix along with a full list of variable
definitions.
Price (dependent):
The primary outcome of interest logSMprice is the log-transformed total price each
individual paid for provider consultations, facility fees, diagnostic tests and drugs for
any episodes of short-term morbidity in the past 30 days.80 However, these prices
may be subject to recall bias by the female adult respondent to the IHDS household
health questionnaire (Das et al., 2012).81 As a robustness test, an appendix compares
logSMprice with logusualcost, an equivalent log-transformed measure of self-reported
consultation and treatment estimates for a routine case of diarrhea in the medical
facility sub-sample.82 I also construct a match variable indicating whether each in-
dividual received care from the surveyed facilities to correct for limited dependent
variables.
To validate whether price eﬀects are driven by search costs, switch approximates the
80Scitovsky (1967) was an early proponent of comparing medical care prices “based on the average
costs of treatment of specific illnesses rather than on the prices of selected items of medical care.”
Richard G. Frank (1998) later expanded that principle to develop price indices for depression by
“attempting to define quantities that better approximate what individuals seek from spending on
medical care: eﬀective treatment for an episode of illness.” This dissertation adopts the implicit
assertation that the right consumer price measure is total expenditure per episode (rather than
disaggregating charges for physician time and other specific inputs, which in any case the data
does not permit) when the elasticity of substitution between treatment bundles is unknown – and
especially when providers face diﬀerent incentives to provide too many or too few inputs, following
from the Ellis and McGuire (1986) model of provider reimbursement as it aﬀects stinting in a hospital
setting.
81Prices exclude reported travel costs (e.g. transportation and lodging) incurred in the course of
treatment, which are collinear with distance and other determinants of demand.
82Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981) relied on provider-reported prices. I find that results diverge
markedly depending on the measure adopted and so are open to interpretation depending on prior
assumptions concerning the relative extent of reporting bias by patients versus providers.
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probability of visiting a new provider by indicating whether households with multiple
episodes of illness sought treatment from diﬀerent sources in the past 30 days.83 The
type of provider last visited by each household is indicated by private to examine
selection by provider type, alongside the relative proportion of informal rural medical
practitioners (untrainedprivate) according to the village questionnaire.84
Finally, logoutpatient captures total out-of-pocket outpatient medical expenditures
in the past 30 days from the separate income and consumption questionnaire to test
whether the eﬀect on price extends to utilization (alongside an indicator binoutpatient
to correct for households with zero spending).85
Quality uncertainty (endogenous):
Information searches are motivated – and mediated – by consumer uncertainty about
the underlying distribution of idiosyncratic quality, i.e. the subjective probability
distribution F ( ) around a reservation price-quality level u⇤.86 As an empirical proxy
for uncertainty, medconfidence_scale rates each household’s confidence in doctors and
83However, switch may understate the true probability of switching between multiple providers of
the same type and location, since only one clinic is uniquely identified per household. Conversely,
visiting more than one provider for a given episode of illness may either reflect established referral
networks (e.g. to a specialist for follow up, a lab for diagnostic tests or a pharmacy to fill a
prescription) or the search for a second opinion if dissatisfied.
84More detailed categories are included as fixed eﬀects in the price specifications.
85In most cases, the income and consumption module was concurrently administered to the male
household head while a separate surveyor privately interviewed a married female household member
regarding gender, health and education. Hence the specific details of short-term illnesses and the
corresponding expenses (as reported by the woman) may not always directly align with the aggregate
level of outpatient spending (as reported by the man) as it is subject to intrahousehold information
exchange and variation in recall bias. See Das et al. (2012) for extended discussion of recall bias in
health expenditure surveys.
86The theoretical model allows subjective beliefs about quality to diﬀer by provider type to the
extent that they are substitutes and strongly correlated with idiosyncratic preferences (i.e. primarily
horizontal rather than vertical diﬀerentiation). Indeed, the IHDS questionnaire was revised in the
subsequent 2011-2012 wave to specifically inquire about government and private doctors, respectively,
where households indicated slightly greater confidence in the latter. Empirically, this is captured
by controlling for the local proportion of provider types (specifically, privateprimarypercent) as an
included instrument alongside the consumer’s own choice of provider.
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hospital administrators to provide good treatment, from “hardly any confidence at all”
(0) to “a great deal” (1).87
Provider supply & density (endogenous):
According to IHDS, 52.0% of patients with short-term illness seek treatment in their
own village, with an additional 24.4% visiting a neighboring village (whereas only
16.0% and 7.6% travel to a town or the district seat, respectively). The key endoge-
nous variable of interest is primarycarefacilities, which reports the total number of
primary care providers listed by focus group respondents on a village questionnaire as
a reasonable proxy for the supply of providers in the local market (Mg). To rule out
the target income hypothesis, some specifications also include the provider-population
ratio primarycareperHH (number of public and private medical providers in each vil-
lage divided by the total households). A closely related measure of geographic density,
primarycaredensityham, reflects the total number of local public and private medi-
cal providers in each village divided by the area in hectares per residential hamlet.88
87Deaton (2008) has previously demonstrated that confidence in the medical system correlates with
health outcomes. However, there is a critical semantic distinction between consumer rankings, which
emphasize the mean level of subjective quality, versus confidence, which invokes variance around
that expected mean. The prevailing degree of confidence – or, more specifically, uncertainty – is also
central to most definitions of trust. Arrow (1963) framed trust in medical providers – as well as third
party licensing and educational bodies that certify them – as a social institution designed to mitigate
treatment uncertainty due to information asymmetry. Reported confidence in doctors and hospitals
to provide good treatment is thus a compelling proxy for quality uncertainty, and arguably defines
the concept outright. In the context of monopolistic competition, Oberholzer-Gee and Calanog
(2007) observe that “generalized trust, a universal confidence that suppliers will not exploit buyers,
encourages the acceptance of new products and speeds up their diﬀusion [whereas] specific trust
in a particular supplier raises expectations of her performance and makes it more diﬃcult for new
suppliers to successfully enter the market.” The primary household survey inquired about medical
confidence alongside a variety of other institutions, though, so respondents may have been primed
to consider public hospitals in particular. As it was not mentioned in the health questionnaire, it
is somewhat less likely to directly reflect patient satisfaction from any one particular episode or
provider. An indicator for whether a household’s social network includes any doctors or nurses will
separately approximate trust in specific relationships, in contrast with institutional confidence.
88Unfortunately, primarycarefacilities and related measures from the village questionnaire are
only available for the IHDS rural subsample; towns and cities are excluded from the analysis as a
result. Note that primarycaredensityham is comparable to the variable MDPCM2 in Pauly and Sat-
terthwaite (1981) and equivalent to the interaction between primarycareperHH and the population
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This may overstate variation in the sample, i.e. if adjacent villages comprise a single
market; clustering by district helps mitigate this concern.89
Social networks:
In addition to provider density, the increasing monopoly model predicts that the
diﬃcult of consumer search (D) is also aﬀected by the share of the local population in
each household’s network (Ngi) as well as their connections’ familiarity with diﬀerent
providers (✓) and degree of reliability (⌘) – as well as their own ability to discern
the latter. Several sociodemographic measures are included as potential proxies for
information networks. The most basic of these is the population density HHham
(total households divided by the area in hectares per residential hamlet, as given by
the village questionnaire).90 Following Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981), localmoved
measures the proportion of those residents who arrived within the past ten years
(constructed from household surveys) and would have less direct experience with
providers as well as fewer friends with whom to exchange information.
Pauly and Satterthwaite also consider female family roles as a proxy for time and op-
portunities available for search. In the Indian context, women face limited mobility
density HHham.
89Controlling for road accessibility and distance from the district center will also correct for het-
erogeneity in market size and integration. In the absence of precise spatial data, though, border
villages where the market extends into a separate district – or even state – are assumed symmetric.
90I interpret the number of subdivisional hamlets per village as a constant land use ratio, which is
inversely related to populated areas as a proportion of the total village size (including agricultural
fields, roads, water bodies, outcroppings and other geographic boundaries that demarcate each ham-
let), i.e. the spatial distribution of households in villages with just one hamlet is relatively uniform
and becomes more concentrated with each additional hamlet. (As a measure of spatial concentra-
tion, it may also correlate with jati fractionalization.) Thus the number of hamlets is a multiplier
for village-level estimates of population density and also mitigates potential collinearity with the
provider ratio. This is consistent with the notion that census village boundaries are primarily a
function of bureaucratic calculus (e.g. population thresholds) layered on historical land tenure sys-
tems, whereas hamlets more organically approximate the spatial locus of social interactions in the
local market. Empirically, HHham is a three-way continuous interaction of the geographic variables
TOTHH, AREA_inverse and HAM.
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and access to public spaces. This is particularly true in regions where some com-
munities observe strict purdah or other forms of seclusion that constrain both when
and with whom women can exchange information, including about medical providers;
moreover, such patriarchal practices may also directly aﬀect demand by raising the
marginal time and travel costs if women cannot seek care unaccompanied. These local
gender norms are reflected by the mean level of physical freedom localgenderclinic,
constructed from the respective proportion of female household respondents indicat-
ing that permission from their husband or senior family member is unnecessary to
visit the local health center (0), that they must request permission to attend alone
(1) or that a chaperone must also be present (2).91
Whereas Pauly and Satterthwaite considered racial diversity solely as a determinant
of demand, social heterogeneity may also aﬀect the flow of information when commu-
nities are rigidly stratified. Following Banerjee and Somanathan (2007), I construct
a fractionalization index of religious and caste identities (jatifraction) as a proxy
for social network density, which measures the probability that two randomly drawn
people from the village belong to diﬀerent communities.92 To capture the strength
91In addition to physical mobility, the IHDS contains a wealth of alternative measures of gender
relations and intrahousehold decision-making. Other relevant examples include whether women
practice ghungat, purdah or pallu (i.e. cover their head with a veil); whether permission or a
chaperone is required to visit neighboring friends or relatives; who decides how many children to
have or what to do when a child falls sick; whether it is usual for men to beat their wife if she goes
out without telling him; and which other household members specifically accompanied them on their
last primary care visit in particular. For the purpose of this analysis, localgenderclinic2 aggregates
responses to a hypothetical scenario that comprises all three elements of social networks, agency and
opportunity cost, thus permitting the single clearest proxy for the overall eﬀect of social norms; it
is also strongly predictive of accompaniment during a given episode (which may also be correlated
with unobservable factors such as illness severity, facility characteristics or expected cost).
92Mathematically, the fractionalization index is equivalent to one minus the Herfindahl index and
is calculated based on the approximate proportion of each distinct jati reported in the village ques-
tionnaire. However, the geographic area is often divided into distinct residential hamlets according
to caste, typically separated by farmland or geographic barriers (e.g. elevation changes). Calculating
provider density based on the number of hamlets is important to mitigate potential confounding ef-
fects of jatifraction (e.g. if providers segment the market by caste) and allow for clean interpretation
of the latter as a measure of social (rather than spatial) heterogeneity.
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of those networks, a complementary measure of network coordination and risk pool-
ing (localcooperation) aggregates the proportion of local households who report that
their community coordinates to resolve water supply issues and other collective ac-
tion problems (as opposed to each family acting individually).93 A socioeconomic
factor variable (GROUPS8, e.g. Brahmin, high caste, “Other Backward Class,” Dalit,
Adivasi, Muslim, Sikh/Jain, Christian) controls for heterogeneity in the amount of
information accessible by diﬀerent community categories.94
Finally, binmednetwork indicates whether a household’s own social acquaintances
include any doctors or nurses, which would increase the amount of reliable informa-
tion on available providers and improve search eﬃciency. However, the net eﬀect
93The eﬀects of localcooperation on consumer information and overall demand may be ambiguous
if intra-group bonding is negatively correlated with the availability of inclusive state- or market-
based mechanisms due to crowding out. Accordingly, localcooperation may indicate the relative
institutional prominence of caste and religion, where collective action on the part of communities
signals the failure of formal institutions. If so, it may be correlated with local variation in regulatory
oversight and corresponding medical quality. For the purposes of my analysis, I will take a loose
interpretation whereby this encompasses myriad facets of caste and communalism, including the role
of informal insurance (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016).
Conversely, civic associations (localcivicbin) may bridge diﬀerent communities to facilitate co-
ordination and information exchange around targeted issues, including: women’s groups (“mahila
mandal”); youth club, sports group, or reading room; trade union, business or professional group;
self help groups; credit or savings group; development group or NGO; agricultural, milk, or other
co-operative. Many – if not all – of these associations are initially introduced by external government
programs to resolve collective action problems, but the level of local participation may also reflect
underlying tendencies toward endogenous group formation for a given purpose. Unfortunately, IHDS
did not specifically ask about participation in patient welfare and hospital management committees
(“Rogi Kalyan Samiti”) or village health, sanitation and nutrition committee, both of which were
subsequently promoted under the National Rural Health Mission. Although membership in caste
associations, religious festival societies or other exclusively identity-based social groups are not in-
cluded, it is unclear whether other organizations succeed in bridging between them or are constituted
along the same lines.
Indeed, localcivicbin is highly collinear with localcooperation; the former represents an ongoing
investment in social capital where the latter is a perceived norm in equilibrium. I reluctantly
dismissed localcivicbin as a feasible proxy for consumer information given potential endogeneity
concerns with respect to service quality (i.e. do local associations arise in response to a problem or
to prevent them?), but the relationship between these variables merits further research.
94The aggregate categories of GROUPS8 in the publicly available IHDS dataset were constructed
to anonymize more specific responses concerning household name, religion and caste. In addi-
tion to allowing heterogeneity in information access, GROUPS8 also controls for discrimination by
providers.
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of binmednetwork is ambiguous if providers discount services to friends and family
or, conversely, raise prices in response to the higher social or psychological costs of
defection (Schwartz et al., 2011).
These sociodemographic characteristics might aﬀect the prevailing level of local qual-
ity via selective provider entry; households may update their subjective probability
distribution through social learning; and some measures may impact overall demand
directly.95 Thus while the signs of these variables can lend additional support for the
increasing monopoly model insofar as they are all aligned with the model’s predic-
tions, the magnitude of their coeﬃcients should be more cautiously interpreted within
a broader social context rather than solely attributed to search eﬃciency.
Regulatory environment:
Fixed costs associated with divergent regulatory barriers may contribute to wide
variation in the quantity of providers between states, as well as consumer uncer-
tainty about their quality (contributing to the multiple equilibria depicted in Figure
4.3). To isolate the impact of consumer uncertainty and information search within
each market, I control for diﬀerent facets of the prevailing health care system.96 As
a proxy for the priority accorded health in each state, the human development in-
dex ncaer_index captures existing trends in government investments and population
health outcomes from the IHDS rural sample ten years earlier.97 Individual compo-
nents include: short-term morbidity rate; crude birth rate; crude death rate; total
fertility rate; infant mortality rate; child mortality rate; life expectancy at birth;
contraceptive prevalence rate; antenatal care; skilled birth attendance; immunization
95The eﬀect of social learning on consumer uncertainty is reflected in the first stage regressions of
medconfidence_scale.
96See Becker et al. (2006) for discussion of governance indicators for commitment to health.
97More specifically, ncaer_index approximates a lagged dependent variable for the incidence of
illness (H¯t 120) and government medical capacity (M¯ t 120k ).
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coverage; percent of villages with sub-centers; percent of villages with pharmacies;
and the percent of villages with a nutrition worker.98
Clinical standards for medical education, licensing and other quality assurance mech-
anisms determine the average occupational competency in each state, approximated
by the proportion of medical providers who gave incorrect diagnoses for all cases
in a separate medical vignette survey (Muralidharan et al., 2014).99 The resulting
measure wrong_all_percent plausibly serves as an upper bound on the mean level of
clinical eﬀectiveness across all providers in the state.100 Similarly, the degree of liabil-
ity in each state is reflected in provider eﬀort, measured by the proportion of licensed
nurses and physicians employed by public primary health clinics or community health
centers who were absent at the facility survey visit. PHC_qualified_absenteeism cap-
tures state diﬀerences in otherwise identical provider types and is drawn directly from
the IHDS sample. A proxy indicator for allocative eﬃciency within each state is dist-
publicvacancy, the proportion of all approved positions in government facilities that
were oﬃcially vacant according to the facility survey in each district.
In addition to medical oversight, the government’s role extends to public health more
broadly. The prevention of infectious disease and associated malnutrition should be
a particularly high priority as both a major determinant of health outcomes and a
quintessential public good, and is also an area where local bureaucrats have greater
discretion. The proportion of local households with a latrine thus constitutes the
98Kundu et al. (2002) note that ncaer_index includes several negative indicators of health de-
velopment. To obtain the final index, these values were transformed by taking the reciprocals and
added to the aggregative value of positive indicators.
99Note that wrong_all_percent is from a separate sample and slightly later time period; it was
selected over a corollary measure right_all_percent to emphasize the variation below the acceptable
standard (rather than positive deviance).
100Note that wrong_all_percent is from a separate sample and slightly later time period; it was
selected over a corollary measure right_all_percent to emphasize the variation below the acceptable
standard (rather than positive deviance).
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proxy measure sanitation.101
To account for the downstream eﬀects on market composition, I include the percent-
age of primary care facilities in each village that are private (privateprimarypercent),
as well as a binary indicator for whether a village has at least one pharmacy (bin-
pharmacy).102 The latter accounts for the possibility that areas with more providers
tend to have more providers with pharmacies. If so, a higher percent of visits in
these areas may include drugs, which could inflate the measured eﬀect of number of
providers on price even after controlling for provider mix.103
Geography:
Geodemographic covariates underpin information search, demand, market entry and
input costs. The village questionnaire reports the total number of resident households
according to the 2001 census (TOTHH ), which is interacted with the reciprocal area
in hectares as a proxy for geographic density (AREA_inverse) and the number of
discrete residential hamlets (HAM ). As a proxy for geographic connectivity and ease
of transportation, road indicates whether a village can be approached by a foot path
only, dirt road or paved road. The number of kilometers to the district hospital
101Spatial access to water and disposal of fecal matter are both also historically linked to caste
(Geruso and Spears, 2014); including these variables thus controls for the major socially-determined
health risk factors, permitting straightforward interpretations of jatifraction in the context of infor-
mation and GROUPS8 in terms of social hierarchy.
102Both privateprimarypercent and binpharmacy are initially presumed exogenous after controlling
for the state regulatory environment and local market size, although I will subsequently revisit this
assumption in the context of possible adverse selection in provider location decisions. Including the
proportion of private providers restricts the appropriate analytic sample to villages with at least one
known primary care provider; however, an appropriate test of the increasing monopoly model might
reasonably exclude villages with zero providers anyway.
103Pharmacies are particularly subject to measurement error in rural India, where some respondents
might include unlicensed compounders, and unregulated prescription practices render them closer
substitutes for other primary care providers; however, this is an important concern for other contexts
where pharmacies are clearly defined providers of complementary inputs.
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(loghospitaldistance) is also drawn from the village questionnaire.104
Input costs:
The market price for a liter of kerosene (keroseneprice) and the average daily wage
rate for male skilled construction workers (constructionwage) proxy for capital and
labor input prices, respectively, as well as the local cost of living. Using the medical
facility questionnaires, I also construct the proportion of individual health workers
who reside within the village boundaries (staﬀresident) as a proxy for complementary
labor supply.
I include hedonic quality adjustments to account for idiosyncratic consumer prefer-
ences over observable factors of production. There are three diﬀerent levels of detail
for the provider type, depending on the outcome variable in question and restric-
tions on sample size. For households who visited the most popular public or private
provider in each market, facility_category (public hospital, primary health clinic,
community health center, sub-center, family planning center, private hospital, pri-
vate clinic, private doctor, other) is a particularly detailed approximation of provider
attributes and capital-labor ratios.105 Figure 4.5 shows the breakdown of surveyed
facilities weighted by the number of household visits in the past 30 days.106 For
these facilities, I also constructed the AYUSH indicator variable to indicate whether
they practice Ayurvedic, homeopathy, unani or other traditional remedies either in
addition to allopathic medicine or exclusively (ranging from zero to two). The total
number of staﬀ at each facility claiming any formal medical training is captured by
the constructed variable clinicqualified. In addition to diﬀerences in the marginal
104Distance to amenities in the district headquarters may also influence provider’s location decisions
more directly, as would water and sanitation infrastructure.
105The facilities were not randomly sampled, but were selected based on market share. They were
further stratified so public providers were disproportionately surveyed.
106Refer to Figure 4.3 for an indication of how this distribution will vary by state.
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Figure 4.5: Rural medical utilization by facility type
cost of inputs, these measures of provider type and training may also reflect financing
constraints for medical education when the fixed costs of entry vary by type.
To make use of the larger sample, I use each household’s most recent source of pri-
mary care according to the factor variable type_HH (government doctor/nurse; gov-
ernment doctor/nurse in private; private doctor/nurse; pharmacy; traditional healer)
and relative location treat_location_HH (same village/neighborhood; another vil-
lage/neighborhood; other town; district seat) as a control for unobserved quality
attributes of the facility.107 Households further noted the demeanor of those doc-
tors and other health workers (rescaled as the binary indicator nice), which captures
bedside manner and is interacted with caste to control for discriminatory behavior.
For households who received treatment during the past 30 days, similar provider de-
tails are available for each episode: type and treat_location captures the first source
of treatment for an individual patient. Match indicates whether the specific pa-
107type_HH and treat_location_HH are given for every household regardless of how long it has
been since they last sought care.
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tient can be mapped to one of the surveyed medical facilities.108 As a proxy for
the provider’s role in the value chain from diagnostic expertise to pharmaceutical
distribution, includesmeds indicates whether tests and drugs were included with the
reported doctors’ fees or paid separately; gaveORS also indicates whether the subset
of diarrhea patients received oral rehydration salts. SM2opinion indicates whether
patients received treatment from more than one source per episode of illness, although
I cannot diﬀerentiate second opinions due to dissatisfaction from cases where patients
received a direct referral from their first provider.
Patient characteristics:
The nature of a given illness may aﬀect demand for medical care as well its cost.
Patients who received primary medical care in the past 30 days are indicated by
illness, along with several potential proxies for severity: SMhospital reflects whether
they were hospitalized from short-term morbidity in the previous month; sickdays
measures the days patients were unable to work or carry out daily activities; SMdaysill
is the total number of days ill during the last episode; and fever, cough and diarrhea
indicate the specific symptoms.
The data also capture a number of other individual characteristics that correspond
with the underlying probability and severity of illness. These include the gender
indicator female; age and its squared value agesq ; a morbidity indicator for whether
they have ever been diagnosed with a chronic disease; a disability index of activities of
daily living; and a behaviors index of lifestyle risk factors such as alcohol and tobacco
consumption.
108The matching algorithm is based on limited information, and may contain false positives (e.g.
when multiple household members received treatment from diﬀerent providers of the same type).
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Demand determinants:
The dataset contains several other determinants of per capita demand. An indicator
for whether a household has access to piped water (piped_HH ) captures potential
geographic confounders as well as the combination of public goods provision and
household assets that aﬀect exposure to water-borne pathogens and environmental
toxins.109 The highest education level of a female adult household member HHED5F
is widely adopted as a proxy for health knowledge and human capital investment,
along with the total number of households members NPERSONS as a measure of
household production and fertility (disaggregated by NCHILDREN, NTEENS and
NADULTS ).110 Household income is log-transformed as linc, accompanied by the
subjective indicator betteroﬀ to capture trends in household economic status over the
past decade.111 In addition to the indicator insurance_med for the negligible fraction
of households formally covered by health insurance policies, several variables proxy
for financial risk protection and incomplete insurance: HHmigrants tallies the number
of non-resident household members; rationcard indicates eligibility for food subsidies;
and commgovpercent aggregates the mean percentage of local income attributable to
government benefits.
109Spatial access to water and disposal of fecal matter are both also historically linked to caste
(Geruso and Spears, 2014); including these variables thus controls for the major socially-determined
health risk factors, permitting straightforward interpretations of jatifraction in the context of infor-
mation and GROUPS8 in terms of social hierarchy.
110Education may also aﬀect consumer information insofar as it increases patients’ ability to verify
the quality of care provided. In addition to formal education, local exposure to mass media may
impact public health knowledge related to both fertility rate and demand for medical care. How-
ever, localmassmedia was rejected due to likely multicollinearity with other determinants of demand
and endogeneity concerns (i.e. if media consumption is a potential complement or substitute for
information networks).
111Perceived trends in economic wellbeing may reflect underlying tendencies toward optimism or
pessimism, which might be correlated with institutional confidence measures.
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Excluded instruments
The price of primary medical care in each market is simultaneously determined with
respect to both the stock of providers primarycarefacilities (as well as alternative mea-
sures primarycaredensityham and primarycareperHH ) and uncertainty about their
quality (medconfidence_scale).112 Consequently, OLS estimates of the increasing
monopoly model may be biased toward zero. For clean identification, I rely on several
excluded exogenous variables that would plausibly influence a primary care provider’s
decision where to work independent of local demand for private clinics or other fac-
tors aﬀecting their income potential, and which also correct for potential measurement
error in reported consumer confidence.113
Elsewhere, Clausen et al. (2011) find that confidence in public institutions is closely
related to perceived corruption of those same institutions. The excluded instrument
ti_healthcomposite exploits this correlation with a state-level index of perceived cor-
ruption in government hospitals, drawn from the Transparency International India
Corruption Study 2005. Specific indicators include: direct experience bribing; poor
quality of service; use of influence or middlemen; perceptions of department corrup-
tion; perceived lack of commitment to reducing corruption; and perceived increases
over time. From the consumer perspective, the experiences of petty corruption cap-
tured by ti_healthcomposite approximate the average reservation price-quality as-
sessment (u¯kg) in each state, which is an ideal instrument for the quality uncer-
tainty measure medconfidence_scale, and the perception measures capture common
112See footnotes 22 and 40 regarding the eﬀects of price on quality expectations.
113The entrance and prices of private providers are more likely to be simultaneously determined
than their government counterparts (which are plausibly exogenous according to the oﬃcial policies,
if not in practice); however, the combined total number of providers is the more relevant metric for
the consumer’s information problem.
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reference points or cultures of “kvetching.”114 Meanwhile, the endogenous provider
variables primarycarefacilities, primarycareperHH and primarycaredensityham will
be negatively correlated with ti_healthcomposite if petty corruption experiences and
perceptions of pervasive regulatory capture approximate the relative magnitude of
scarcity rents in each state (controlling for other regulatory factors).115
Specific confidence in medical providers may further mirror trust in institutions more
generally and shared perceptions thereof, approximated by a subjective index of mean
local confidence in other institutions (localconfidence, constructed from household
surveys), including: politicians to fulfill promises; police to enforce the law; state
government to look after the people; village councils to implement public projects;
courts to mete out justice; and banks to keep money safe.116 The plausible exogeneity
of institutional confidence as an instrument is predicated on the assumption that
medical care is not a salient political concern for most households.117
114The included instrument betteroﬀ may also capture individual proclivities for kvetching (Clausen
et al., 2011).
115Qualitative research by Wade (1982) analyzes the perverse structural relationship between petty
corruption and high-level bureaucratic incentives for the public delivery of private goods in the In-
dian context. In the medical context, Wade’s findings are consistent with La Forgia et al. (2014) on
the parallel system of human resources management among government physicians; Coﬀey (2014)
at lower levels of rural health care delivery; and Kumar (2015) in medical education. Some of these
channels reportedly include: deliberate shortages of training programs to impede quality compe-
tition; intentional rents from occupational licensing due to direct quantity restrictions; high entry
costs for government jobs and transfers, and corresponding loan repayments and kickbacks; an in-
ability to monitor or enforce regulations, leading to fewer external constraints on price setting or
diagnostic eﬀort; less oversight of unqualified providers who are misrepresenting the marginal health
product of care; procurement irregularities and low quality control of pharmaceutical supply chains.
However, the state-level index ti_healthcomposite focuses on hospital specialists and administrators
in an unrelated survey sample, and so is plausibly exogenous with respect to the number of primary
care providers in the IHDS village sample regardless of the precise mechanisms involved.
116In addition to confidence in doctors, I also excluded confidence in schools from this index (al-
though both are closely correlated with the other components). Whereas the other six measures are
largely public goods in the form of government institutions, education and health instead represent
the subsidized delivery of rival and excludable services. Moreover, education may well be considered
a reputation good in low-literacy settings. Given those similarities, I anticipate that future analyses
will consider school fees and include edconfidence as an endogenous quality measure rather than an
instrument.
117This is supported by the political economy literature on the major determinants of voter pref-
erences in India, as well as more recent research on how private primary education provision aﬀects
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Finally, certain locations may attract providers for non-financial reasons, such as
geographic desirability, public goods provision and personal amenities.118 Local in-
frastructure is represented by the proportion of households with electricity (comm-
electricity), reflecting district administrative capacity and village geography. “Family
friendliness” and educational opportunities are particularly frequent concerns cited by
government physicians seeking transfers. The cumulative number of private primary
and secondary schools (privateschools) in each village is a proxy for the latter, and
for complementary human capital investment options more generally.119
The preceding instruments plausibly meet the exclusion criteria when taken together
with the other independent variables, insofar as the attractiveness measures aﬀect
providers’ location choice without directly aﬀecting their pricing decisions. However,
localconfidence and commelectricity may only satisfy the exclusion restriction when
separately controlling for the probability of illness as a potential confounder, e.g. via
health-related public goods such as sanitation and drinking water source piped_HH,
while privateschools hinges on the inclusion of maternal education HHED5F as a
determinant of demand. Similarly, ti_healthcomposite approximates a split sample
IV and should not have any relevance to local demand as long as the aforemen-
tioned regulatory variables ensure that it only aﬀects price through the quantity of
providers and associated quality uncertainty in each state. Otherwise, potential con-
founding variables might include: health outcomes from prior investment in public
expectations of the state. (Anecdotally, the few states that have successfully made health care an
election issue focused on catastrophic insurance rather than primary care.) However, the possible
endogeneity of this instrument significantly constrains its applicability to replications in other set-
tings – including the U.S. – where consumers in areas with high prices and low quality are liable to
lack confidence in the government as a result.
118To the extent that localconfidence corresponds with the delivery of public goods to an attractive
location, that measure might also be correlated with the supply of providers.
119See Fuchs (1978). An ideal measure of local desirability would be residential land prices. Unfor-
tunately, however, the IHDS data on rental prices for agricultural land is incomplete and does not
include sales, while no information at all is available on land prices for non-agricultural use.
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goods (addressed here by ncaer_index ); salary incentives and liability in the public
sector (PHC_qualified_absenteeism); underinvestment in medical education (proxied
by wrong_all_percent); administrative capability (captured by distpublicvacancy);
and the viability of district hospitals as substitutes (loghospitaldistance). State ran-
dom eﬀects capture any omitted sources of policy variation that might be jointly
correlated with ti_healthcomposite and price. Controlling for type, treat_location
and other provider attributes also isolates selective entry as a potential mechanism
both between and within states.
Because my equations are over-identified, I am able to empirically verify that the
excluded instruments are valid insofar as the Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying
restrictions cannot reject the null that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with
the error term.120
120I also reject the null of under-identification and redundant instruments.
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CHAPTER 5 : RESULTS
Price of primary care
I estimate the eﬀects of consumer information and provider quality on the market for
primary medical care as follows:
ln(P ) =  0 +  1QUAL+  2MP +  3MD +  4SOCDEM
+ 5REG+  6GEO +  7W +  8X +  9Y + "ij
(5.1)
Although village boundaries proxy for geographically-defined primary care markets,
data suggest that local market activity encompasses neighboring villages and spillovers
from adjacent towns within each district as well. Standard errors are accordingly clus-
tered by district (except where otherwise specified), which is also the primary unit of
administration and implementation in the Indian bureaucracy.121 Full details of the
central results are presented here, with supplementary tables in the appendix. The
discussion will focus on the consumer information variables (i.e.  1,  3,  4). However,
several of the other interesting coeﬃcients merit further research, and the regulatory
variables are particularly relevant from a policy perspective.
121District boundaries have remained largely stable since the colonial era, unlike political con-
stituencies, and are typically divvied up in their entirety when new states are carved out of existing
ones (e.g. Telangana from Andhra Pradesh). IHDS was designed as a clustered sample of 373 dis-
tricts, of which my main analytic sub-sample constitutes 185 clusters. Districts are also the lowest
sampling stage with publicly available identifiers that can be mapped to other data sources. All key
regressors are nested at the village, medical provider, household or individual level. Three included
instruments and one excluded instrument pertaining to state regulatory environment are aggregated
due to data limitations; however, the state level is generally inappropriate for clustering intraclass
correlation in hyper-local rural markets. (By way of comparison: 11 of the 16 Indian states in this
sub-sample are more populous than California, which as the largest U.S. state is still less than one-
fifth the size of Uttar Pradesh alone, while Himachal Pradesh is the smallest with a population of
6.8 million, i.e. approximately the size of Washington and bigger than 37 other U.S. states.)
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Table 5.1: Patient treatment price of short-term illness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS IV (2SLS) IV (GMM) IV (BE) IV (GLS)
QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
medconfidence_scale -0.197** -1.229*** -1.090*** -0.915* -1.229***
(0.0790) (0.424) (0.413) (0.546) (0.253)
PROVIDER SUPPLY & DENSITY
primarycarefacilities 0.0178* 0.0646 0.0756** 0.0707 0.0646**
(0.00928) (0.0395) (0.0376) (0.0629) (0.0311)
SOCIAL NETWORKS
HHham -0.000423 -0.00180 -0.00200 0.00454 -0.00180
(0.00386) (0.00387) (0.00385) (0.00727) (0.00409)
localmoved 0.788** 1.118*** 1.109*** 1.887*** 1.118***
(0.363) (0.370) (0.369) (0.710) (0.375)
localgenderclinic 0.261** 0.187* 0.207* 0.167 0.187***
(0.103) (0.112) (0.111) (0.130) (0.0666)
jatifraction 0.170 0.0985 0.0511 0.286 0.0985
(0.177) (0.214) (0.212) (0.241) (0.123)
localcooperation -0.315*** -0.402*** -0.381*** -0.453*** -0.402***
(0.116) (0.131) (0.130) (0.148) (0.0797)
High caste 0.0424 0.0223 -0.00292 -0.255 0.0223
(0.180) (0.193) (0.190) (0.319) (0.110)
OBC 0.0486 0.0151 0.0122 -0.175 0.0151
(0.172) (0.184) (0.181) (0.288) (0.103)
Dalit -0.0529 -0.0801 -0.106 -0.366 -0.0801
(0.173) (0.181) (0.176) (0.292) (0.103)
Adivasi -0.0857 -0.0852 -0.0670 -0.369 -0.0852
(0.214) (0.224) (0.223) (0.337) (0.133)
Muslim 0.0151 -0.0225 -0.0410 0.00633 -0.0225
(0.194) (0.215) (0.210) (0.326) (0.119)
Sikh/Jain 0.293 0.352 0.368 0.00336 0.352**
(0.231) (0.268) (0.265) (0.487) (0.163)
Christian 0.381 0.428 0.301 -0.537 0.428
(0.510) (0.527) (0.519) (0.850) (0.280)
binmednetwork 0.0948* 0.130** 0.138** 0.0448 0.130***
(0.0561) (0.0569) (0.0566) (0.128) (0.0475)
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT & MARKET COMPOSITION
ncaer_index 0.382 0.545* 0.639** 0.0745 0.545***
(0.275) (0.308) (0.294) (0.334) (0.174)
wrong_all_percent -0.0148** -0.0187*** -0.0194*** -0.0243** -0.0187***
(0.00725) (0.00714) (0.00712) (0.00988) (0.00432)
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Patient treatment price of short-term illness (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS IV (2SLS) IV (GMM) IV (BE) IV (GLS)
PHC_qualified_absenteeism 1.698*** 2.117*** 2.253*** 2.228*** 2.117***
(0.449) (0.426) (0.419) (0.555) (0.268)
distpublicvacancy 0.364 0.495** 0.513** 0.512 0.495***
(0.233) (0.252) (0.251) (0.321) (0.171)
sanitation -0.0305 -0.0806 -0.0975 -0.0362 -0.0806
(0.126) (0.138) (0.137) (0.196) (0.100)
binpharmacy -0.0268 -0.0460 -0.0774 -0.170* -0.0460
(0.0652) (0.0770) (0.0743) (0.0959) (0.0523)
privateprimarypercent -0.215** -0.402*** -0.424*** -0.529*** -0.402***
(0.0909) (0.143) (0.140) (0.201) (0.0985)
GEOGRAPHY
TOTHH -7.30e-05 -0.000172* -0.000204** -0.000203 -0.000172**
(5.78e-05) (0.000103) (9.81e-05) (0.000148) (8.06e-05)
AREA_inverse 3.736 4.360 3.795 4.441 4.360
(4.394) (4.509) (4.498) (10.51) (3.907)
HAM -0.0156 -0.0191 -0.0194 -0.0170 -0.0191*
(0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0219) (0.0111)
TOTHH*AREA_inverse 0.0106* 0.0121* 0.0134* 0.00699 0.0121
(0.00586) (0.00720) (0.00703) (0.0158) (0.00746)
TOTHH*HAM -3.30e-06 -1.56e-06 -1.42e-06 4.85e-07 -1.56e-06
(3.90e-06) (4.30e-06) (4.16e-06) (9.28e-06) (4.64e-06)
AREA_inverse*HAM -0.674 -0.819 -0.539 -5.330 -0.819
(3.534) (3.489) (3.480) (5.476) (2.729)
road 0.0420 0.0252 0.0263 0.0771 0.0252
(0.0563) (0.0710) (0.0685) (0.0955) (0.0516)
loghospitaldistance -0.0621 -0.0808* -0.0801 -0.0667 -0.0808**
(0.0440) (0.0487) (0.0487) (0.0640) (0.0346)
INPUT COSTS
staﬀresident -0.0355 -0.0850 -0.125 -0.0419 -0.0850
(0.106) (0.113) (0.111) (0.137) (0.0722)
constructionwage 0.000280 0.000308 0.000307 0.000489* 0.000308*
(0.000192) (0.000198) (0.000197) (0.000279) (0.000186)
keroseneprice -0.0145* -0.0222*** -0.0207** -0.00644 -0.0222***
(0.00770) (0.00813) (0.00810) (0.0106) (0.00520)
Primary Health Clinic -0.726*** -0.448** -0.460** 0.0374 -0.448**
(0.202) (0.207) (0.206) (0.378) (0.192)
Community Health Center -0.413 -0.193 -0.175 0.164 -0.193
(0.377) (0.427) (0.423) (0.463) (0.228)
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Patient treatment price of short-term illness (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS IV (2SLS) IV (GMM) IV (BE) IV (GLS)
Sub-Center -0.0428 0.282 0.330 0.382 0.282
(0.312) (0.311) (0.310) (0.441) (0.233)
Family Planning Center -0.181 0.0870 -0.0190 0.0870
(0.247) (0.243) (1.060) (0.618)
Private Hospital -0.0335 0.154 0.179 0.373 0.154
(0.243) (0.237) (0.234) (0.455) (0.212)
Private Clinic -0.255 -0.0732 -0.0558 0.287 -0.0732
(0.227) (0.229) (0.228) (0.434) (0.203)
Private Doctor -0.153 0.135 0.146 0.440 0.135
(0.224) (0.232) (0.231) (0.435) (0.210)
Other -0.197 0.0341 0.0288 0.154 0.0341
(0.222) (0.231) (0.231) (0.419) (0.212)
clinicqualified 0.0242* 0.0380** 0.0365** 0.0343 0.0380***
(0.0142) (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0315) (0.0138)
AYUSH -0.116** -0.133** -0.117** -0.130* -0.133***
(0.0508) (0.0578) (0.0573) (0.0761) (0.0387)
Dual practice 0.454** 0.553*** 0.525*** 0.574* 0.553***
(0.185) (0.186) (0.182) (0.324) (0.146)
Private Dr/Nurse 0.616*** 0.651*** 0.637*** 0.805*** 0.651***
(0.165) (0.164) (0.158) (0.312) (0.110)
Pharmacy 0.0766 0.182 0.167 0.174 0.182
(0.188) (0.196) (0.193) (0.435) (0.154)
Traditional healer -0.121 -0.0301 -0.0647 0.246 -0.0301
(0.390) (0.389) (0.388) (0.465) (0.191)
Another village 0.404*** 0.441*** 0.442*** 0.652*** 0.441***
(0.0700) (0.0789) (0.0787) (0.158) (0.0582)
Other town 0.652*** 0.617*** 0.622*** 0.587*** 0.617***
(0.0939) (0.108) (0.108) (0.194) (0.0721)
District town 0.886*** 0.874*** 0.848*** 0.775** 0.874***
(0.124) (0.134) (0.133) (0.360) (0.109)
includesmed 0.0243 0.0504 0.0356 0.198* 0.0504
(0.0762) (0.0768) (0.0756) (0.114) (0.0455)
nice 0.0504 0.0948 0.0868 0.0615 0.0948*
(0.0594) (0.0670) (0.0667) (0.153) (0.0505)
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
SMhospital 0.126*** 0.130*** 0.149*** 0.276*** 0.130***
(0.0328) (0.0332) (0.0320) (0.0567) (0.0160)
sickdays 0.0598*** 0.0605*** 0.0621*** 0.0804*** 0.0605***
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Patient treatment price of short-term illness (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS IV (2SLS) IV (GMM) IV (BE) IV (GLS)
(0.00573) (0.00571) (0.00563) (0.0117) (0.00362)
fever 0.425*** 0.412*** 0.411*** 0.514** 0.412***
(0.0805) (0.0791) (0.0789) (0.211) (0.0671)
cough 0.0382 0.0209 0.0179 -0.00711 0.0209
(0.0555) (0.0589) (0.0581) (0.131) (0.0466)
diarrhea 0.251*** 0.277*** 0.294*** -0.203 0.277***
(0.0594) (0.0626) (0.0619) (0.209) (0.0566)
female -0.0193 0.00183 0.00206 -0.251 0.00183
(0.0367) (0.0396) (0.0392) (0.159) (0.0430)
age 0.00687** 0.00635* 0.00626* 0.00613 0.00635*
(0.00346) (0.00362) (0.00360) (0.0113) (0.00334)
agesq -5.47e-05 -5.59e-05 -5.94e-05 -8.25e-05 -5.59e-05
(4.99e-05) (5.31e-05) (5.27e-05) (0.000161) (4.73e-05)
morbidity 0.0992 0.159 0.134 0.256 0.159*
(0.0898) (0.0973) (0.0964) (0.327) (0.0839)
disability 0.0154 0.00560 0.0144 0.0274 0.00560
(0.0254) (0.0276) (0.0273) (0.0864) (0.0254)
behaviors 0.0103 0.0123 0.0156 -0.0856 0.0123
(0.0273) (0.0272) (0.0270) (0.0889) (0.0267)
DEMAND DETERMINANTS
piped_HH -0.111 -0.115 -0.116 -0.0880 -0.115**
(0.0716) (0.0762) (0.0760) (0.124) (0.0547)
HHED5F 0.00171 0.00901 0.00895 0.0257 0.00901
(0.00643) (0.00714) (0.00713) (0.0181) (0.00558)
NPERSONS 0.00555 0.00112 0.00380 0.0123 0.00112
(0.00819) (0.00854) (0.00842) (0.0263) (0.00812)
linc 0.0770** 0.0457 0.0327 -0.0191 0.0457*
(0.0297) (0.0331) (0.0324) (0.0648) (0.0246)
betteroﬀ 0.0197 0.0580 0.0545 0.263*** 0.0580*
(0.0355) (0.0426) (0.0425) (0.0890) (0.0304)
insurance_med 0.0287 0.105 0.109 0.0518 0.105
(0.175) (0.191) (0.190) (0.537) (0.173)
HHmigrants 0.0327 0.00673 0.0288 0.423*** 0.00673
(0.0584) (0.0596) (0.0579) (0.164) (0.0502)
rationcard -0.0348 -0.0399 -0.0279 -0.0377 -0.0399
(0.0366) (0.0361) (0.0356) (0.0951) (0.0293)
commgovpercent -0.841 -0.972 -0.996 -1.870 -0.972
(1.593) (1.654) (1.618) (2.018) (1.163)
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Patient treatment price of short-term illness (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS IV (2SLS) IV (GMM) IV (BE) IV (GLS)
Constant 2.416*** 3.457*** 3.352*** 3.567*** 3.457***
(0.563) (0.695) (0.692) (1.064) (0.481)
Observations 4,339 4,339 4,334 4,339 4,339
R-squared 0.257 0.200 0.207
Between estimator village
Random eﬀects state
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.1 presents the results for patient treatment prices of short-term illness, which
are robust to multiple specifications. Column 1 presents the results for ordinary least
squares, using data from 4,339 rural individuals who sought treatment for short-term
illness. Although the information variables are all significant and aligned with the
model’s predictions, the OLS estimates may substantially understate the true coeﬃ-
cient magnitudes due to simultaneity and attenuation bias. As previously discussed,
medconfidence_scale reflects consumer certainty regarding the underlying variance
of observable inputs and other attributes (after controlling for underlying regional
productivity diﬀerences); asymmetric preferences for idiosyncratic quality; and the
eﬀects of reference points, prior beliefs, cognitive biases and Bayesian updating (in-
cluding from education, social networks, previous medical interactions, exposure to
other markets, etc.) on the subjective probability distribution thereof. OLS may
thus attenuate the eﬀects of medconfidence_scale if quality uncertainty is simultane-
ously determined with price due to confirmation bias or the placebo eﬀect. Similarly,
OLS understates the negative correlation with primarycarefacilities predicted by the
increasing monopoly model: high prices attract more providers to profitable markets.
Column 2 reports cluster robust results from two-stage least squares, while column
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3 reports cluster robust results of the two-step feasible eﬃcient GMM estimator.122
The results are consistent in direction, and as expected the coeﬃcients of medcon-
fidence_scale and primarycarefacilities are substantially larger after controlling for
endogeneity.
As a robustness test, Table 5.1 column 4 compares the IV-GMM estimates with the
“between” estimator restricting analysis to variation across 655 villages, which yields
generally similar but less significant coeﬃcients.123 Column 5 adopts a two-stage
least-squares random-eﬀects estimator to account for unobserved state variables; the
coeﬃcients are nearly indistinguishable from column 2 with the notable exception that
primarycarefacilities becomes significant. In all column specifications, the social net-
work variables localmoved, localgenderclinic, and localcooperation are also significant
and align with the predicted eﬀects of consumer information.
While Table 5.1 checks for robustness across multiple estimators, Table A.2 in the
appendix further tests whether the eﬀect is sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of
specific variable components. In each column, I sequentially: 1) estimate the relation-
ship between underlying quality uncertainty and spending, controlling only for income
(across all states and including urban areas); 2) show how the number of primary care
providers further aﬀects prices controlling for only income, geographic market size and
provider category (limited to the nationally representative rural sample, but includ-
ing villages with zero local providers); 3) account for regulatory environment and
122The joint instrument tests reported in Table A.2 validate the results of column 3.
123The attenuated magnitude of medconfidence_scale relative to the other IV specifications is an
unsurprising exception that is not robust to the between estimator, insofar as the variable typically
captures household-level variation within each market. Interestingly, the between estimator yields
the only significant eﬀect from the presence of pharmacies (binpharmacy, which reduces total price)
or the bundling of medicine and tests with provider services (includes med, which increases it),
although the signs are consistent across all specifications; this indirectly suggests that local diﬀerences
in prescription patterns may be one of the mechanisms through which state regulatory environments
aﬀect market composition and ultimately price.
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market composition, including the percentage of providers by type, as well as a bi-
nary indicator for whether a village has at least one pharmacy (restricting the sample
to villages with at least one provider in the 16 largest states); 4) match patients of
surveyed clinics to control for staﬀ training, medical orientation (i.e. AYUSH) and
other facility characteristics (observing only patients who sought care from the most
popular providers); incorporate several indicators of 5) illness severity as well as 6)
other household determinants of demand; and finally 7) assess whether indicators of
social network strength are similarly consistent in the full model of consumer infor-
mation.124 Column 8) then facilitates comparison with the target income hypothesis
by controlling for the number of providers per household as well.125 Taken as a whole,
Table A.2 demonstrates that the signs of medconfidence_scale and primarycarefacil-
ities are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of most variables; even the magnitude
of the coeﬃcients shifts only slightly.126 Indeed, diﬀerences in the magnitude may be
driven by selection bias from the number of truncated observations corresponding to
the respective variable specifications in addition to the confounders themselves.
The preceding results in Table 5.1 are limited to prices paid by consumers who expe-
rienced an episode of short-term morbidity and sought care from any provider. Table
5.2 corrects for possible selection in the incidence of illness and management thereof
in a limited dependent variable model, where column 1 reports the probability that
an individual visited a surveyed medical facility in the past 30 days.127 The result-
ing Inverse Mills Ratio permits a Heckman correction to the two-stage least-squares
124Table A.2, column 7 is identical to Table 5.1, column 3.
125The sensitivity tests in Table A.3 employ the IV-GMM specification for convenience insofar as
a) it is the most eﬃcient so the diﬀerences will be most easily distinguished between columns, and
b) the instrument tests are directly reported in Stata.
126However, the instrument tests presented in Table A.2 does suggest that the exclusion restrictions
may be more sensitive to variable inclusion.
127Probit results in Table 5.2, column 1 reflect observations for all rural individuals surveyed in
the 16 largest states.
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model in column 2, which incorporates facility_category fixed eﬀects alongside state
random eﬀects to closely control for variation in input costs.128 The results in column
2 are thus the most cleanly identified, and remain extremely significant despite the
smaller sample of 4,339 matched patients. The corresponding first stage regressions
are reported in Table A.3 of the appendix. 129
Table 5.2: Selection in treatment price of short-term ill-
ness
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Probit [match] IV (Heckman)
QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
medconfidence_scale -0.0420 -1.240***
(0.0324) (0.254)
PROVIDER SUPPLY
primarycarefacilities 0.00453 0.0668**
(0.00366) (0.0314)
SOCIAL NETWORKS
HHham -0.00210* -0.000373
(0.00123) (0.00415)
localmoved 0.0113 1.147***
(0.189) (0.374)
localgenderclinic -0.121*** 0.261***
(0.0362) (0.0702)
jatifraction 0.120** 0.0336
(0.0582) (0.123)
localcooperation 0.0363 -0.434***
(0.0370) (0.0799)
High caste -0.0158 0.0384
(0.0550) (0.109)
128I cannot include variables from the facility surveys without accounting for selection in both
treatment seeking and sampling methodology. However, I do not distinguish between the diﬀerent
levels of selection in whether a treatment episode can be conclusively mapped to a specific facility
type, which is based on whether an individual falls sick, seeks any treatment, visits the sampled
facilities or seeks more than one source of care.
129Although maternal education HHED5F does exhibit a positive eﬀect on medconfidence_scale,
social learning itself does not seem to have persistent eﬀects on subjective quality expectations. If
anything, localcooperation runs in the opposite direction and reduces confidence. From an informa-
tion perspective, perhaps households are more likely to exchange warnings than recommendations.
Alternatively, localcooperation may be correlated with unobservable eﬀects on local quality itself
(e.g. if caste networks dominate more formal institutions).
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Selection in treatment price of short-term illness (contin-
ued)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Probit [match] IV (Heckman)
OBC -0.0378 0.0475
(0.0521) (0.103)
Dalit -0.0249 -0.0606
(0.0537) (0.103)
Adivasi 0.0411 -0.0935
(0.0634) (0.133)
Muslim -0.0360 0.00459
(0.0612) (0.119)
Sikh/Jain -0.0451 0.384**
(0.0984) (0.162)
Christian -0.0815 0.572**
(0.135) (0.280)
binmednetwork 0.0125 0.124***
(0.0241) (0.0475)
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT & MARKET COMPOSITION
ncaer_index 0.291 0.435**
(0.215) (0.181)
wrong_all_percent 0.00538 -0.0222***
(0.00507) (0.00422)
PHC_qualified_absenteeism -1.823*** 3.040***
(0.375) (0.331)
distpublicvacancy 0.329*** 0.319*
(0.0840) (0.175)
sanitation -0.215*** 0.0288
(0.0523) (0.107)
binpharmacy 0.0230 -0.0645
(0.0236) (0.0517)
privateprimarypercent -0.416***
(0.0984)
GEOGRAPHY
TOTHH -7.61e-06 -0.000168**
(2.29e-05) (8.19e-05)
AREA_inverse 2.688** 3.401
(1.340) (3.915)
HAM 0.00376 -0.0220**
(0.00387) (0.0110)
TOTHH*AREA_inverse 0.0121
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Selection in treatment price of short-term illness (contin-
ued)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Probit [match] IV (Heckman)
(0.00747)
TOTHH*HAM -2.02e-06
(4.65e-06)
AREA_inverse*HAM -1.184
(2.729)
road 0.0260 0.00591
(0.0198) (0.0510)
loghospitaldistance 0.0105 -0.0924***
(0.0155) (0.0343)
INPUT COSTS
staﬀresident 0.0333 -0.0956
(0.0335) (0.0719)
constructionwage -0.000382*** 0.000529***
(8.98e-05) (0.000193)
keroseneprice 0.00126 -0.0217***
(0.00258) (0.00521)
Primary Health Clinic -0.424**
(0.192)
Community Health Center -0.154
(0.226)
Sub-Center 0.302
(0.233)
Family Planning Center 0.178
(0.616)
Private Hospital 0.133
(0.213)
Private Clinic -0.0828
(0.204)
Private Doctor 0.139
(0.210)
Other 0.0360
(0.212)
clinicqualified 0.0379***
(0.0138)
AYUSH -0.140***
(0.0385)
Dual practice -0.208*** 0.723***
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Selection in treatment price of short-term illness (contin-
ued)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Probit [match] IV (Heckman)
(0.0560) (0.148)
Private Dr/Nurse 0.189*** 0.582***
(0.0271) (0.113)
Pharmacy 0.289*** 0.0563
(0.0595) (0.161)
Traditional healer -0.0861 0.0784
(0.0833) (0.190)
Another village -0.223*** 0.565***
(0.0256) (0.0607)
Other town -0.350*** 0.798***
(0.0322) (0.0842)
District town -0.577*** 1.184***
(0.0461) (0.133)
includesmed 0.0550
(0.0454)
nice 0.0660** 0.0627
(0.0257) (0.0513)
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
SMhospital 0.129***
(0.0160)
sickdays 0.0499***
(0.00464)
SMdaysill 0.0262***
(0.00193)
fever 1.974*** -0.902***
(0.0281) (0.348)
cough 0.645*** -0.354***
(0.0270) (0.107)
diarrhea 0.744*** -0.0885
(0.0327) (0.115)
female 0.111*** -0.0652
(0.0216) (0.0468)
age -0.0102*** 0.0119***
(0.00173) (0.00366)
agesq 9.41e-05*** -0.000109**
(2.42e-05) (4.90e-05)
morbidity -0.00684 0.175**
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Selection in treatment price of short-term illness (contin-
ued)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Probit [match] IV (Heckman)
(0.0429) (0.0835)
disability -0.00934 0.0137
(0.0135) (0.0255)
behaviors -0.0157 0.0205
(0.0129) (0.0267)
DEMAND DETERMINANTS
piped_HH -0.0578** -0.0830
(0.0271) (0.0562)
HHED5F -0.00196 0.0101*
(0.00277) (0.00555)
NPERSONS -0.0246*** 0.0141
(0.00390) (0.00891)
linc 0.0337*** 0.0243
(0.0113) (0.0244)
betteroﬀ -0.0168 0.0684**
(0.0151) (0.0302)
insurance_med -0.0666 0.151
(0.0779) (0.172)
HHmigrants 0.0416* -0.0150
(0.0249) (0.0505)
rationcard 0.0359** -0.0579*
(0.0151) (0.0296)
commgovpercent 0.697 -1.296
(0.563) (1.162)
INVERSE MILLS RATIO
lambda -0.961***
(0.251)
Constant -2.606*** 5.860***
(0.316) (0.723)
Constant_2 -3.914***
(0.439)
Observations 87,248 4,339
Random eﬀects state state
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Focusing on Table 5.2 column 2, we see that providers can more than double prices
in markets where consumers lack confidence in the prevailing quality of treatment.
In the context of the sample population, this means that prices drop by an average
of 30.1% for each provider type as the proportion of households in a village with a
great deal of confidence in the medical system moves from the 25th to 75th percentile.
This convincingly validates the increasing monopoly model: that prices rise in direct
proportion to consumer ignorance and decline with consumer knowledge.
Controlling for that underlying uncertainty, primarycarefacilities is significant and
in the expected direction. Each additional rural provider raises market prices by
6.7% as their respective word-of-mouth reputations become noisier. The strength of
social networks also aﬀects search eﬃciency and hence price insofar as localmoved,
localgenderclinic and localcooperation are all consistent with the increasing monopoly
model: for example, moving from the 25th to 75th percentile of localcooperation re-
duces prices by 21.7%. Conversely, the few villages that received new residents within
the past 10 years faced higher prices due to inexperience and social isolation, and lim-
ited gender mobility has a similarly significant eﬀect on prices.130 (Although HHham
and jatifraction are suggestive of the model’s predictions, neither is statistically sig-
nificant after making the Heckman correction in column 2, possibly due to sample
size); however, both are significant predictors of whether a patient seeks care from
a surveyed facility in the first place. Meanwhile, the eﬀects of binmednetwork were
theoretically ambiguous, but the 12.4% premium paid by households with medical
connections confirms that relationship maintenance costs outweigh gains to search
eﬃciency.131
130Rural-urban migration trends mean that over 75% of the villages surveyed had no new residents
arrive within the past decade.
131In addition to the eﬀects of consumer information, several other independent variables are no-
table in their significance. Each percentage increase in the proportion of private primary care
providers located in the village reduces market prices by 0.4% after controlling for the individual
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Table A.4 (see appendix) further tests the target income hypothesis by including
state random eﬀects and correcting for Heckman selection. Probit results in column
1 are used to adjust the IV results for matched patients, which demonstrates that
the results of Table 5.2 are robust to using the geographic density of primary care
providers rather than their absolute number as the central measure of supply. As the
geographic density of rural providers primarycaredensityham increases from the 25th
to 75th percentile, their respective word-of-mouth reputations become substantially
noisier and raise market prices by 20.8%. This fully oﬀsets the decrease in prices
from the corresponding change in provider-population ratio primarycareperHH at a
given residential density HHham.132 The latter’s direct eﬀect on prices as a measure
of social network density also becomes significant in this specification: increasing
population density HHham from the 25th to 75th percentile leads to 15.5% reduction
in prices.
Usual fees reported by providers
The simplest interpretation of price increases is that patients are charged higher rates
for the same mix of inputs k (i.e. an information mark up). However, it is equally
plausible that they are provided additional inputs with negligible health benefits
such as unnecessary or outright counterfeit medications. The previous analysis does
not attempt to distinguish between monopolistic pricing, demand inducement, fraud,
or otherwise deliberately misrepresenting the shadow price of medical care to the
provider’s characteristic. Clinics command an additional 3.8% quality premium for each staﬀ mem-
ber with formal medical training, while practitioners of alternative medicine are 14.0% less expensive
than their purely allopathic counterparts. The highest prices of all are commanded by government
physicians moonlighting in their private practice. Across all provider types, patients pay higher
prices the further they travel for care (indicating that distance signals higher vertical quality and/or
unobservable illness severity).
132Given that the sample contains many villages with a single local provider, I also ran the analysis
for markets with at least three local providers; this had little impact on the findings, recalling
that the actual market size comprises several neighboring villages and/or the nearest town (with a
substantially larger geographic radius for inpatient care).
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Table 5.3: Patient price vs. provider-reported fees for child diarrhea
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS (public) OLS (dual) OLS (private) OLS (pharmacy) OLS (healer) OLS (all)
logusualcost 1.397*** 1.159*** 1.173*** 0.891*** 0.860** 1.167***
(0.117) (0.129) (0.0257) (0.0573) (0.226) (0.0252)
Observations 139 14 767 30 5 955
R-squared 0.324 0.723 0.902 0.903 0.865 0.830
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
consumer. For the purpose of this dissertation, I simply assume that a provider’s
mean price already implicitly incorporates his latent proclivity to induce demand.133
Table 5.3 shows the relationship between the price reported for children suﬀering from
diarrhea and the usual fees for a typical case according to the medical facility survey
(where match=1), which varies significantly by provider type. Government physicians
in particular may have had an incentive to conceal illicit charges (e.g. unoﬃcial price
markups in “free” public facilities), which are systematically understated by 40%
relative to the prices paid by actual patients. Even among private providers, patients
pay a 17% average markup above the facility-reported fee. Figure 5.1 depicts the
disparity between the relative distributions by comparing the kernel density plots for
each price measure over the subset of patients who received diarrhea treatment from
surveyed facilities in the past 30 days.134
Table A.5 (see appendix) tests whether the previous findings from Table 5.1 are ro-
133Das et al. (2015) found that all providers were equally motivated to overprescribe medications.
If overuse is standardized across markets as well as within it, then all variations are in price (at least
of a given provider type). Although increases in unnecessary treatments would slightly change the
interpretation of the underlying incentive mechanisms, it would suggest that these estimates may
actually understate eﬀects on the shadow price of health insofar as unnecessary treatments have no
clinical benefits to oﬀset the iatrogenic risks of side eﬀects and antimicrobial resistance.
134Public clinics were overweighted in the stratified facility sample, so the overall distribution of
logusualcost skews further toward zero before adjusting for market share in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of alternate price measures
bust to logusualcost as an alternate measure of price, with mixed results. Reported
fees in Table A.5 are weighted by the number of visits to each medical facility and
include state random eﬀects. Columns 1 and 2 directly compare price results for
matched cases of childhood diarrhea according to the respective subset of households
and providers. Column 3 draws on the full set of surveyed providers. Column 4 incor-
porates facility_category fixed eﬀects across all provider types (roughly analogous to
patient-reported prices in Table 5.1, column 5), while column 5 restricts the sample
to exclude public clinics.135
In particular, the coeﬃcient of medconfidence_scale changes direction depending on
whether the dependent variable is logSMprice or logusualcost, even over identical spec-
ifications and subpopulations. Indeed, Table A.6 (see appendix) demonstrates that
quality uncertainty itself strongly predicts the diﬀerence between the prices reported
135Results in Table A.5 are robust to correcting for Heckman selection in a household’s choice of a
surveyed provider (not shown).
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by patients versus their providers. This may be an indicator of induced demand; at
a minimum, it indicates systematic reporting bias that explains the apparent incon-
gruity between the two price measures. The results shed light on Figure 5.1 and are
consistent with omitted costs of unnecessary inputs (e.g. treatment that is not clin-
ically indicated) corresponding to the “know do” gap reported elsewhere (Mohanan
et al., 2015). Unfortunately, without detailed data on medical inputs I cannot discern
the extent to which providers are deliberately misrepresenting prices to the surveyor
versus clinical quality to their patients.
Under either interpretation, the validation of the increasing monopoly model ulti-
mately hinges on the relative trustworthiness of households and providers. My own
priors are that providers have a much stronger incentive to misreport their fees; if
anything, previous research suggests that households underestimate expenses due to
recall bias, so the actual discrepancy could be even larger (Das et al., 2012).136 That
said, I cannot conclusively reject the possibility that Table A.6 reflects a confounding
relationship between uncertainty and recall rather than selective misrepresentation
on the part of providers, so the latter interpretation remains speculative.
Patient switching
If the results for patient-reported logSMprice are valid, they should reflect underlying
variation in consumer choice. To that end, I empirically test whether patient switching
is a plausible causal mechanism driving the increasing monopoly model.137 Table 5.4
estimates the impact of consumer information on the probability that households
136To the extent that the respective reporting biases generalize to primary care worldwide, Pauly
and Satterthwaite (1981) may underestimate the true impact of increasing monopolies in the U.S.
by relying on price data from physician surveys.
137Although the model is concerned with dynamic “switching,” the semantics may be misleading in
an empirical cross-sectional analysis. An equivalent term might be the rate of “multi-homing” that
corresponds to the strength of patient-provider matching.
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with multiple episodes of illness sought treatment from diﬀerent providers in the past
30 days. The results are inconclusive, butat least suggestively consistent with the
theoretical predictions.
Table 5.4: Probability of switching
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES IV (Probit) Probit [multi-episode] IV (Heckman) IV (Heckman)
QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
medconfidence_scale -0.249 0.0124 0.0241 0.00624
(0.324) (0.0201) (0.105) (0.107)
PROVIDER SUPPLY
primarycarefacilities 0.0107 0.000282 7.42e-05 -0.00158
(0.0294) (0.00232) (0.00929) (0.00976)
SOCIAL NETWORKS
HHham 0.0115** -0.00100 0.00223 0.00314**
(0.00486) (0.000845) (0.00148) (0.00156)
localmoved -0.517 -0.142 -0.161 -0.195
(0.472) (0.127) (0.151) (0.157)
localgenderclinic 0.0457 -0.0849*** 0.00412 -0.00924
(0.0823) (0.0230) (0.0262) (0.0265)
jatifraction 0.185 -0.0389 0.0846* 0.0983**
(0.140) (0.0356) (0.0444) (0.0464)
localcooperation 0.236** 0.0761*** 0.0706** 0.0405
(0.102) (0.0232) (0.0326) (0.0343)
High caste 0.0586 0.0231 0.0232 0.0537
(0.119) (0.0340) (0.0386) (0.0413)
OBC 0.0358 -0.0268 0.0265 0.0692*
(0.118) (0.0323) (0.0378) (0.0400)
Dalit 0.113 -0.0562* 0.0465 0.0842**
(0.117) (0.0333) (0.0376) (0.0400)
Adivasi 0.171 -0.135*** -0.0181 0.0181
(0.157) (0.0409) (0.0524) (0.0550)
Muslim 0.133 -0.0410 0.0484 0.0951**
(0.133) (0.0379) (0.0425) (0.0448)
Sikh/Jain 0.576*** 0.125** 0.142** 0.192***
(0.185) (0.0591) (0.0620) (0.0670)
Christian 0.564** 0.144 0.213** 0.253**
(0.287) (0.0946) (0.0930) (0.0994)
binmednetwork -0.0396 0.0384** -0.00458 0.00227
(0.0553) (0.0149) (0.0176) (0.0182)
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Probability of switching (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES IV (Probit) Probit [multi-episode] IV (Heckman) IV (Heckman)
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT & MARKET COMPOSITION
ncaer_index 0.197 0.0631 9.90e-05 -0.0809
(0.208) (0.274) (0.0663) (0.0711)
wrong_all_percent -0.00853* 0.00601 -0.00356** -0.00332**
(0.00461) (0.00659) (0.00148) (0.00159)
PHC_qualified_absenteeism 1.273*** 0.956** 0.455*** 0.416***
(0.300) (0.486) (0.107) (0.112)
distpublicvacancy -0.193 0.212*** -0.0881 -0.123*
(0.212) (0.0517) (0.0665) (0.0691)
sanitation 0.0762 0.200*** 0.0769** 0.0945**
(0.115) (0.0329) (0.0381) (0.0393)
binpharmacy -0.0541 0.0691*** -0.00894 -0.000178
(0.0555) (0.0146) (0.0184) (0.0200)
privateprimarypercent -0.0871 0.00614 0.0124
(0.0989) (0.0316) (0.0324)
GEOGRAPHY
TOTHH -3.66e-05 1.15e-05 3.76e-06 2.69e-05
(7.81e-05) (1.57e-05) (2.47e-05) (2.77e-05)
AREA_inverse 7.595 -2.775*** 1.637 2.133
(5.608) (0.834) (1.642) (1.662)
HAM -0.00250 0.00415* 0.000752 -0.000200
(0.0132) (0.00249) (0.00421) (0.00445)
TOTHH*AREA_inverse -0.0374** -0.00990** -0.0128***
(0.0167) (0.00467) (0.00488)
TOTHH*HAM 1.24e-06 5.03e-07 7.01e-10
(4.25e-06) (1.36e-06) (1.42e-06)
AREA_inverse*HAM -6.782* -1.121 -1.103
(3.530) (1.068) (1.089)
road -0.00376 -0.0248** -0.0132 -0.00207
(0.0559) (0.0121) (0.0178) (0.0182)
loghospitaldistance -0.0143 -0.00971 -0.00775 0.00650
(0.0387) (0.00959) (0.0121) (0.0126)
INPUT COSTS
staﬀresident -0.0662 -0.0913*** -0.0493* -0.0400
(0.0843) (0.0208) (0.0270) (0.0286)
constructionwage 2.87e-05 0.000341*** 2.46e-05 4.80e-05
(0.000175) (5.22e-05) (6.00e-05) (6.44e-05)
keroseneprice 0.00294 -0.0124*** -0.000365 -0.00161
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Probability of switching (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES IV (Probit) Probit [multi-episode] IV (Heckman) IV (Heckman)
(0.00580) (0.00164) (0.00190) (0.00202)
Primary Health Clinic -0.249***
(0.0677)
Community Health Center -0.254***
(0.0879)
Sub-Center -0.282***
(0.0788)
Family Planning Center -0.688**
(0.315)
Private Hospital -0.313***
(0.0716)
Private Clinic -0.315***
(0.0648)
Private Doctor -0.323***
(0.0678)
Other -0.231***
(0.0714)
clinicqualified -0.0132**
(0.00541)
AYUSH -0.0202
(0.0134)
Dual practice 0.747*** 0.115*** 0.298*** 0.293***
(0.122) (0.0320) (0.0401) (0.0429)
Private Dr/Nurse -0.123* 0.0890*** -0.0385* -0.0235
(0.0660) (0.0173) (0.0218) (0.0275)
Pharmacy 1.059*** 0.144*** 0.385*** 0.421***
(0.117) (0.0387) (0.0384) (0.0424)
Traditional healer 0.834*** 0.281*** 0.296*** 0.302***
(0.143) (0.0500) (0.0484) (0.0549)
Another village 0.206*** -0.0186 0.0732*** 0.0726***
(0.0611) (0.0158) (0.0196) (0.0204)
Other town 0.384*** 0.0537*** 0.127*** 0.125***
(0.0775) (0.0195) (0.0262) (0.0278)
District town 0.409*** 0.0396 0.161*** 0.188***
(0.104) (0.0260) (0.0349) (0.0387)
includesmed -0.106* -0.0223 -0.0166
(0.0546) (0.0177) (0.0184)
nice -0.117***
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Probability of switching (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES IV (Probit) Probit [multi-episode] IV (Heckman) IV (Heckman)
(0.0155)
SM2opinion -0.186*** -0.0688*** -0.0349
(0.0661) (0.0205) (0.0216)
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
SMhospital 0.0232 0.00900 0.00961
(0.0197) (0.00676) (0.00713)
SM10 -0.00480 -0.00224 -0.00316**
(0.00438) (0.00141) (0.00147)
fever -0.0327 -0.0127 -0.0194
(0.0744) (0.0239) (0.0250)
cough -0.0293 0.00186 -0.00107
(0.0549) (0.0178) (0.0184)
diarrhea 0.0329 0.0116 0.00395
(0.0655) (0.0207) (0.0216)
female -0.0235 -0.00147 -0.00335
(0.0492) (0.0157) (0.0162)
age 0.00598 0.00183 0.00167
(0.00393) (0.00127) (0.00131)
agesq -9.96e-05* -3.26e-05* -3.43e-05*
(5.61e-05) (1.82e-05) (1.87e-05)
morbidity 0.165* 0.0494 0.0602*
(0.100) (0.0324) (0.0334)
disability 0.0136 -0.00197 0.00119
(0.0270) (0.00932) (0.00973)
behaviors 0.0444 0.0187* 0.0211*
(0.0329) (0.0108) (0.0113)
HHbehaviors 0.0822***
(0.00679)
DEMAND DETERMINANTS
piped_HH 0.250*** -0.103*** 0.0477** 0.0534**
(0.0644) (0.0176) (0.0222) (0.0234)
HHED5F 0.0246*** 0.0227*** 0.00766*** 0.00747***
(0.00605) (0.00178) (0.00205) (0.00215)
NPERSONS -0.0103 0.00295 0.00381
(0.00905) (0.00479) (0.00500)
NCHILDREN 0.125***
(0.00387)
NTEENS 0.0609***
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Probability of switching (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES IV (Probit) Probit [multi-episode] IV (Heckman) IV (Heckman)
(0.00602)
NADULTS -0.0167***
(0.00457)
linc -0.0554* -0.00944 -0.0169* -0.0210**
(0.0291) (0.00730) (0.00947) (0.0100)
betteroﬀ -0.0392 -0.00198 -0.0139 -0.0124
(0.0368) (0.00940) (0.0119) (0.0120)
insurance_med 0.376** 0.100** 0.135** 0.137*
(0.185) (0.0461) (0.0603) (0.0718)
HHmigrants -0.139** 0.0112 -0.0665*** -0.0684***
(0.0576) (0.0161) (0.0184) (0.0192)
rationcard -0.0460 -0.0520*** -0.0191 -0.0253**
(0.0354) (0.00956) (0.0119) (0.0124)
commgovpercent -0.0174 0.933*** 0.111 0.378
(1.312) (0.361) (0.419) (0.439)
INVERSE MILLS RATIO
lambda 0.0794 0.107
(0.0764) (0.0811)
Constant -0.373 -0.992*** 0.198 0.537**
(0.555) (0.371) (0.226) (0.236)
Constant_2 -3.232***
(0.364)
Observations 3,579 46,273 3,479 3,190
Random eﬀects state state state
Fixed eﬀects facility type
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column 1 contains the results from a straightforward twostep IV probit analysis
of the 3,579 households with more than one sick member. Those results may not
be a representative, though, so column 2 estimates the probability that a household
appears in that subsample, including state random eﬀects. The corresponding Inverse
Mills Ratio is incorporated into a two-stage least squares regression with state random
eﬀects in column 3. Column 4 then adds facility_category fixed eﬀects corresponding
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to the provider who most recently “acquired” the household.
Focusing on column 4, HHham and localcooperation are significant and in the pre-
dicted direction after controlling for quality uncertainty.138 Maternal educationHHED5F
also increases the probability of visiting more than one provider, which supports its
interpretation as a measure of information as well as demand. However, fewer of the
other information variables retain significance after excluding single-episode house-
holds, including primarycarefacilities. These results may understate the true proba-
bility of visiting multiple providers of the same type and location, though, since only
one clinic is uniquely identified per household.
Adverse selection & provider quality
That providers may sort between markets by type is a feature of the increasing
monopoly model, not a bug, given suﬃciently rich data on patient and provider
characteristics combined with strong instruments for provider density and consumer
confidence. If anything, the results may even understate the true costs of consumer
ignorance and should be regarded as lower bounds on eﬀect size. Although I do
not attempt to estimate the welfare eﬀects of such selection, there is suggestive evi-
dence that consumer uncertainty disproportionately selects for entry by low quality
providers when licensed physicians are relatively scarce, face higher opportunity costs
138It is not entirely surprising that medconfidence_scale loses significance. As previously dis-
cussed, the relationship between generalized confidence and specific trust is not well understood
(Oberholzer-Gee and Calanog, 2007). If high confidence is correlated with high patient satisfaction,
risk averse households may be less motivated to switch in the first place even if they could easily
obtain recommendations for other providers above their reservation price-quality combination, i.e.
they believe that their current provider is further to the right along a given subjective probability
distribution. Unobserved satisfaction with one’s current provider may confound the interpretation
of medconfidence_scale in Table 5.4, since switch does not distinguish between the desire to seek
out alternative providers versus the costs of doing so.
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and so favor markets where there are higher returns to reputation.139 As a result, low
information markets might suﬀer from worse outcomes despite higher prices.
The preceding analyses directly control for potential sorting of patients among providers
based on severity and of providers across markets according to type.140 But is there
such sorting, and if so, what are the implications for price and quality? The model
predicts that rising search costs will lower consumers’ reservation price-quality level.
As previously shown, providers respond by raising equilibrium price. Average quality
should also decline, especially when it is more noisily observed than price. Dranove
and Satterthwaite (1992) consider how providers might alter their package of services
under those conditions to reduce the quality of unobservable inputs such as diagnostic
eﬀort or the level of active pharmaceutical ingredients.141 In the long run, noisy mar-
kets will attract providers with lower latent productivity, and induce lower marginal
ability individuals to pursue medical occupations in the first place.142
A provider’s clinical eﬀectiveness is a function of medical technology, diagnostic ef-
fort, education and latent ability (Goldman and Grossman, 1978). These factors of
production are imperfect substitutes, where education is fixed in the short run and
139Possible selection on quality includes clinical eﬀectiveness, but extends to all dimensions of
vertical quality for which most consumers share ordered preferences.
140In other words, the hedonic quality adjustments in preceding analyses might include diﬀerences
across markets due to information externalities (i.e. spillovers in the form of search costs).
141The primary care market corresponds to the Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992) model of manu-
facturers versus retailers if the allocation of political rents from regulatory capture implicitly select
for quality composition of providers in each state, while prices are set by individual providers subject
to consumer information. This holds true for the latter’s role selling diagnostic services as well as
retailing drugs. It is unclear how much those providers typically know about the quality of specific
pharmaceutical products (e.g. counterfeits, local versus national brands, or improper storage), be-
yond the conditional probability of its clinical indication for a patient’s symptoms. However, Bennett
and Yin (2014) and Björkman Nyqvist et al. (2012) find that incumbent pharmacies improve drug
eﬀectiveness in response to increasing quality competition and transparency in the local market,
implying that they were well aware of prior product deficiencies; I see no reason that other provider
types would not share such knowledge.
142Similarly, high quality doctors may select out of noisy markets because they cannot compete
eﬀectively on reputation.
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ability is stochastically determined. All else equal, medical training should shift a
provider’s health production possibility frontier outward. The increasing monopoly
model suggests that providers may not operate along their frontier (Stigler, 1976),
consistent with the “know-do gap” documented among Indian medical providers (Mo-
hanan et al., 2015). In equilibrium, the frontier itself should shift inward in the
absence of competitive pressure to invest in education. Insofar as there is provider
mobility, untrained rural medical practitioners should disproportionately enter low
information markets. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) predict that cannibalization
by these “discounters” will then further distort the incentives for remaining “experts”
(i.e. licensed physicians). In the extreme case, this can result in a quality death
spiral where the market for health collapses into a lemons market for expensive and
ineﬀective counterfeits (Akerlof, 1970), with disastrous consequences for public health
(Alsan et al., 2015).
Longitudinal data on market entry and exit alongside verifiable measures of input
costs and quality (including practitioner knowledge and clinical eﬀectiveness) would
permit conclusive tests of adverse selection.143 The cross-sectional data is nonetheless
highly suggestive of provider sorting consistent with adverse selection on productive
eﬃciency in the meantime, though.
First I examine a discrete choice model of whether information and expected quality
aﬀect the probability that a household has most recently visited a private provider
in Table 5.5. I test this using a clustered probit analysis (column 1), followed by
an endogenous probit model using Newey’s minimum chi-squared two-step estima-
tor (column 2), as well as a linear regression that incorporates state random eﬀects
(column 3). The results are strongly indicative of a scenario where private providers
143Indeed, the forthcoming IHDS panel wave will partially facilitate such a study by including
changes in provider type and geographic density, along with more details on pharmaceutical patterns.
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receive a greater market share where confidence in medical quality is low, provider
density is high and social networks are fragmented – especially in states where the
average diagnostic accuracy is low.
Table 5.5: Selective entry of private providers
Probability of private treatment Proportion untrained
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Probit IV (probit) IV (GLS) IV (GLS)
QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
medconfidence_scale -0.0537 -1.302*** -0.440*** -0.525***
(0.0790) (0.164) (0.0525) (0.0427)
PROVIDER SUPPLY
primarycarefacilities -0.0126 0.0879*** 0.0316*** 0.00143
(0.00874) (0.0198) (0.00646) (0.00521)
SOCIAL NETWORKS
HHham -0.00328 -0.000292 -0.000334 8.73e-05
(0.00307) (0.00169) (0.000541) (0.000493)
localmoved -0.515 0.0657 -0.00940 -0.170***
(0.424) (0.210) (0.0683) (0.0563)
localgenderclinic -0.138 -0.166*** -0.0557*** 0.0924***
(0.0981) (0.0418) (0.0134) (0.0113)
jatifraction 0.0782 -0.0416 -0.00405 0.0247
(0.200) (0.0827) (0.0263) (0.0230)
localcooperation 0.133 0.0665 0.0245 -0.0395***
(0.141) (0.0487) (0.0155) (0.0130)
High caste 0.240** 0.237*** 0.0786*** 0.00991
(0.116) (0.0725) (0.0234) (0.0200)
OBC 0.0938 0.108 0.0324 0.0254
(0.110) (0.0685) (0.0222) (0.0190)
Dalit 0.0381 0.0539 0.0191 0.0552***
(0.102) (0.0703) (0.0227) (0.0195)
Adivasi -0.162 -0.131 -0.0507* 0.0458*
(0.135) (0.0852) (0.0277) (0.0252)
Muslim 0.171 0.173** 0.0588** 0.0354
(0.129) (0.0806) (0.0257) (0.0217)
Sikh/Jain -0.0752 -0.0426 0.00703 0.174***
(0.164) (0.123) (0.0370) (0.0307)
Christian 0.171 0.217 0.0650 -0.149***
(0.228) (0.143) (0.0467) (0.0398)
binmednetwork 0.00489 0.00948 0.00319 0.0194**
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Selective entry of private providers (continued)
Probability of private treatment Proportion untrained
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Probit IV (probit) IV (GLS) IV (GLS)
(0.0611) (0.0328) (0.0104) (0.00885)
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT & MARKET COMPOSITION
ncaer_index 0.552** 0.785*** 0.243*** -0.0598**
(0.268) (0.103) (0.0337) (0.0284)
wrong_all_percent 0.0601*** 0.0523*** 0.0148*** -0.000509
(0.00680) (0.00313) (0.000946) (0.000873)
PHC_qualified_absenteeism -1.189** -0.593*** -0.131** 1.103***
(0.601) (0.181) (0.0566) (0.0466)
distpublicvacancy -0.0208 -0.000772 0.0241 0.173***
(0.318) (0.107) (0.0336) (0.0290)
sanitation -0.469*** -0.515*** -0.186*** 0.0489***
(0.172) (0.0581) (0.0187) (0.0161)
binpharmacy -0.0291 -0.0623* -0.0172* 0.0323***
(0.0803) (0.0324) (0.0103) (0.00909)
privateprimarypercent 0.689*** 0.403*** 0.145*** 0.264***
(0.0985) (0.0622) (0.0201) (0.0189)
GEOGRAPHY
TOTHH 0.000171*** -3.47e-05 -1.34e-05 -2.19e-05*
(6.53e-05) (4.43e-05) (1.44e-05) (1.23e-05)
AREA_inverse 0.859 2.750 0.759 0.544
(8.247) (3.109) (0.929) (0.775)
HAM 0.0382** 0.0203*** 0.00587** -0.0119***
(0.0168) (0.00779) (0.00248) (0.00219)
TOTHH*AREA_inverse -0.000982 -0.00110 0.000162 -0.00519***
(0.0101) (0.00500) (0.00150) (0.00126)
TOTHH*HAM -1.59e-05*** -1.33e-05*** -4.11e-06*** 4.21e-06***
(5.03e-06) (2.82e-06) (9.31e-07) (7.66e-07)
AREA_inverse*HAM -7.382* -8.507*** -2.535*** -1.995***
(4.239) (1.844) (0.571) (0.488)
road 0.0652 0.0217 0.00791 -0.0630***
(0.0654) (0.0332) (0.0106) (0.00942)
loghospitaldistance 0.0119 -0.00463 3.85e-05 0.0369***
(0.0501) (0.0220) (0.00702) (0.00596)
INPUT COSTS
staﬀresident 0.0901 0.0215 0.0161 0.0431***
(0.107) (0.0438) (0.0140) (0.0122)
constructionwage -7.80e-06 4.71e-05 1.71e-05 -4.95e-05*
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Selective entry of private providers (continued)
Probability of private treatment Proportion untrained
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Probit IV (probit) IV (GLS) IV (GLS)
(0.000202) (0.000104) (3.38e-05) (2.95e-05)
keroseneprice -0.00146 -0.0133*** -0.00442*** -0.00111
(0.00840) (0.00333) (0.00105) (0.000906)
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
HHillness 0.115*** 0.123*** 0.0391*** -0.00956**
(0.0192) (0.0164) (0.00507) (0.00429)
HHmorbiditybin 0.181*** 0.176*** 0.0573*** 0.0217**
(0.0401) (0.0328) (0.0104) (0.00879)
HHdisabilitybin -0.136** -0.105** -0.0300* 0.00491
(0.0574) (0.0490) (0.0158) (0.0134)
HHbehaviors -0.0695*** -0.0570*** -0.0174*** -0.0118**
(0.0257) (0.0173) (0.00549) (0.00466)
DEMAND DETERMINANTS
piped_HH 0.0537 0.0187 0.00473 -0.0835***
(0.0549) (0.0337) (0.0111) (0.00949)
HHED5F -0.0122** -0.00766** -0.00238** -0.00375***
(0.00477) (0.00358) (0.00115) (0.000980)
NPERSONS 0.00935 0.00658 0.00142 0.00230
(0.00702) (0.00607) (0.00192) (0.00163)
linc 0.0595*** 0.0402*** 0.0127*** -0.00896**
(0.0153) (0.0139) (0.00452) (0.00385)
betteroﬀ 0.0220 0.0535*** 0.0184*** 0.000905
(0.0265) (0.0206) (0.00657) (0.00562)
insurance_med -0.0766 -0.0733 -0.0196 -0.0848***
(0.115) (0.0990) (0.0325) (0.0277)
HHmigrants -0.0109 -0.00635 -0.00355 0.00137
(0.0382) (0.0335) (0.0107) (0.00913)
rationcard 0.00822 -0.00417 -0.00140 -0.0119**
(0.0247) (0.0201) (0.00636) (0.00540)
commgovpercent -0.475 -0.480 -0.222 0.467**
(1.548) (0.701) (0.228) (0.196)
Constant -1.840*** -0.445 0.372*** 0.684***
(0.508) (0.279) (0.0902) (0.0772)
Observations 11,831 11,831 11,831 9,905
Random eﬀects state state
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Moreover, as the share of private providers in a market increases, a greater proportion
of them are untrained. Column 4 presents IV estimates based on the number of
diﬀerent types of facilities reported on the village questionnaire.144 The proportion of
unqualified rural medical providers is significantly higher in markets with low medical
confidence, and is an increasing share of all private providers.145
Taken as a whole, Table 5.5 confirms that low information markets correspond with a
high probability of private treatment, of which an increasing proportion are untrained
RMPs. These findings are consistent with – but not conclusive of – adverse selection
for low quality providers, especially when viewed in combination with the state-level
regulatory environment.
144The total number of providers from the village questionnaire is used to calculate primarycarefa-
cilities; however, most previous analyses rely on either the household or facility survey to identify
the type of treatment provider. The village questionnaire oﬀers an alternate set of facility categories
and the local accessibility of each (e.g. number present, years established, schedule, or distance
to nearest): health sub-center, primary health center, community health center, district hospital,
government maternity center, government communicable disease facility, private clinic – trained doc-
tor, private clinic – untrained doctor, private hospital, private pharmacy, private maternity center,
private dai, and any other government medical facility. Unfortunately, though, these do not map
precisely to facility_category. To focus on supply side selection, Table 5.5 column 4 focuses on
“private clinic – untrained doctor” as a subset of private clinics, after controlling for the latter as
a proportion of all local providers. (By comparison, columns 1-3 examine the source of treatment
identified by households, which is jointly determined by the short term selection among consumers
in addition to the long term shifts in supply.) Similar results may be obtained based on the level
of provider education reported on the medical facility questionnaire; however, that is drawn from
an unrepresentative sample of providers and further subject to reporting bias pertaining to illegal
practices.
145 Although localcooperation is correlated with fewer unqualified providers, Table 5.5 does not
reveal a clear pattern with respect to other social network variables on overall market composition.
This may be due to measurement error (i.e. survey respondents’ level of knowledge about the
qualifications of local providers is endogenous, especially if the latter are deliberately misrepresenting
themselves).
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Figure 5.2: Log outpatient expenditures vs. log short-term morbidity expenses
Utilization patterns
How does consumer information aﬀect overall household outpatient expenditures,
then? Although the sign is theoretically ambiguous, we might reasonably expect out-
patient spending due to short term illness to rise proportionally with treatment prices
given previous evidence that the price elasticity is less than one.146 But the relation-
ship between curative treatment and other outpatient health expenses (preventive
measures, chronic disease management, reproductive and maternal health, etc.) is
unknown and may vary by region. Overall, there is an extremely strong correlation
between logoutpatient and logSMpriceHH (  = 0.4426 and R2 = 0.1974, depicted
in Figure 5.2), which supports the assumption that short-term illnesses are signifi-
cant driver of household outpatient expenditures relative to preventive investments
146See Dardanoni and Wagstaﬀ (1990). When 0  the elasticity of demand for health with respect
to its shadow price < elasticity of medical demand < 1, the quantity of medical care consumed rises
as quality of care declines (i.e. more care is required to achieve the same level of health).
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or chronic disease management.147
Even for short-term morbidity costs, though, there are several reasons to think that
information and quality uncertainty might aﬀect overall demand for medical care
beyond just price. In particular, the probability of short-term illness ↵t may not
be exogenous as originally assumed. There have been several studies linking social
fragmentation to poor health outcomes; similarly, ineﬀective providers may fail to
prevent illness as well as require more visits to cure it. In the event of persistent
productivity diﬀerences, I revisit whether social fragmentation and provider quality
might separately aﬀect household demand in light of the relationship with health
outcomes (see equation 1.
Each household i in market g demands quantity of medical care Qk during period t:
Qikgt (pj) = v (pj) = v(↵gt, f(k¯), pj, Yi) = v(↵gt(Dg,  kg, Yi), u
i
j, p
⇤(Dg, Mg, Wkg, Yg))
= z(Dg, Mg, Wkg,  kg, Yi) (5.2)
where ↵g is the underlying risk of illness based on local epidemiology; Dg is social
network density;  k is the quality of providers of type k; Y is a vector of income and
other household determinants of demand; and pj is the price of provider j as a function
of Dg, the number of other providers in the marketMg, the vector of input pricesWkg
and local determinants of demand Y .148 The implication is that although provider
147The constructed measure logSMpriceHH in Figure 5.2 is a log transformation of aggregate
short-term illness treatment by household. For comparison,   = 0.1241 and R2 = 0.0087 for the
relationship between short-term illness expenses and annual inpatient spending. (Meanwhile, the
correlation between annual expenditures for diagnosed sources of major morbidity and monthly
outpatient expenditures has a coeﬃcient of   = 0.1972 with R2 = 0.0293; the equivalent figures for
major morbidity and annual inpatient spending are   = 0.6025 and R2 = 0.1529.)
148In contrast to the pure pricing model, objective clinical eﬀectiveness enters the visit function
directly in the production of health (either as iatrogenic harm in period t or prevention in period
t  1), in addition to consumer perception or utility thereof. Here, I assume that clinical outcomes
are correlated with – although not necessarily constitutive of – other dimensions of idiosyncratic
92
density should only influence utilization via information search, social fragmentation
may directly aﬀect demand through multiple other channels beyond just price.
Table A.7 (see appendix) empirically tests this hypothesis, accounting for state ran-
dom eﬀects: column 1 displays the results of a negative binomial regression for the
total episodes of short-term illness in each household; column 2 shows the eﬀects on
the probability that at least one household member has been diagnosed with a ma-
jor or chronic condition; and column 3 considers the probability of disability based
on an index of activities of daily living. I find that social fragmentation does not
have consistently significant eﬀects on the incidence of short term illness. However,
HHham, localgenderclinic and jatifraction are all correlated with the probability of a
morbidity diagnosis or other physical disability, and suggests that sociodemographic
conditions may be determinants of demand for certain kinds of outpatient medical
care.149
Meanwhile, the regulatory environment and prevailing level of clinical quality in each
state may also directly impact the quantity of medical care demanded. For example,
ineﬀective providers might fail to suﬃciently cure an otherwise short-term ailment
(e.g. fake drugs), cause side eﬀects (e.g. antibiotic-related diarrhea), forgo preventive
interventions (e.g. vaccines), or misdiagnose something more serious (e.g. tuberculo-
sis).150 Whereas the price analyses focused on the relative assessment of alternative
providers with respect to the probability of switching, households may be less likely
to seek treatment for a given episode of illness at all as the assessment uij of their
current provider decreases; conversely, the corresponding increase in uncertainty may
quality  .
149Table A.7 also reveals significant eﬀects of the regulatory environment on health outcomes, as
expected, as well as a negative correlation with the number of facilities.
150In addition to the implications for individual health, there may also be population eﬀects from
antimicrobial resistance. Alsan et al. (2015) recently found evidence that higher out-of-pocket ex-
penditures are correlated with the proportion of bacterial isolates that showed antibiotic resistance.
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have countervailing eﬀects depending on the level of risk aversion. Hence the net
eﬀects of medical confidence on outpatient expenditures are ambiguous.
Table 5.6: Aggregate household outpatient spending
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES IV (GMM) Probit [outpatient] IV (Heckman)
QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
medconfidence_scale -0.493 0.0476 -0.671***
(0.304) (0.0354) (0.157)
PROVIDER SUPPLY
primarycarefacilities 0.0421* -0.000215 0.0436**
(0.0251) (0.00417) (0.0185)
SOCIAL NETWORKS
HHham 0.000314 0.000729 0.000592
(0.00162) (0.00104) (0.00164)
localmoved 0.151 0.136 0.106
(0.278) (0.179) (0.224)
localgenderclinic 0.0276 0.173*** -0.0212
(0.0756) (0.0364) (0.0411)
jatifraction 0.142 0.121* 0.150**
(0.109) (0.0639) (0.0750)
localcooperation -0.00505 -0.185*** 0.0293
(0.0902) (0.0392) (0.0468)
High caste -0.0680 -0.0463 -0.0769
(0.0709) (0.0615) (0.0655)
OBC -0.0334 -0.137** -0.0159
(0.0676) (0.0584) (0.0620)
Dalit -0.0659 -0.0551 -0.0705
(0.0658) (0.0601) (0.0633)
Adivasi -0.226** -0.126* -0.176**
(0.0906) (0.0689) (0.0813)
Muslim -0.0263 -0.0296 -0.0333
(0.0815) (0.0693) (0.0721)
Sikh/Jain 0.156 -0.111 0.219**
(0.136) (0.112) (0.104)
Christian -0.0964 -0.268** -0.0558
(0.107) (0.131) (0.137)
binmednetwork 0.0631 0.138*** 0.0261
(0.0390) (0.0268) (0.0298)
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT & MARKET COMPOSITION
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Aggregate household outpatient spending (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES IV (GMM) Probit [outpatient] IV (Heckman)
ncaer_index 0.340* 0.162 0.345***
(0.177) (0.337) (0.0995)
wrong_all_percent -0.0165*** 0.0102 -0.0238***
(0.00453) (0.00826) (0.00276)
PHC_qualified_absenteeism 2.122*** -0.755 2.580***
(0.404) (0.597) (0.184)
distpublicvacancy 0.131 0.383*** -0.0279
(0.180) (0.0896) (0.100)
sanitation -0.00872 -0.0855 0.0480
(0.0958) (0.0536) (0.0576)
binpharmacy -0.0221 -0.0609** 0.0129
(0.0405) (0.0254) (0.0306)
privateprimarypercent -0.146 -0.123**
(0.0987) (0.0609)
GEOGRAPHY
TOTHH -4.67e-05 8.07e-05*** -7.91e-05*
(5.65e-05) (2.36e-05) (4.04e-05)
AREA_inverse 1.603 -2.535* 1.873
(3.302) (1.514) (2.733)
HAM 0.00161 -0.000764 -0.00306
(0.0108) (0.00421) (0.00702)
TOTHH*AREA_inverse 0.00350 0.00182
(0.00432) (0.00504)
TOTHH*HAM -2.30e-06 -1.31e-06
(2.85e-06) (2.76e-06)
AREA_inverse*HAM -2.170 -2.145
(1.583) (1.603)
road -0.0307 0.0768*** -0.0505
(0.0492) (0.0209) (0.0327)
loghospitaldistance -0.00649 0.00252 -0.0188
(0.0318) (0.0166) (0.0208)
INPUT COSTS
staﬀresident -0.0924 -0.0288 -0.0659
(0.0626) (0.0358) (0.0422)
constructionwage -3.86e-05 0.000205** -3.68e-05
(0.000143) (9.21e-05) (9.51e-05)
keroseneprice -0.00940* 0.00884*** -0.0155***
(0.00556) (0.00279) (0.00314)
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Aggregate household outpatient spending (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES IV (GMM) Probit [outpatient] IV (Heckman)
Dual practice 0.166** 0.208*** 0.102*
(0.0738) (0.0536) (0.0611)
Private Dr/Nurse 0.236*** 0.125*** 0.175***
(0.0445) (0.0271) (0.0324)
Pharmacy -0.149 -0.0440 -0.122
(0.102) (0.0668) (0.0788)
Traditional healer 0.182 -0.0651 0.176
(0.112) (0.0922) (0.113)
Another village 0.169*** 0.0642** 0.160***
(0.0407) (0.0277) (0.0341)
Other town 0.253*** 0.0677** 0.256***
(0.0502) (0.0324) (0.0377)
District town 0.452*** 0.0181 0.444***
(0.0643) (0.0430) (0.0519)
nice 0.0400 0.0653** 0.00355
(0.0474) (0.0277) (0.0319)
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
HHillness 0.612***
(0.0163)
HHmorbiditybin 0.275***
(0.0269)
HHdisabilitybin 0.0692*
(0.0412)
HHbehaviors -0.0353**
(0.0143)
DEMAND DETERMINANTS
piped_HH -0.0150 -0.114*** 0.0101
(0.0452) (0.0276) (0.0336)
HHED5F 0.00820** 0.00658** 0.00326
(0.00352) (0.00312) (0.00337)
NPERSONS 0.0524*** 0.0393***
(0.00558) (0.00528)
NCHILDREN 0.0246***
(0.00767)
NTEENS 0.00915
(0.0117)
NADULTS 0.0308***
(0.00982)
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Aggregate household outpatient spending (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES IV (GMM) Probit [outpatient] IV (Heckman)
linc 0.0236 -0.0222* 0.0345**
(0.0158) (0.0115) (0.0135)
betteroﬀ -0.0475** -0.0133 -0.0327*
(0.0225) (0.0166) (0.0191)
insurance_med 0.139 -0.0986 0.162*
(0.100) (0.0819) (0.0947)
HHmigrants 0.0621 0.0273 0.0440
(0.0401) (0.0271) (0.0302)
rationcard 0.0237 -0.0365** 0.0282
(0.0223) (0.0162) (0.0184)
commgovpercent -1.385 -0.242 -0.813
(0.934) (0.579) (0.680)
INVERSE MILLS RATIO
lambda -0.605***
(0.0554)
Constant 4.351*** -0.704 5.034***
(0.414) (0.467) (0.280)
Constant_2 -2.851***
(0.385)
Observations 7,414 16,061 7,414
R-squared 0.060
Random eﬀects state state
Underidentification test 18.979
Weak identification test 101.897
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 4.353
Hansen J statistic 3.767
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.6 confirms that the eﬀects of consumer information extend beyond the short-
term treatment prices to overall outpatient expenditures, both on the probability of
utilization and the amount spent. Column 1 reports cluster robust results of the two-
step feasible eﬃcient GMM estimator (analagous to Table 5.1, column 3). Column
2 shows the probability that a household reported any outpatient spending during
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the past 30 days, controlling for episodes of illness and chronic morbidity as well as
state random eﬀects; the resulting Inverse Mills Ratio is incorporated into a two-stage
least-squares model in column 3 to correct for Heckman selection.
Indeed, the latter set of information coeﬃcients in column 3 are surprisingly close to
the equivalent specification for patient-level prices (see Table 5.2, column 2). Each
additional provider increases prices by 4.4%, although consumer uncertainty itself
has a slightly smaller eﬀect on overall outpatient expenditures. After controlling for
the risk of illness and provider preferences, monthly outpatient spending drops by
an average of 16.3% as the proportion of households in a village with a great deal of
confidence in the medical system moves from the 25th to 75th percentile of my overall
sample.
Finally, table A.8 (see appendix) tests whether the increasing monopoly model applies
to inpatient expenditures as well, replicating the specifications from Table 5.6. The
results appear largely consistent with the model, but ultimately (and unsurprisingly)
inconclusive. The eﬀects of primarycarefacilities and the other information search
measures are roughly consistent with the previous analyses, except that medconfi-
dence_scale loses significance in the market for hospitalization.151
151If anything, the eﬀect of primarycarefacilities is larger on inpatient spending relative to out-
patient. Although initially counterintuitive, one speculative interpretation is that the substitution
eﬀects between hospitals and primary care providers are heterogeneous according to patient severity,
underscoring the need for further research on the relationship between inpatient and outpatient care
in the Indian context.
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CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION
This dissertation holistically demonstrates how information networks and search eﬃ-
ciency shape consumer expectations and provider pricing decisions in equilibrium, as
well as the long-run implications for entry and productivity.
In accordance with the increasing monopoly model, I find that regional health ex-
penditure patterns reflect underlying variation in regulatory capacity, social fragmen-
tation and the corresponding supply of primary care providers. While Das et al.
(2015) analyze the choice of eﬀort and treatment by providers facing diﬀerent in-
centives within a given market, here I shed light on how and why the strength of
those incentives – and the corresponding distribution of provider quality – might
vary systematically across rural India.
The preceding analyses show that households bear greater financial risks from illness
in socially fragmented markets: they seek medical care more frequently, receive that
treatment from less trained providers, and pay steeper prices for it.152 These eﬀects
are further exacerbated by an increase in the number of providers, which counter-
intuitively permits higher monopoly prices by decreasing search eﬃciency. Not only
does entry of additional primary care providers raise prices by increasing households’
information search costs, but marginal entrants are disproportionately untrained pri-
vate providers. While rural medical practitioners are consistently preferred over their
licensed government counterparts within a given market, the geographic distribution
thereof is indicative of possible adverse selection on quality across markets that would
152To the extent that the same social networks serve as informal insurance, households may also
be less capable of pooling those risks precisely where they are highest. See Munshi (2014) for a
review of the role of community networks in the development process more generally, especially
as information insurance. However, Gertler et al. (2006) finds little evidence that ethnolinguistic
fragmentation and other measures of social capital play a role in protecting against health shocks.
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further reduce consumer welfare.153
To my knowledge, this is the first work to consider the role of social fragmentation
on private markets for medical care as a corollary to the existing evidence on public
goods provision and underlying health risks. The results suggest that the current
literature on regional variations may overlook an important way that networks aﬀect
treatment prices in the context of quality uncertainty. Indeed, the attention health
economists have devoted to consumer uncertainty has heretofore been more theoretical
than empirical, so the estimated eﬀects of medical confidence comprise another major
contribution of this thesis.
Policy relevance
It is diﬃcult to overstate the IHDS’s potential to inform policy in India. The dataset
is among the first to match household medical spending with provider characteristics
and local sociodemographics, and the central role of consumer information revealed
here upends much of the conventional wisdom about the primary care market. In
fact, 94.9% of rural households already access primary care whenever they fall ill,
suggesting that very few areas are truly underserved; if anything, over-treatment may
be the larger concern given rampant antimicrobial resistance.154 Although the quality
of that care varies widely, proposed hardship bonuses to attract more government
physicians to rural areas may perversely raise the equilibrium price and mitigate
quality competition.
Improving provider quality – and, perhaps more importantly, information – through
153This paper assumes that markets are in equilibrium; if not, though, these persistent productivity
diﬀerences might contribute to further disinvestment in medical education among the most aﬀected
states.
154Assam is extreme outlier, with only 50% of sick individuals receiving treatment. (Notably,
Assam is also the state where public providers have the largest market share.)
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consistent financial and promotional incentives for licensed physicians combined with
training programs for existing unqualified rural medical practitioners might constrain
prices more eﬀectively than further subsidizing inputs or outpatient insurance, which
would be largely captured as producer surplus.155 In general, greater transparency
should reduce consumer uncertainty and mitigate adverse selection. This model could
be applied to analyze related policy initiatives including: quality certification (e.g. fa-
cility accreditation or network empanelment); local performance monitoring or public
reporting (e.g. physician report cards or NGO-facilitated community score cards); or
branded primary health care chains (e.g. social franchises). The market has begun
to respond as well, as evidenced by the subsequent growth of online doctor ratings
websites in urban India to enable consumers to exchange information more widely.
The capacity of state regulatory bodies to guarantee quality assurance is reflected in
the levels of consumer confidence; in turn, weak regulatory environments are further
exacerbated by fragmentation of local markets, insofar as holding providers legally
or financially accountable depends on knowledge of their performance. Currently,
the flow of information remains impeded by religious, caste and gender barriers in
many parts of India, driving up prices and out-of-pocket medical expenditures. The
negative eﬀects of underlying social fragmentation on consumer information may be
greatest for historically disadvantaged groups (e.g. Dalit and Adivasi), but ultimately
reduce welfare for patients of all backgrounds and income levels.
Many of these policy implications are particularly applicable to India and other low-
income countries. However, the findings also have broader significance for health
care systems everywhere insofar as they validate the increasing monopoly model of
physician price formation, extending earlier research by showing that these predictions
155See Pulla (2016) for examples of such programs, including a forthcoming study in West Bengal.
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are not only robust to quality variation but are in fact magnified by it.
Further research
The contributions of this dissertation barely scratch the surface of the IHDS’s poten-
tial for insight on medical markets in India and for reputation goods more generally.
There are several particularly promising ways to extend this line of research. Most
notably, the addition of a recent wave of panel data from 2011-2012 will allow more
current insights on the market, especially in light of large government subsidies for
rural primary care during the intervening years.
An immediate next step is to estimate insurance demand using variance-based risk
premiums, building on Pauly et al. (2009) and predicated on a distributional analysis
of annualized outpatient spending within and between regions (e.g. predicted by
household propensity for illness).156 This could also incorporate recall bias and other
behavioral eﬀects, and should examine diﬀerent utilization patterns in urban versus
rural populations.
Assessing the impact of primary care on future health and income using household
fixed eﬀects is a another high priority. The inclusion of social fragmentation measures
would also confirm whether the eﬀects can be attributed to imperfect information by
ruling out informal insurance as a competing explanation (Kaufmann and Pistaferri,
2009). Both state institutions and social capital have theoretical roles in financial risk
protection, although the evidence for the latter is mixed (Gertler et al., 2006). New
panel data could address this potential endogeneity concern by estimating whether
156Insuring outpatient and pharmaceutical costs would theoretically oﬀer relatively little financial
risk protection in settings characterized by high levels of uncertainty, consistent with both observed
coverage rates and estimated variance-based risk premiums (which are also positively correlated
with governance indicators). In practice, there may be gains from purchasing power to ensure a high
quality network of providers, although that is unlikely to happen in a rural sample where almost all
licensed physicians are already government employees.
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either of these variables are found to mitigate the eﬀects of illness on household
consumption.157
Evaluating the impact of government subsidies on the quantity and quality of providers,
price, incidence of illness, and overall expenditures is another major priority area. Sev-
eral state and national reforms have been implemented between the two panel waves,
which presents an optimal opportunity to observe the eﬀects under an increasing
monopoly model. In particular, this would facilitate a more conclusive examination
of adverse selection on provider quality. It may also be beneficial to measure changes
to infrastructure quality following Powell-Jackson et al. (2013) using village-level fixed
eﬀects model combined with district budgetary data from the National Rural Health
Mission.
It would be worthwhile to extend the analysis beyond short-term morbidity to other
types of care such as inpatient, preventive, reproductive and/or pharmaceutical mar-
kets. The latter would be aided by data from the recent IHDS wave with more specific
treatment details on the use of antibiotics, steroids, analgesics, etc.158 Finally, future
research should test the increasing monopoly model for reputation goods more broadly
by moving into domains entirely separate from medical care. In particular, the pre-
ceding analysis could be easily replicated for education spending (e.g. school fees),
insofar as primary education plausibly meets the criteria for a reputation good in set-
tings characterized by high rates of illiteracy and innumeracy. The IHDS panel has
157Civic memberships as an investment in social capital might be an ideal measure for social capital
investments. Related analysis might explore the relationship between medical utilization and media
exposure.
158This analysis of outpatient care for short-term illness elides several challenges in extending it
to other categories. For example, diagnosis of major morbidity is endogenous with quality of care
whereas symptoms of short-term illness are observable directly by patients, while acute inpatient
demand is generally less elastic. IHDS also only sampled primary care facilities, so it would be harder
to match provider details with other medical categories, and others like vaccines don’t include prices.
Finally, the dataset only includes subjective beliefs about the expected quality of medical providers,
rather than the quality of drugs or other medical technologies themselves.
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equally rich data on educational infrastructure and corresponding household spend-
ing, as well as directly administered learning tests. The empirical results could be
couched in a corresponding political economy model of public service delivery and
regulatory capture, drawing on comparisons between the health and education regu-
latory architecture in terms of their eﬀects on supply and quality, as well as better
understanding the dynamics of intra-community cooperation.
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APPENDIX
Definitions
logSMprice Total price paid for provider fees, diagnostic tests & drugs per individual episode of
short-term morbidity (log scale)
logusualcost Facility-reported fee estimate for consultation & treatment of diarrhea (log scale)
switch Indicator for whether households with multiple episodes of illness sought treatment from
diﬀerent providers in the past 30 days
logoutpatient Overall out-of-pocket household expenditures on outpatient medical care in the past
30 days (log scale)
binoutpatient Binary indicator for whether households have positive outpatient spending in the
past 30 days
medconfidence_scale Household confidence in doctors & hospital administrators to provide good
treatment (hardly any at all, only some, or a great deal) [endogenous, i.e. F ( ) subjective
probability distribution]
primarycarefacilities Number of public & private medical providers located in the village
primarycareperHH Number of public & private medical providers, divided by total households
[endogenous]
primarycaredensityham Number of public & private medical providers located in village, divided
by total hectares / number of hamlets [endogenous]
HHham Total households in village divided by total hectares / number of hamlets
localmoved Proportion of residents who moved to community < 10 years ago
localgenderclinic Index of limited female mobility constructed from the respective proportion of
women who require either permission (1) or a chaperone (2) to visit the local health center
jatifraction Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index of religious/caste networks [proxy for social
network density]
localcooperation Proportion of local households reporting that their jati / community coordinates
to resolve water supply issues (as opposed to each family acting individually)
GROUPS8 Household religious/caste status (Brahmin, high caste, OBC, Dalit, Adivasi, Muslim,
Sikh/Jain, Christian)
binmednetwork Indicator for whether a household’s social network includes any doctors or nurses
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ncaer_index State index of health outcomes & primary care access [1994 panel (H¯t 120, M¯ t 120k ):
short-term morbidity rate; crude birth rate; crude death rate; total fertility rate; infant
mortality rate; child mortality rate; life expectancy at birth; contraceptive prevalence rate;
antenatal care; skilled birth attendance; immunization coverage; % villages with sub-centers;
% villages with pharmacies; % villages with anganwadi nutrition worker]
wrong_all_percent Proportion of medical providers in each state who gave incorrect diagnoses
for all cases in a 2009 medical vignette survey
PHC_qualified_absenteeism Proportion of licensed nurses & physicians employed by public
primary health clinics or community health centers who were absent at the facility survey
visit, aggregated by state
distpublicvacancy Proportion of approved positions in government facilities (all levels / types)
that were oﬃcially vacant according to the facility survey, aggregated by district
sanitation Proportion of households in the community with access to a latrine
binpharmacy Binary indicator for whether a village reportedly contains at least one pharmacy
privateprimarypercent Private clinics as a poportion of all primary care providers in a village
TOTHH Total households in village according to the 2001 census
AREA_inverse Reciprocal transformation of the census village area (in hectares) as a proxy for
geographic density
HAM Number of discrete residential hamlets in each census village
road Index of geographic connectivity & ease of transportation (foot path only, dirt road, paved
road)
loghospitaldistance Kilometers to the district hospital (log scale)
staﬀresident Proportion of local medical staﬀ who reside within the village boundaries
constructionwage Average daily wage rate for male skilled construction workers
keroseneprice Market price for a liter of kerosene
facility_category Medical facility category for surveyed subsample of providers (public hospital,
primary health clinic, community health center, sub-center, family planning center; private
hospital, private clinic, private doctor, other)
clinicqualified Number of staﬀ members at surveyed facilities reporting any formal medical edu-
cation
AYUSH Indicator for whether surveyed facilities practice Ayurvedic, homeopathy, unani or other
(in addition to allopathic, exclusively)
type_HH Most recent household source of primary care (government doctor / nurse; government
doctor / nurse in private; private doctor/nurse; pharmacy; traditional healer)
treat_location_HH Location of provider QC1 relative to household (same village/neighborhood;
another village/neighborhood; other town; district seat)
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type First source of treatment for individual patient (government doctor / nurse; government doctor
/ nurse in private; private doctor/nurse; pharmacy; traditional healer)
treat_location Location of first provider SM13A1 (same village/neighborhood; another village/neighborhood;
other town; district seat)
match Indicator for whether the provider type (SM13A1) and location (SM14A1) for a given patient
matches those of the most recent household visit (QC1 and QC2), and whether that uniquely
identifies a provider in the medical facility sample (IDCLINIC)
includesmeds Indicator for whether tests & drugs were included in doctors fees or paid separately
nice Binary indicator for whether a household was treated nicely at their most recent visit to a
medical provider
SM2opinion Indicator for seeking additional source of care
SMhospital Days hospitalized from short-term morbidity in past 30 days
sickdays Days of lost productivity from short-term morbidity in past 30 days
SMdaysill Days ill during last episode
Fever Indicator for febrile patients
Cough Indicator for cough symptoms
Diarrhea Indicator for diarrhea
female Indicator for patient gender
age Patient age in years
agesq Age squared
morbidity Ever diagnosed with a chronic disease [household indicator HHmorbiditybin]
disability Index of individual’s activities of daily living [household members HHdisability]
behaviors Index of alcohol & tobacco consumption [household total HHbehaviors]
HHillness Total episodes of short-term illness across all household members in past 30 days
piped_HH Binary indicator for whether a household uses piped water as their primary drinking
source
HHED5F Highest education level of female adult household member
NPERSONS Total number of households members [disaggregated byNCHILDREN,NTEENS,
NADULTS]
linc Household income (log scale)
betteroﬀ Indicator of self-reported economic wellbeing compared to 10 years ago (worse=-1, same=0,
better=1)
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insurance_med Indicator for health insurance coverage
HHmigrants Number of non-resident household members
rationcard Indicator for level of subsidized rations available to household (below poverty line,
standard or pensioner)
commgovpercent mean percentage of income attributable to government benefits
ti_healthcomposite State index of perceived corruption in government medical facilities [Trans-
parency International 2005 : direct experience bribing; poor quality of service; use of influence
/ middlemen; perceived department corruption; lack of commitment to reducing corruption;
perceived increase in corruption]
localconfidence Community confidence in institutions (hardly any at all, only some, or a great
deal) [aggregate means: politicians to fulfill promises; police to enforce the law; state govern-
ment to look after the people; village councils to implement public projects; courts to mete
out justice; banks to keep money safe]
commelectricity Proportion of local households with access to electricity
privateschools Number of private primary and secondary schools
A full correlation matrix is available as a separate Excel file.
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
(1) (2)
Matched patients Households
mean mean
VARIABLES (sd) (sd)
PRICE & UTILIZATION
logSMprice 4.617
(1.441)
logoutpatient 3.326
(2.702)
binoutpatient 0.629
(0.483)
QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
medconfidence_scale 0.770 0.778
(0.333) (0.322)
PROVIDER SUPPLY & DENSITY
primarycarefacilities 3.782 3.577
(3.733) (3.542)
SOCIAL NETWORKS
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Descriptive statistics (continued)
(1) (2)
Matched patients Households
mean mean
VARIABLES (sd) (sd)
HHham 5.574 6.176
(10.66) (14.89)
localmoved 0.0227 0.0298
(0.0609) (0.0746)
localgenderclinic 1.147 1.109
(0.372) (0.385)
jatifraction 0.615 0.618
(0.186) (0.188)
localcooperation 0.602 0.593
(0.298) (0.310)
Brahmin 0.0477 0.0457
(0.213) (0.209)
High caste 0.154 0.145
(0.361) (0.352)
OBC 0.340 0.359
(0.474) (0.480)
Dalit 0.270 0.251
(0.444) (0.434)
Adivasi 0.0565 0.0621
(0.231) (0.241)
Muslim 0.0998 0.103
(0.300) (0.303)
Sikh/Jain 0.0263 0.0227
(0.160) (0.149)
Christian 0.00599 0.0114
(0.0772) (0.106)
binmednetwork 0.331 0.295
(0.471) (0.456)
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT & MARKET COMPOSITION
ncaer_index 0.970 1.022
(0.209) (0.227)
wrong_all_percent 16.03 13.22
(10.22) (9.510)
PHC_qualified_absenteeism 0.232 0.235
(0.106) (0.110)
distpublicvacancy 0.214 0.203
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Descriptive statistics (continued)
(1) (2)
Matched patients Households
mean mean
VARIABLES (sd) (sd)
(0.139) (0.137)
sanitation 0.275 0.329
(0.262) (0.307)
binpharmacy 0.551 0.546
(0.497) (0.498)
privateprimarypercent 0.622 0.585
(0.374) (0.382)
GEOGRAPHY
TOTHH 696.4 801.7
(792.3) (950.5)
AREA_inverse 0.00410 0.00366
(0.00995) (0.00843)
HAM 3.369 3.389
(3.240) (3.421)
road 1.714 1.714
(0.518) (0.535)
loghospitaldistance 3.621 3.633
(0.699) (0.695)
INPUT COSTS
staﬀresident 0.586 0.575
(0.327) (0.344)
constructionwage 140.4 147.1
(112.5) (134.5)
keroseneprice 15.61 15.31
(5.374) (5.451)
Public Hospital 0.0157
(0.124)
Primary Health Clinic 0.121
(0.326)
Community Health Center 0.0207
(0.143)
Sub-Center 0.0228
(0.149)
Family Planning Center 0.00115
(0.0339)
Private Hospital 0.0611
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Descriptive statistics (continued)
(1) (2)
Matched patients Households
mean mean
VARIABLES (sd) (sd)
(0.239)
Private Clinic 0.199
(0.399)
Private Doctor 0.510
(0.500)
Other 0.0482
(0.214)
clinicqualified 0.723
(1.939)
AYUSH 0.549
(0.650)
Govt Dr/Nurse 0.202 0.312
(0.401) (0.463)
Dual practice 0.0304 0.0492
(0.172) (0.216)
Private Dr/Nurse 0.716 0.593
(0.451) (0.491)
Pharmacy 0.0353 0.0320
(0.184) (0.176)
Traditional healer 0.0161 0.0138
(0.126) (0.117)
Same village 0.618 0.520
(0.486) (0.500)
Another village 0.231 0.244
(0.422) (0.429)
Other town 0.112 0.160
(0.316) (0.367)
District town 0.0387 0.0759
(0.193) (0.265)
includesmed 0.597
(0.491)
nice 0.693 0.727
(0.461) (0.445)
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
SMhospital 0.147
(1.264)
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Descriptive statistics (continued)
(1) (2)
Matched patients Households
mean mean
VARIABLES (sd) (sd)
sickdays 4.606
(5.830)
fever 0.883
(0.321)
cough 0.706
(0.455)
diarrhea 0.189
(0.392)
female 0.546
(0.498)
age 22.63
(21.23)
agesq 962.9
(1,442)
morbidity 0.0698
(0.255)
disability 0.0966
(0.812)
behaviors 0.291
(0.864)
DEMAND DETERMINANTS
piped_HH 0.289 0.357
(0.453) (0.479)
HHED5F 3.602 3.495
(4.378) (4.389)
NPERSONS 6.059 5.381
(2.874) (2.599)
linc 10.18 10.16
(1.030) (1.113)
betteroﬀ 0.268 0.287
(0.732) (0.716)
insurance_med 0.0143 0.0185
(0.119) (0.135)
HHmigrants 0.157 0.146
(0.420) (0.412)
rationcard 1.479 1.429
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Descriptive statistics (continued)
(1) (2)
Matched patients Households
mean mean
VARIABLES (sd) (sd)
(0.733) (0.726)
commgovpercent 0.0138 0.0143
(0.0195) (0.0205)
Observations 4,339 11,783
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Sensitivity analysis
Table A.2: Variable sensitivity of patient treatment
prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quality Local primary Composition Provider Illness Demand Social Provider
VARIABLES uncertainty care providers & input costs characteristics severity determinants networks ratio
QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
medconfidence_scale -0.968*** -1.009*** -1.574*** -1.378*** -1.334*** -1.375*** -1.090*** -0.941**
(0.192) (0.209) (0.381) (0.391) (0.359) (0.376) (0.413) (0.450)
PROVIDER SUPPLY
primarycarefacilities 0.0541** 0.0344 0.0553 0.0706** 0.0746** 0.0756** 0.136**
(0.0221) (0.0236) (0.0355) (0.0329) (0.0345) (0.0376) (0.0639)
primarycareperHH -49.28
(44.25)
SOCIAL NETWORKS
HHham -0.00200 -0.0107
(0.00385) (0.00846)
localmoved 1.109*** 1.511***
(0.369) (0.543)
localgenderclinic 0.207* 0.301**
(0.111) (0.137)
jatifraction 0.0511 -0.171
(0.212) (0.326)
localcooperation -0.381*** -0.208
(0.130) (0.179)
High caste -0.00292 -0.122
(0.190) (0.177)
OBC 0.0122 -0.150
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Variable sensitivity of patient treatment prices (contin-
ued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quality Local primary Composition Provider Illness Demand Social Provider
VARIABLES uncertainty care providers & input costs characteristics severity determinants networks ratio
(0.181) (0.189)
Dalit -0.106 -0.239
(0.176) (0.173)
Adivasi -0.0670 -0.253
(0.223) (0.229)
Muslim -0.0410 -0.157
(0.210) (0.203)
Sikh/Jain 0.368 0.134
(0.265) (0.294)
Christian 0.301 0.282
(0.519) (0.550)
binmednetwork 0.138** 0.148**
(0.0566) (0.0599)
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT & MARKET COMPOSITION
ncaer_index 0.791** 0.687** 0.784*** 0.757** 0.639** 0.826**
(0.310) (0.310) (0.300) (0.296) (0.294) (0.341)
wrong_all_percent -0.00370 -0.00531 -0.0117* -0.0141** -0.0194*** -0.0184**
(0.00617) (0.00684) (0.00640) (0.00671) (0.00712) (0.00815)
PHC_qualified_absenteeism 1.164*** 1.313*** 1.756*** 1.950*** 2.253*** 2.465***
(0.381) (0.438) (0.376) (0.386) (0.419) (0.471)
distpublicvacancy 0.194 0.481* 0.513** 0.528** 0.513** 0.408
(0.309) (0.283) (0.254) (0.252) (0.251) (0.264)
sanitation -0.0418 -0.0544 -0.0721 -0.104 -0.0975 -0.0504
(0.121) (0.131) (0.127) (0.134) (0.137) (0.164)
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Variable sensitivity of patient treatment prices (contin-
ued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quality Local primary Composition Provider Illness Demand Social Provider
VARIABLES uncertainty care providers & input costs characteristics severity determinants networks ratio
binpharmacy -0.0789 -0.118 -0.121* -0.119* -0.0774 -0.119
(0.0694) (0.0764) (0.0701) (0.0695) (0.0743) (0.0753)
privateprimarypercent -0.197* -0.382*** -0.425*** -0.432*** -0.424*** -0.346**
(0.112) (0.136) (0.133) (0.135) (0.140) (0.170)
GEOGRAPHY
TOTHH 1.29e-06 -2.06e-05 -6.04e-05 -9.63e-05 -0.000109 -0.000204** -0.000453**
(5.74e-05) (4.99e-05) (7.39e-05) (6.96e-05) (7.18e-05) (9.81e-05) (0.000226)
AREA_inverse 2.575 4.182 4.376 5.082 5.109 3.795 16.97
(3.177) (5.602) (4.910) (4.367) (4.436) (4.498) (13.68)
HAM -0.0222 -0.0194 -0.0166 -0.0172 -0.0159 -0.0194 -0.0259
(0.0154) (0.0236) (0.0206) (0.0179) (0.0173) (0.0156) (0.0168)
TOTHH*AREA_inverse -0.000798 0.00739 0.00709* 0.00680 0.00858* 0.0134* 0.00977
(0.00313) (0.00583) (0.00418) (0.00434) (0.00453) (0.00703) (0.0103)
TOTHH*HAM -8.27e-06 -7.27e-06 -7.45e-06 -6.77e-06 -7.33e-06 -1.42e-06 3.39e-06
(5.11e-06) (5.93e-06) (5.37e-06) (4.73e-06) (4.54e-06) (4.16e-06) (6.46e-06)
AREA_inverse*HAM -0.183 -2.252 -2.664 -1.754 -1.984 -0.539 5.149
(1.729) (3.249) (3.676) (3.294) (3.296) (3.480) (6.559)
road -0.0129 -0.00462 -0.0360 -0.0156 0.0263 0.0203
(0.0619) (0.0759) (0.0698) (0.0682) (0.0685) (0.0778)
loghospitaldistance 0.0461 -0.0442 -0.0587 -0.0587 -0.0801 -0.123*
(0.0495) (0.0534) (0.0484) (0.0488) (0.0487) (0.0693)
INPUT COSTS
staﬀresident 0.0177 -0.0769 -0.0806 -0.0799 -0.125 -0.233*
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Variable sensitivity of patient treatment prices (contin-
ued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quality Local primary Composition Provider Illness Demand Social Provider
VARIABLES uncertainty care providers & input costs characteristics severity determinants networks ratio
(0.105) (0.115) (0.111) (0.110) (0.111) (0.136)
constructionwage 0.000138 0.000326* 0.000380* 0.000306 0.000307 0.000293
(0.000208) (0.000178) (0.000195) (0.000193) (0.000197) (0.000244)
keroseneprice -0.0208** -0.0199** -0.0218*** -0.0236*** -0.0207** -0.0267***
(0.00823) (0.00859) (0.00826) (0.00833) (0.00810) (0.00934)
Primary Health Clinic -0.602*** -0.473*** -0.461** -0.460** -0.381
(0.196) (0.179) (0.184) (0.206) (0.254)
Community Health Center 0.0913 -0.0473 -0.116 -0.175 -0.220
(0.371) (0.382) (0.403) (0.423) (0.388)
Sub-Center 0.00512 0.306 0.349 0.330 0.255
(0.315) (0.301) (0.303) (0.310) (0.332)
Private Hospital -0.0543 0.0286 0.0559 0.179 0.413
(0.190) (0.193) (0.196) (0.234) (0.318)
Private Clinic -0.184 -0.138 -0.119 -0.0558 0.0694
(0.211) (0.203) (0.209) (0.228) (0.266)
Private Doctor 0.0118 0.0862 0.108 0.146 0.231
(0.201) (0.196) (0.202) (0.231) (0.256)
Other -0.0885 -0.0511 -0.0361 0.0288 0.0277
(0.187) (0.199) (0.204) (0.231) (0.235)
clinicqualified 0.0228 0.0318** 0.0323** 0.0365** 0.0407**
(0.0141) (0.0137) (0.0159) (0.0168) (0.0169)
AYUSH -0.123** -0.117** -0.115** -0.117** -0.113*
(0.0561) (0.0558) (0.0563) (0.0573) (0.0685)
Dual practice 0.521*** 0.470** 0.541*** 0.517*** 0.515*** 0.525*** 0.514***
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Variable sensitivity of patient treatment prices (contin-
ued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quality Local primary Composition Provider Illness Demand Social Provider
VARIABLES uncertainty care providers & input costs characteristics severity determinants networks ratio
(0.143) (0.194) (0.190) (0.178) (0.178) (0.182) (0.193)
Private Dr/Nurse 0.628*** 0.688*** 0.567*** 0.691*** 0.678*** 0.637*** 0.542***
(0.0874) (0.108) (0.165) (0.153) (0.152) (0.158) (0.175)
Pharmacy -0.224** 0.0657 0.0209 0.159 0.152 0.167 0.149
(0.112) (0.145) (0.225) (0.190) (0.192) (0.193) (0.209)
Traditional healer -0.434** -0.253 -0.237 -0.0106 -0.00559 -0.0647 -0.158
(0.170) (0.234) (0.363) (0.387) (0.393) (0.388) (0.411)
Another village 0.488*** 0.518*** 0.536*** 0.480*** 0.468*** 0.442*** 0.459***
(0.0612) (0.0692) (0.0863) (0.0815) (0.0820) (0.0787) (0.0839)
Other town 0.913*** 0.925*** 0.832*** 0.624*** 0.635*** 0.622*** 0.658***
(0.0725) (0.0827) (0.114) (0.109) (0.110) (0.108) (0.113)
District town 1.306*** 1.153*** 1.124*** 0.896*** 0.882*** 0.848*** 0.791***
(0.0889) (0.128) (0.125) (0.125) (0.127) (0.133) (0.141)
includesmed 0.0711 -0.0187 0.0166 0.0187 0.0356 0.00730
(0.0702) (0.0837) (0.0758) (0.0768) (0.0756) (0.0790)
nice 0.0666 0.0535 0.0715 0.0868 0.145*
(0.0721) (0.0670) (0.0676) (0.0667) (0.0785)
SM2opinion 0.486***
(0.101)
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
SMhospital 0.134*** 0.137*** 0.149*** 0.133***
(0.0297) (0.0291) (0.0320) (0.0335)
sickdays 0.0626*** 0.0624*** 0.0621*** 0.0586***
(0.00569) (0.00576) (0.00563) (0.00623)
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Variable sensitivity of patient treatment prices (contin-
ued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quality Local primary Composition Provider Illness Demand Social Provider
VARIABLES uncertainty care providers & input costs characteristics severity determinants networks ratio
fever 0.401*** 0.408*** 0.411*** 0.415***
(0.0828) (0.0821) (0.0789) (0.0798)
cough 0.0302 0.0404 0.0179 0.0395
(0.0571) (0.0565) (0.0581) (0.0590)
diarrhea 0.252*** 0.268*** 0.294*** 0.286***
(0.0648) (0.0652) (0.0619) (0.0639)
female -0.0204 -0.0210 0.00206 -0.00883
(0.0392) (0.0394) (0.0392) (0.0417)
age 0.00718** 0.00703* 0.00626* 0.00566
(0.00351) (0.00363) (0.00360) (0.00383)
agesq -6.84e-05 -5.77e-05 -5.94e-05 -4.75e-05
(5.24e-05) (5.38e-05) (5.27e-05) (5.65e-05)
morbidity 0.121 0.112 0.134 0.157
(0.0889) (0.0921) (0.0964) (0.0982)
disability 0.00637 0.0107 0.0144 0.0132
(0.0269) (0.0275) (0.0273) (0.0280)
behaviors 0.0159 0.0185 0.0156 0.0130
(0.0256) (0.0266) (0.0270) (0.0286)
DEMAND DETERMINANTS
piped_HH -0.114 -0.116 -0.130*
(0.0783) (0.0760) (0.0767)
HHED5F 0.0119* 0.00895 0.00783
(0.00705) (0.00713) (0.00731)
NPERSONS 0.00456 0.00380 0.000776
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Variable sensitivity of patient treatment prices (contin-
ued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quality Local primary Composition Provider Illness Demand Social Provider
VARIABLES uncertainty care providers & input costs characteristics severity determinants networks ratio
(0.00855) (0.00842) (0.00910)
linc 0.0432** 0.0464*** 0.0377* 0.0488* 0.0696** 0.0449 0.0327 0.0479
(0.0187) (0.0156) (0.0207) (0.0287) (0.0279) (0.0315) (0.0324) (0.0336)
betteroﬀ 0.0561 0.0545 0.0475
(0.0418) (0.0425) (0.0440)
insurance_med 0.202 0.109 0.152
(0.191) (0.190) (0.172)
HHmigrants -0.0444 0.0288 0.0157
(0.0604) (0.0579) (0.0601)
rationcard -0.0418 -0.0279 -0.00377
(0.0357) (0.0356) (0.0404)
commgovpercent -1.579 -0.996 -1.449
(1.635) (1.618) (1.817)
Constant 4.962*** 4.220*** 3.879*** 4.363*** 3.148*** 3.439*** 3.352*** 3.467***
(0.245) (0.243) (0.514) (0.570) (0.555) (0.563) (0.692) (0.709)
Observations 22,602 15,095 8,082 4,682 4,585 4,538 4,334 4,334
R-squared -0.035 0.089 0.076 0.077 0.176 0.175 0.207 0.174
Underidentification test 63.83 20.63 23.89 20.21 19.40 19.70 15.03 9.408
Weak identification test 1596 377.6 145.8 71.21 69.18 69.20 52.50 18.79
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 85 4.076 6.968 4.319 4.161 4.284 4.260 2.024
Hansen J statistic 0.0426 5.003 1.886 4.340 3.815 4.752 4.754 1.858
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.3: First stage regressions
(1) (2)
VARIABLES medconfidence primarycarefacilities
EXCLUDED INSTRUMENTS
ti_healthcomposite -0.00389*** -0.00759
(0.000803) (0.00741)
localconfidence 0.0787*** -0.0584
(0.00500) (0.0461)
commelectricity 0.00685 1.945***
(0.0233) (0.215)
privateschools 0.000414 0.135***
(0.00129) (0.0119)
SOCIAL NETWORKS
HHham 6.65e-05 0.0453***
(0.000929) (0.00857)
localmoved 0.150* -3.320***
(0.0841) (0.776)
localgenderclinic -0.0610*** -0.0357
(0.0156) (0.144)
jatifraction 0.0437 0.487*
(0.0293) (0.270)
localcooperation -0.108*** -0.438***
(0.0176) (0.163)
High caste -0.0499** -0.490**
(0.0251) (0.232)
OBC -0.0282 -0.154
(0.0241) (0.222)
Dalit -0.0126 0.197
(0.0242) (0.224)
Adivasi 0.0212 -0.424
(0.0311) (0.287)
Muslim -0.0255 0.420
(0.0281) (0.259)
Sikh/Jain 0.0711* -0.151
(0.0382) (0.353)
Christian -0.0365 0.0651
(0.0660) (0.609)
binmednetwork 0.0311*** 0.0717
(0.0109) (0.101)
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT & MARKET COMPOSITION
ncaer_index 0.0357 -3.602***
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First stage regressions (continued)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES medconfidence primarycarefacilities
(0.0434) (0.401)
wrong_all_percent 0.00104 0.0602***
(0.000893) (0.00824)
PHC_qualified_absenteeism 0.00271 0.938
(0.0803) (0.740)
distpublicvacancy 0.230*** 0.582*
(0.0379) (0.350)
sanitation -0.0417* 0.343
(0.0247) (0.228)
binpharmacy 0.0142 0.567***
(0.0110) (0.102)
privateprimarypercent -0.0537*** 2.453***
(0.0147) (0.136)
GEOGRAPHY
TOTHH 8.23e-06 0.00201***
(1.06e-05) (9.77e-05)
AREA_inverse 2.890*** 5.569
(0.934) (8.615)
HAM 0.000580 0.0826***
(0.00259) (0.0239)
TOTHH*AREA_inverse -0.00219 -0.104***
(0.00159) (0.0146)
TOTHH*HAM -6.41e-07 -4.87e-05***
(1.04e-06) (9.59e-06)
AREA_inverse*HAM -1.162* -11.40*
(0.649) (5.987)
road 0.0260** 0.553***
(0.0105) (0.0969)
loghospitaldistance 0.00629 0.423***
(0.00744) (0.0687)
INPUT COSTS
staﬀresident -0.0156 0.755***
(0.0158) (0.146)
constructionwage -5.62e-06 0.000248
(4.53e-05) (0.000418)
keroseneprice -0.00562*** 0.0298***
(0.00120) (0.0111)
Primary Health Clinic 0.110*** -2.457***
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First stage regressions (continued)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES medconfidence primarycarefacilities
(0.0404) (0.372)
Community Health Center 0.0610 -1.965***
(0.0513) (0.473)
Sub-Center 0.132*** -2.742***
(0.0499) (0.461)
Family Planning Center 0.184 -0.258
(0.145) (1.338)
Private Hospital 0.0615 -1.992***
(0.0481) (0.444)
Private Clinic 0.0387 -2.536***
(0.0447) (0.412)
Private Doctor 0.102** -2.801***
(0.0443) (0.408)
Other 0.0434 -2.819***
(0.0456) (0.420)
clinicqualified 0.00646** -0.191***
(0.00293) (0.0270)
AYUSH 0.00336 0.507***
(0.00799) (0.0737)
Dual practice 0.0235 -0.253
(0.0349) (0.322)
Private Dr/Nurse 0.0506* -0.891***
(0.0259) (0.239)
Pharmacy 0.137*** -1.281***
(0.0363) (0.335)
Traditional healer 0.0427 -0.657
(0.0444) (0.410)
Another village -0.0418*** -0.417***
(0.0136) (0.125)
Other town -0.0920*** 0.0587
(0.0186) (0.172)
District town -0.111*** 0.473*
(0.0301) (0.278)
includesmed 0.0178* -0.165*
(0.0106) (0.0978)
nice 0.0439*** 0.215**
(0.0115) (0.106)
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
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First stage regressions (continued)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES medconfidence primarycarefacilities
SMhospital 0.00409 -0.0234
(0.00376) (0.0347)
sickdays 0.00378*** -0.0377***
(0.00102) (0.00941)
fever 0.378*** -4.408***
(0.0713) (0.658)
cough 0.0949*** -1.190***
(0.0227) (0.209)
diarrhea 0.117*** -1.586***
(0.0234) (0.216)
female 0.0419*** -0.221**
(0.0106) (0.0979)
age -0.00209** 0.0164**
(0.000837) (0.00772)
agesq 1.71e-05 -6.91e-05
(1.15e-05) (0.000106)
morbidity 0.0254 -0.301*
(0.0194) (0.179)
disability -0.0133** -0.0366
(0.00592) (0.0546)
behaviors -0.000902 0.0694
(0.00628) (0.0579)
DEMAND DETERMINANTS
piped_HH 0.00486 0.559***
(0.0123) (0.114)
HHED5F 0.00418*** -0.0361***
(0.00125) (0.0115)
NPERSONS -0.00883*** 0.0427**
(0.00201) (0.0186)
linc -0.0151*** 0.0103
(0.00564) (0.0520)
betteroﬀ 0.0241*** -0.0405
(0.00687) (0.0634)
insurance_med 0.0304 -0.266
(0.0404) (0.373)
HHmigrants -0.0253** -0.448***
(0.0115) (0.106)
rationcard -0.00218 -0.146**
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First stage regressions (continued)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES medconfidence primarycarefacilities
(0.00695) (0.0641)
commgovpercent -0.0878 4.049
(0.275) (2.539)
INVERSE MILLS RATIO
lambda 0.283*** -3.248***
(0.0509) (0.469)
Constant -0.0925 8.907***
(0.166) (1.529)
Observations 4,344 4,344
Random eﬀects state state
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.4: Target income hypothesis test
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Probit [match] IV (Heckman)
QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
medconfidence_scale -0.0454 -0.929***
(0.0324) (0.280)
PROVIDER SUPPLY
primarycareperHH -4.204*** -33.15**
(1.363) (16.04)
primarycaredensityham 0.707*** 9.856***
(0.194) (2.395)
SOCIAL NETWORKS
HHham -0.00456*** -0.0357***
(0.00144) (0.00988)
localmoved -0.0126 0.995***
(0.189) (0.381)
localgenderclinic -0.129*** 0.163**
(0.0363) (0.0789)
jatifraction 0.118** 0.170
(0.0582) (0.143)
localcooperation 0.0384 -0.279***
(0.0371) (0.0981)
High caste -0.0274 -0.154
(0.0551) (0.128)
OBC -0.0458 -0.137
(0.0521) (0.127)
Dalit -0.0333 -0.223*
(0.0537) (0.122)
Adivasi 0.0308 -0.170
(0.0635) (0.151)
Muslim -0.0417 -0.128
(0.0613) (0.134)
Sikh/Jain -0.0379 0.245
(0.0985) (0.187)
Christian -0.0849 0.253
(0.136) (0.307)
binmednetwork 0.0134 0.153***
(0.0241) (0.0503)
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT & MARKET COMPOSITION
ncaer_index 0.280 0.644***
(0.219) (0.199)
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Target income hypothesis test (continued)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Probit [match] IV (Heckman)
wrong_all_percent 0.00564 -0.0134***
(0.00519) (0.00470)
PHC_qualified_absenteeism -1.832*** 2.110***
(0.384) (0.427)
distpublicvacancy 0.359*** 0.703***
(0.0842) (0.196)
sanitation -0.215*** -0.0503
(0.0524) (0.113)
binpharmacy 0.0275 -0.0205
(0.0236) (0.0489)
privateprimarypercent -0.360***
(0.104)
GEOGRAPHY
TOTHH 2.29e-06 -0.000166***
(2.13e-05) (6.24e-05)
AREA_inverse 2.181 16.77***
(1.440) (5.984)
HAM 0.00252 -0.00955
(0.00393) (0.0117)
TOTHH*AREA_inverse 0.0325***
(0.0104)
TOTHH*HAM -1.08e-06
(4.75e-06)
AREA_inverse*HAM -29.57***
(7.888)
road 0.0311 -0.0560
(0.0199) (0.0582)
loghospitaldistance 0.00997 -0.123***
(0.0155) (0.0358)
INPUT COSTS
staﬀresident 0.0261 -0.185**
(0.0336) (0.0787)
constructionwage -0.000389*** 0.000261
(9.01e-05) (0.000217)
keroseneprice 0.000820 -0.0249***
(0.00258) (0.00579)
Primary Health Clinic 0.107
(0.251)
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Target income hypothesis test (continued)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Probit [match] IV (Heckman)
Community Health Center 0.230
(0.264)
Sub-Center 0.725**
(0.286)
Family Planning Center 0.392
(0.657)
Private Hospital 0.775***
(0.274)
Private Clinic 0.614**
(0.283)
Private Doctor 0.766***
(0.283)
Other 0.611**
(0.283)
clinicqualified 0.0648***
(0.0167)
AYUSH -0.0985**
(0.0400)
Dual practice -0.204*** 0.472***
(0.0560) (0.167)
Private Dr/Nurse 0.194*** 0.592***
(0.0271) (0.119)
Pharmacy 0.294*** 0.141
(0.0595) (0.168)
Traditional healer -0.0873 -0.0410
(0.0834) (0.207)
Another village -0.232*** 0.402***
(0.0256) (0.0758)
Other town -0.357*** 0.614***
(0.0323) (0.103)
District town -0.587*** 0.730***
(0.0462) (0.189)
includesmed 0.0620
(0.0513)
nice 0.0719*** 0.232***
(0.0258) (0.0671)
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
SMhospital 0.124***
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Target income hypothesis test (continued)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Probit [match] IV (Heckman)
(0.0168)
sickdays 0.0615***
(0.00578)
SMdaysill 0.0261***
(0.00193)
fever 1.976*** 0.577
(0.0281) (0.552)
cough 0.647*** 0.0894
(0.0270) (0.167)
diarrhea 0.743*** 0.287*
(0.0327) (0.161)
female 0.110*** -0.00661
(0.0216) (0.0518)
age -0.0103*** 0.00578
(0.00173) (0.00422)
agesq 9.50e-05*** -4.87e-05
(2.42e-05) (5.45e-05)
morbidity -0.00838 0.178**
(0.0430) (0.0872)
disability -0.00923 -0.00272
(0.0135) (0.0268)
behaviors -0.0158 0.0174
(0.0129) (0.0279)
DEMAND DETERMINANTS
piped_HH -0.0557** -0.0811
(0.0271) (0.0555)
HHED5F -0.00225 0.00401
(0.00277) (0.00585)
NPERSONS -0.0249*** 0.00126
(0.00390) (0.0101)
linc 0.0350*** 0.0555**
(0.0114) (0.0269)
betteroﬀ -0.0163 0.0418
(0.0151) (0.0322)
insurance_med -0.0666 0.0556
(0.0779) (0.180)
HHmigrants 0.0397 0.0342
(0.0249) (0.0542)
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Target income hypothesis test (continued)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Probit [match] IV (Heckman)
rationcard 0.0376** -0.0366
(0.0151) (0.0330)
commgovpercent 0.688 -1.535
(0.564) (1.218)
INVERSE MILLS RATIO
lambda 0.104
(0.398)
Constant -2.567*** 2.858***
(0.322) (1.105)
Constant_2 -3.858***
(0.433)
Observations 87,248 4,339
Random eﬀects state state
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.5: Providers’ usual fee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS)
VARIABLES patients clinic clinic clinic private clinics
QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
medconfidence_scale -0.620 1.176** 0.631*** 0.941*** -0.0920
(0.431) (0.524) (0.204) (0.161) (0.171)
PROVIDER SUPPLY & DENSITY
primarycarefacilities 0.0270 0.0496 -0.0257 -0.0662*** -0.152***
(0.0545) (0.0629) (0.0232) (0.0194) (0.0178)
SOCIAL NETWORKS
HHham 0.00944 -0.0109 -0.00955*** -0.00554** 0.000510
(0.00600) (0.00713) (0.00297) (0.00241) (0.00278)
localmoved 2.373*** -1.406 -0.286 0.0768 0.832***
(0.824) (0.964) (0.313) (0.247) (0.273)
localgenderclinic 0.201* -0.369** -0.235*** -0.129*** -0.205***
(0.121) (0.143) (0.0570) (0.0448) (0.0475)
jatifraction 0.0963 -0.0228 0.0947 0.0754 0.308***
(0.214) (0.259) (0.102) (0.0807) (0.0849)
localcooperation -0.281* 0.115 -0.0392 -0.146*** -0.510***
(0.157) (0.191) (0.0681) (0.0533) (0.0571)
High caste 0.124 0.317 0.168* 0.0587 -0.0337
(0.208) (0.256) (0.0948) (0.0740) (0.0820)
OBC 0.0161 0.420* 0.0588 -0.0222 -0.00719
(0.197) (0.240) (0.0899) (0.0701) (0.0769)
Dalit -0.0656 0.500** 0.0374 -0.0416 -0.0267
(0.195) (0.238) (0.0905) (0.0707) (0.0776)
Adivasi -0.142 0.760** -0.0558 -0.0371 -0.0240
(0.258) (0.318) (0.117) (0.0913) (0.107)
Muslim -0.107 0.523** 0.0231 0.0638 -0.0156
(0.213) (0.261) (0.103) (0.0806) (0.0868)
Sikh/Jain 0.842* -0.180 -0.403*** -0.364*** -0.259**
(0.474) (0.548) (0.146) (0.114) (0.116)
Christian 0.410 -1.948 -0.423* -0.779*** -1.046***
(0.958) (1.529) (0.225) (0.176) (0.186)
binmednetwork 0.101 -0.131 0.00918 0.0183 0.0237
(0.0933) (0.114) (0.0413) (0.0321) (0.0344)
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT & MARKET COMPOSITION
ncaer_index 0.286 -0.547 -0.529*** -0.745*** -0.932***
(0.328) (0.396) (0.147) (0.118) (0.131)
wrong_all_percent 0.00646 0.0156* 0.00255 -0.00603** -0.0119***
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Providers’ usual fee (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS)
VARIABLES patients clinic clinic clinic private clinics
(0.00645) (0.00813) (0.00352) (0.00278) (0.00282)
PHC_qualified_absenteeism 1.013* -1.047 0.324 0.334* 0.640***
(0.567) (0.678) (0.231) (0.180) (0.191)
distpublicvacancy 0.0467 0.753** 0.628*** 0.633*** 1.271***
(0.326) (0.382) (0.146) (0.116) (0.127)
sanitation 0.0615 -0.362 -0.0965 0.0108 -0.0947
(0.186) (0.226) (0.0824) (0.0646) (0.0688)
binpharmacy -0.0146 -0.0573 0.0875** 0.0587* 0.153***
(0.0935) (0.114) (0.0420) (0.0334) (0.0350)
privateprimarypercent -0.0867 -0.00537 0.235*** 0.173*** 0.189***
(0.161) (0.190) (0.0737) (0.0610) (0.0617)
GEOGRAPHY
TOTHH -0.000276* -1.13e-05 5.39e-05 5.34e-05 0.000380***
(0.000143) (0.000172) (6.27e-05) (5.23e-05) (5.55e-05)
AREA_inverse 3.728 4.718 -0.520 4.401 4.194
(7.763) (8.948) (3.586) (2.796) (2.913)
HAM -0.0154 -0.0419* -0.0315*** -0.0306*** -0.0330***
(0.0193) (0.0234) (0.00964) (0.00748) (0.00827)
TOTHH*AREA_inverse 0.000336 0.0160 0.0197*** 0.0172*** -0.0148***
(0.0116) (0.0141) (0.00637) (0.00509) (0.00529)
TOTHH*HAM 7.25e-06 6.58e-06 3.84e-06 9.06e-06*** 7.04e-06**
(6.25e-06) (7.42e-06) (3.57e-06) (2.80e-06) (3.52e-06)
AREA_inverse*HAM -10.22** 8.082 9.534*** 6.408*** 2.230
(5.121) (5.938) (2.356) (1.840) (2.020)
road 0.0239 -0.221** -0.152*** -0.132*** -0.0226
(0.0918) (0.108) (0.0422) (0.0328) (0.0353)
loghospitaldistance 0.0126 0.0197 0.0285 0.0141 0.0135
(0.0620) (0.0784) (0.0285) (0.0224) (0.0236)
INPUT COSTS
staﬀresident -0.0180 -0.00584 0.254*** 0.173*** 0.373***
(0.146) (0.175) (0.0607) (0.0480) (0.0511)
constructionwage 0.000171 0.000370 -0.000850*** -0.000605*** -0.000363***
(0.000394) (0.000587) (0.000150) (0.000118) (0.000129)
keroseneprice -0.0161 0.000837 -0.00840* 0.000260 0.00667*
(0.00985) (0.0121) (0.00431) (0.00335) (0.00357)
Primary Health Clinic -0.344***
(0.107)
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Providers’ usual fee (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS)
VARIABLES patients clinic clinic clinic private clinics
Community Health Center -0.373***
(0.134)
Sub-Center -0.592***
(0.134)
Family Planning Center -1.114**
(0.464)
Private Hospital 2.702***
(0.117)
Private Clinic 2.686***
(0.106)
Private Doctor 2.748***
(0.110)
Other 1.420***
(0.120)
clinicqualified 0.0521***
(0.00916)
AYUSH -0.159***
(0.0246)
Dual practice 0.359* 0.941*** 1.048*** -0.209*** -0.194**
(0.184) (0.220) (0.0870) (0.0706) (0.0887)
Private Dr/Nurse 0.462*** 1.802*** 1.835*** 0.0240 0.000357
(0.111) (0.136) (0.0489) (0.0473) (0.0624)
Pharmacy -0.364** 1.247*** 1.587*** 0.0517 0.118
(0.172) (0.213) (0.0878) (0.0725) (0.0865)
Traditional healer -0.136 1.730*** 1.390*** -0.144 -0.233**
(0.239) (0.305) (0.125) (0.101) (0.112)
Another village 0.217** 0.108 0.00148 -0.0263 -0.140***
(0.0933) (0.113) (0.0472) (0.0370) (0.0400)
Other town 0.789*** 0.0319 0.0488 0.0662 -0.0347
(0.119) (0.150) (0.0573) (0.0448) (0.0494)
District town 0.958*** 0.162 -0.00323 -0.0377 -0.157**
(0.185) (0.230) (0.0839) (0.0658) (0.0711)
includesmed 0.180** -0.138 -0.164*** -0.175*** -0.0226
(0.0828) (0.100) (0.0386) (0.0302) (0.0327)
gaveORS 0.219*** 0.0300
(0.0769) (0.0925)
SM2opinion 0.550***
133
Providers’ usual fee (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS)
VARIABLES patients clinic clinic clinic private clinics
(0.106)
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
SMhospital 0.249*** 0.0142 0.00982 0.0113 0.00789
(0.0270) (0.0315) (0.0128) (0.00999) (0.0111)
sickdays 0.0411*** 0.000266 0.00664** 0.00352 0.00735***
(0.00614) (0.00733) (0.00314) (0.00246) (0.00261)
fever 0.254** -0.242* -0.00781 0.0247 0.0418
(0.105) (0.126) (0.0576) (0.0450) (0.0479)
cough 0.157 0.148 -0.0696* -0.0537* -0.0702**
(0.102) (0.122) (0.0398) (0.0311) (0.0336)
diarrhea -0.672 -0.0589 -0.0439 -0.0642
(1.343) (0.0489) (0.0381) (0.0407)
female -0.0781 -0.0402 -0.0502 -0.00712 0.0245
(0.0787) (0.0972) (0.0371) (0.0289) (0.0310)
age 0.00161 -0.00337 -0.00166 -0.000325 -0.000202
(0.00582) (0.00720) (0.00290) (0.00226) (0.00244)
agesq 4.94e-05 5.30e-05 3.91e-05 2.80e-05 1.26e-05
(8.40e-05) (0.000105) (4.11e-05) (3.20e-05) (3.50e-05)
morbidity -0.0176 -0.108 0.0264 -0.0644 -0.0334
(0.147) (0.179) (0.0690) (0.0539) (0.0575)
disability -0.128*** 0.0158 -0.00109 0.00829 -0.0254
(0.0485) (0.0619) (0.0213) (0.0166) (0.0186)
behaviors 0.0264 -0.0252 -0.000763 0.00721 0.00355
(0.0430) (0.0522) (0.0230) (0.0180) (0.0194)
DEMAND DETERMINANTS
piped_HH -0.0468 -0.136 -0.0169 -0.0459 -0.0468
(0.112) (0.137) (0.0468) (0.0365) (0.0395)
HHED5F 0.00175 0.0248** 0.0135*** 0.00972*** 0.00289
(0.0101) (0.0125) (0.00459) (0.00360) (0.00387)
NPERSONS 0.00940 0.0119 0.0117* 0.0129** 0.00302
(0.0136) (0.0167) (0.00698) (0.00544) (0.00582)
linc 0.0202 0.144** 0.0201 0.00451 -0.0304*
(0.0429) (0.0565) (0.0200) (0.0156) (0.0167)
betteroﬀ 0.0854* -0.0824 -0.0611** -0.0598*** -0.0539**
(0.0518) (0.0638) (0.0259) (0.0202) (0.0220)
insurance_med -0.372 0.346 0.232 0.137 0.0123
(0.301) (0.396) (0.148) (0.115) (0.120)
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Providers’ usual fee (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS) IV (GLS)
VARIABLES patients clinic clinic clinic private clinics
HHmigrants 0.0312 0.0461 -0.144*** -0.107*** -0.106***
(0.0858) (0.107) (0.0426) (0.0333) (0.0352)
rationcard -0.104* 9.55e-05 -0.00226 -0.0294 -0.0571***
(0.0535) (0.0652) (0.0257) (0.0200) (0.0210)
commgovpercent -0.664 -4.795* -2.015** 0.0184 -0.813
(2.024) (2.452) (0.954) (0.747) (0.886)
Constant 3.972** 0.111 1.757*** 1.439*** 5.232***
(1.563) (0.980) (0.384) (0.307) (0.323)
Observations 1,371 1,229 6,675 6,650 5,092
Random eﬀects state state state state state
Subpopulation diarrhea diarrhea
Fixed eﬀects facility type
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.6: Log diﬀerence between reported fee & patient
price
(1)
VARIABLES GLS
QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
medconfidence_scale -0.375***
(0.135)
PROVIDER TYPE
Primary Health Clinic 0.436
(0.379)
Community Health Center 0.585
(0.453)
Sub-Center 0.472
(0.674)
Family Planning Center 1.357
(0.952)
Private Hospital 0.659*
(0.395)
Private Clinic 0.535
(0.369)
Private Doctor 0.625*
(0.364)
Other 0.765*
(0.413)
DISTANCE
Another village 0.0558
(0.107)
Other town 0.594***
(0.160)
District town 0.516***
(0.182)
Constant 4.542***
(0.391)
Observations 706
Number of STATEID 23
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.7: Incidence of household morbidity
(1) (2) (3)
Short-term illness Major morbidity Disability (ADLs)
VARIABLES Negbin Probit Probit
QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
medconfidence_scale 0.00198 -0.00131 0.0864
(0.0366) (0.0413) (0.0559)
PROVIDER SUPPLY & DENSITY
primarycarefacilities -0.00276 -0.00310 -0.0104*
(0.00397) (0.00449) (0.00599)
SOCIAL NETWORKS
HHham -0.00190* -0.00337*** -0.00430***
(0.00114) (0.00109) (0.00151)
localmoved 0.0467 0.110 0.189
(0.206) (0.209) (0.283)
localgenderclinic -0.0315 0.0401 -0.157***
(0.0403) (0.0447) (0.0605)
jatifraction -0.0865 0.247*** 0.199*
(0.0695) (0.0830) (0.109)
localcooperation 0.0784* 0.0157 -0.0189
(0.0427) (0.0481) (0.0641)
High caste 0.0560 -0.116* 0.116
(0.0636) (0.0687) (0.0939)
OBC 0.0395 -0.0926 0.00819
(0.0604) (0.0650) (0.0907)
Dalit 0.0750 -0.159** 0.0194
(0.0616) (0.0669) (0.0922)
Adivasi -0.118 -0.273*** -0.0480
(0.0788) (0.0857) (0.115)
Muslim -0.0336 -0.159** -0.0692
(0.0701) (0.0773) (0.107)
Sikh/Jain -0.00628 0.0489 0.0920
(0.102) (0.110) (0.142)
Christian -0.0200 0.270** 0.308*
(0.152) (0.132) (0.163)
binmednetwork 0.0362 0.00609 0.0235
(0.0277) (0.0308) (0.0415)
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT & MARKET COMPOSITION
ncaer_index -3.247*** 0.123 0.169
(1.020) (0.357) (0.470)
wrong_all_percent 0.0977* 0.0160* 0.00793
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Incidence of household morbidity (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
Short-term illness Major morbidity Disability (ADLs)
VARIABLES Negbin Probit Probit
(0.0516) (0.00877) (0.0116)
PHC_qualified_absenteeism -14.04*** -2.320*** -2.530***
(1.558) (0.659) (0.875)
distpublicvacancy 0.339*** 0.413*** 0.395***
(0.0920) (0.106) (0.142)
sanitation -0.134** 0.0819 -0.0426
(0.0562) (0.0603) (0.0814)
binpharmacy -0.0488* 0.0313 0.0714*
(0.0273) (0.0310) (0.0413)
privateprimarypercent 0.0205 0.0410 0.141**
(0.0369) (0.0423) (0.0558)
GEOGRAPHY
TOTHH 3.66e-05 7.00e-05*** 0.000106***
(2.46e-05) (2.42e-05) (3.22e-05)
AREA_inverse -4.815*** 3.918** -2.774
(1.490) (1.635) (2.681)
HAM 0.00616 0.0109** -0.00350
(0.00389) (0.00443) (0.00620)
road 0.00495 0.0530* -0.0336
(0.0246) (0.0285) (0.0382)
loghospitaldistance 0.0156 0.00975 0.0196
(0.0186) (0.0208) (0.0279)
INPUT COSTS
staﬀresident -0.207*** 0.00437 -0.126**
(0.0383) (0.0426) (0.0565)
constructionwage -8.16e-05 5.16e-05 4.51e-06
(9.78e-05) (0.000101) (0.000137)
keroseneprice -0.00565* 0.00779** 0.0188***
(0.00304) (0.00330) (0.00458)
Dual practice 0.176*** 0.0746 -0.0202
(0.0592) (0.0633) (0.0834)
Private Dr/Nurse 0.246*** 0.218*** -0.0155
(0.0320) (0.0332) (0.0429)
Pharmacy 0.0314 0.0958 0.0980
(0.0704) (0.0784) (0.104)
Traditional healer 0.248*** 0.0428 0.190
(0.0907) (0.118) (0.147)
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Incidence of household morbidity (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
Short-term illness Major morbidity Disability (ADLs)
VARIABLES Negbin Probit Probit
Another village 0.00811 0.0673** 0.0697
(0.0291) (0.0336) (0.0446)
Other town -0.0279 0.207*** 0.0385
(0.0360) (0.0381) (0.0518)
District town -0.179*** 0.463*** 0.250***
(0.0496) (0.0490) (0.0641)
nice 0.0244 0.0211 -0.0145
(0.0290) (0.0336) (0.0446)
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
HHdisabilitybin 0.220***
(0.0375)
HHbehaviors 0.0817*** 0.0165 0.0550***
(0.0139) (0.0165) (0.0211)
DEMAND DETERMINANTS
piped_HH -0.0469 -0.0239 0.0358
(0.0314) (0.0325) (0.0430)
HHED5F 0.0173*** -0.000458 -0.0210***
(0.00323) (0.00355) (0.00481)
NCHILDREN 0.123*** -0.0544*** -0.0688***
(0.00731) (0.00903) (0.0120)
NTEENS 0.0218* 0.00831 -0.00780
(0.0121) (0.0138) (0.0181)
NADULTS -0.00336 0.136*** 0.166***
(0.00953) (0.0111) (0.0142)
linc -0.0279** -0.0272** -0.0522***
(0.0119) (0.0133) (0.0171)
betteroﬀ -0.0259 -0.0396** -0.139***
(0.0170) (0.0192) (0.0252)
insurance_med 0.0381 0.308*** 0.286**
(0.0880) (0.0909) (0.113)
HHmigrants -0.00117 0.129*** 0.0613
(0.0279) (0.0304) (0.0409)
rationcard -0.00847 0.0766*** 0.00687
(0.0170) (0.0198) (0.0268)
commgovpercent 0.202 0.162 1.225
(0.659) (0.707) (0.966)
Constant 8.209*** -1.481*** -1.469**
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Incidence of household morbidity (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
Short-term illness Major morbidity Disability (ADLs)
VARIABLES Negbin Probit Probit
(1.627) (0.505) (0.664)
Constant_2 1.698*** -2.739*** -2.193***
(0.468) (0.466) (0.445)
Constant_3 -0.674*
(0.347)
Observations 11,807 11,807 11,807
Random eﬀects state state state
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.8: Household inpatient spending
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES IV (GMM) Probit [outpatient] IV (Heckman)
QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
medconfidence_scale -0.262 0.0724* -0.363
(0.556) (0.0379) (0.285)
PROVIDER SUPPLY
primarycarefacilities 0.130** -0.00656 0.158***
(0.0548) (0.00442) (0.0434)
SOCIAL NETWORKS
HHham -0.00149 -0.00169 -0.00196
(0.00638) (0.00111) (0.00343)
localmoved 0.281 0.927*** -0.112
(0.480) (0.186) (0.375)
localgenderclinic -0.209* 0.293*** -0.368***
(0.121) (0.0399) (0.0765)
jatifraction -0.224 -0.0120 -0.323**
(0.219) (0.0690) (0.160)
localcooperation -0.309** 0.209*** -0.459***
(0.124) (0.0422) (0.0838)
High caste -0.213 0.214*** -0.405***
(0.150) (0.0650) (0.134)
OBC -0.278** 0.142** -0.392***
(0.135) (0.0616) (0.127)
Dalit -0.478*** 0.134** -0.543***
(0.137) (0.0637) (0.131)
Adivasi -0.680*** 0.0705 -0.718***
(0.165) (0.0741) (0.163)
Muslim -0.151 -0.0111 -0.179
(0.165) (0.0734) (0.149)
Sikh/Jain 0.0104 0.0719 -0.0377
(0.230) (0.121) (0.235)
Christian -0.120 -0.0992 -0.101
(0.292) (0.138) (0.245)
binmednetwork 0.0351 0.199*** -0.125**
(0.0831) (0.0278) (0.0540)
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT & MARKET COMPOSITION
ncaer_index 1.201*** 0.406 0.742***
(0.314) (0.835) (0.183)
wrong_all_percent 0.0199** -0.00663 0.0110*
(0.00777) (0.0204) (0.00568)
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Household inpatient spending (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES IV (GMM) Probit [outpatient] IV (Heckman)
PHC_qualified_absenteeism 0.817* 0.429 1.008***
(0.436) (1.503) (0.305)
distpublicvacancy -0.196 -0.00239 -0.212
(0.277) (0.0943) (0.182)
sanitation -0.279 0.0828 -0.351***
(0.177) (0.0580) (0.0996)
binpharmacy -0.120 -0.0114 -0.134**
(0.0890) (0.0272) (0.0553)
privateprimarypercent -0.416** -0.447***
(0.175) (0.126)
GEOGRAPHY
TOTHH -0.000280** 4.36e-05* -0.000357***
(0.000114) (2.54e-05) (7.75e-05)
AREA_inverse -6.910 -0.896 -12.47***
(5.004) (1.578) (4.799)
HAM -0.0410** -0.00747 -0.0531***
(0.0176) (0.00460) (0.0139)
TOTHH*AREA_inverse 0.00720 0.0103
(0.0201) (0.0148)
TOTHH*HAM 6.44e-06 1.27e-05**
(8.87e-06) (5.55e-06)
AREA_inverse*HAM 8.459** 12.34***
(4.246) (3.648)
road 0.0973 0.0885*** -0.0311
(0.0848) (0.0227) (0.0661)
loghospitaldistance -0.0292 -0.0368** -0.00425
(0.0543) (0.0176) (0.0360)
INPUT COSTS
staﬀresident -0.293*** 0.106*** -0.332***
(0.107) (0.0385) (0.0757)
constructionwage -7.23e-05 0.000206** -0.000165
(0.000248) (9.30e-05) (0.000158)
keroseneprice -0.0191** -0.0172*** -0.00918*
(0.00841) (0.00303) (0.00538)
Dual practice 0.0632 0.00592 0.0467
(0.111) (0.0555) (0.104)
Private Dr/Nurse 0.250*** 0.0128 0.179***
(0.0769) (0.0292) (0.0549)
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Household inpatient spending (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES IV (GMM) Probit [outpatient] IV (Heckman)
Pharmacy 0.0312 0.0977 -0.118
(0.126) (0.0721) (0.130)
Traditional healer 0.0667 -0.145 0.242
(0.178) (0.102) (0.207)
Another village 0.143* 0.0487 0.0573
(0.0758) (0.0299) (0.0601)
Other town 0.252*** 0.171*** 0.0691
(0.0726) (0.0341) (0.0645)
District town 0.302*** 0.310*** -0.0351
(0.0951) (0.0441) (0.0844)
nice 0.0594 -0.0765** 0.0860
(0.0787) (0.0302) (0.0590)
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS
HHillness 0.0864***
(0.0135)
HHmorbiditybin 0.906***
(0.0268)
HHdisabilitybin -0.0335
(0.0407)
HHbehaviors -0.0196
(0.0146)
DEMAND DETERMINANTS
piped_HH 0.0551 -0.0575* 0.0626
(0.0803) (0.0302) (0.0589)
HHED5F 0.0273*** 0.00180 0.0260***
(0.00785) (0.00328) (0.00596)
NPERSONS 0.0612*** 0.0440***
(0.00974) (0.00933)
NCHILDREN 0.0174**
(0.00808)
NTEENS 0.0264**
(0.0123)
NADULTS 0.0258***
(0.00999)
linc 0.0610** -0.0143 0.0691***
(0.0286) (0.0118) (0.0223)
betteroﬀ -0.0332 -0.0169 -0.0164
(0.0366) (0.0174) (0.0340)
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Household inpatient spending (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES IV (GMM) Probit [outpatient] IV (Heckman)
insurance_med 0.235 -0.0490 0.178
(0.178) (0.0840) (0.157)
HHmigrants 0.0549 0.0490* 0.00752
(0.0575) (0.0282) (0.0517)
rationcard 0.102*** -0.0410** 0.0930***
(0.0383) (0.0172) (0.0324)
commgovpercent 0.968 -3.226*** 2.349*
(2.072) (0.640) (1.222)
INVERSE MILLS RATIO
lambda -1.130***
(0.0809)
Constant 6.363*** -1.703 8.817***
(0.900) (1.113) (0.530)
Constant_2 -0.948***
(0.358)
Observations 3,659 16,061 3,659
R-squared 0.072
Random eﬀects state state
Underidentification test 10.03
Weak identification test 28.29
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 1.929
Hansen J statistic 2.741
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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